People v. Reading, 85.

• Decision Date: 29 December 1943
• Docket Number: No. 85.,85.
• Citation: 307 Mich. 616,12 N.W.2d 482
• Parties: PEOPLE v. READING.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

307 Mich. 616

12 N.W.2d 482

PEOPLE

v.READING.

No. 85.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 29, 1943.

Richard W. Reading was convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Earl C. Pugsley, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Frank G. Schemanske and Guy W. Moore, both of Detroit, for appellant.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and

Thomas A. Kenney and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

NORTH, Justice.

On trial by jury in the circuit court for the county of Wayne the defendant, Richard W. Reading, formerly mayor of Detroit, was convicted of wilfully and corruptly conspiring with several other defendants named and with other persons ‘to procure the wilful, intentional and corrupt failure, omission and neglect on the part of’ certain public officials named ‘to perform their respective official duties as public officials of said County (of Wayne) and City (of Detroit) respectively in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State relating to lotteries.’ His motion for a new trial was denied, and a sentence committing the defendant to the penitentiary for a term of years was imposed. He has appealed and incident thereto has noted in his brief fourteen grounds or reasons in support of his claim that his conviction should be set aside.

John W. Roxborough, a codefendant, has also appealed, and the opinion of this court disposing of the Roxborough appeal is handed down herewith. 12 N.W.2d 466. The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the prosecution of Reading and his codefendants need not be detailed in this opinion because they sufficiently appear in the opinion in the Roxborough appeal and the reported cases referred to in the Roxborough opinion. Notwithstanding numerous defendants were jointly charged and tried in the circuit court, we herein refer to Richard W. Reading as defendant or appellant, except as otherwise indicated.

The first reason asserted in support of this appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insufficient evidence of conspiracy to obstruct justice on the part of this appellant. Our review of this record conclusively discloses that this ground of appeal is without merit. The record on the appeal of these joint prosecutions consists of four large volumes containing upwards of 2400 pages. Aside from that portion of the People's testimony which was pertinent to the prosecution of defendant Reading; his own testimony on direct and cross-examination occupies over 100 pages of the printed record. It would serve no useful purpose to attempt to review in detail all the testimony in consequence of which a question was fairly presented for the jury as to the guilt or innocence of this appellant; and we note only the following. The record clearly shows that one Boykin was a go-between or contact man between Mayor Reading and others interested in the operation of gambling; and that one Raymond W. Boettcher, a member of the police department, also served this appellant in that capacity. Boettcher, as a witness in behalf of the prosecution, testified that in the latter part of 1938 he received from one Everett I. Watson $4,000 and that Watson said, ‘two thousand was for the mayor (Reading), eighteen hundred for Frahm and two hundred for myself.’ And the witness further testified: ‘I called the mayor on the telephone * * * and told him I wanted to see him and did see him at the Book-Cadillac Hotel. I didn't pay much attention the first couple of months; after I had been going to the Book for a while, I remember the (room) number was 2815. I continued to go to 2815 until August, 1939, and I never went to that room to see anybody other than Richard W. Reading. I saw him on this first occasion after Watson had given me this two thousand for him after the telephone call and I just gave him the envelope with the money in it in this room in the Book-Cadillac Hotel. He made no comment outside of passing the time of day * * *. This was in October or December, I should say, of 1938, but I had contacted him in October as well as November. In December, 1938, I gave him three thousand dollars more; in January, 1939, I gave him eight thousand dollars; in February, I contacted him at the same place, 2815 Book-Cadillac. I would arrange to meet him by contacting him on the telephone at which time, I would arrange for a specific time, and then meet him at that time.’

The foregoing testimony and much of tht other testimony offered by the People which tended to incriminate Reading, was directly contradicted by Reading. For example, concerning the witness Boettcher, Reading testified: ‘I met him on one or two occasions at functions of the police department * * * I hardly knew him. He never came to my room at 2815 Book-Cadillac Hotel at any time, and I never received any money from him for any purpose, definitely, * * * not a cent.’

The record contains much other testimony, which we refrain from quoting, which either directly or by fair inference supported the prosecution's contention that this appellant was guilty of the charge of which he was convicted. It cannot be said that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by the proof or that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty in behalf of Reading.

Another ground of error alleged by appellant is the court's refusal to admit into evidence the context of certain communications which appellant received from the commissioner of police of Detroit. The court's ruling on the admissibility of these exhibits came up incident to the direct examination of Reading who was a witness in his own behalf. In the main the purpose for which exhibits of this character were offered is indicated by the following statement of appellant's counsel:

‘I submit, your Honor please, it goes to the fact that showing what was in the intent of the mind of the mayor in making his approval of certain advancements in ranks of police officers and further, it is in reply to the accusations by the prosecution that certain things were done in the police department * * * with the knowledge of the mayor. I conclude, your Honor please, that the communications here definitely show otherwise * * *.

‘We want to show that the Commissioner of Police had recommended Boettcher for advancement and it was at the same time that the witness Boettcher had testified he started to pay money to the Mayor of the City of Detroit, and shows whether or not there is any motive behind the testimony of Boettcher, coming in here to testify.’

The foregoing refers to a letter identified as exhibit 140; and notwithstanding the court ruled against the contents of the letter being admissible, Reading was permitted to testify as follows relative to the letter: ‘Exhibit No. 140 was a letter I received from Commissioner Pickert in December, 1938, and after that letter was submitted to me I crossed off certain names (of police officers proposed for promotion), and I returned the letter back to the commissioner, and it was sent back to me again together with a revised list. * * * I remember very distinctly of Mr. Boettcher's name appearing on that particular list at that particular time, and I crossed it off, and sent it back to the Commissioner.’

Because of the foregoing and other testimony which clearly revealed the purport of the excluded exhibits, the ruling of the trial court was not erroneous.

Appellant urges error (1) because of alleged prejudicial remarks made to his counsel by the trial judge and also (2) because of alleged prejudicial remarks of the prosecuting attorney. The first of these two claims of error may well be considered in connection with defendant's fifth reason assigned in support of his appeal, which is that the trial court ‘erred in admitting in evidence a collateral criminal indictment in the United States District Court, wherein this appellant was a defendant, and in permitting the Prosecuting Attorney to read to the jury the counts of the indictment.’

As to the asserted error last above quoted the record discloses that appellant in his direct examination testified relative to his having been convicted of a criminal charge in the federal court. We quote from this testimony: ‘I was indicted by the Federal Court after I became Mayor, * * * about one and one-half years ago, I think. * * * I was charged with making a false statement in connection with the bank settlement, with the Receivers of the First National Bank. At the time the settlement was being negotiated * * *, and I might say we had been negotiating back and forth on the obligations that I owed, (several thousand dollars). * * * The other part of the charge was that I had money in the bank. I made a statement to the bank on the basis of what they would collect from me if they attempted to collect it. I made a statement which disclosed all the property I had * * *. But I did not include in that some moneys that I had in a safety deposit vault which was held in a joint box that either my wife or I could take the money out * * *. After I was confronted with that particular charge, I had attorneys who represented me in court and as soon as it was brought to my attention that I should have reported that money, I said, ‘If that is what I should have done, I am certainly guilty of it.’ I was fined $10,500 and placed on probation for three years.'

On cross-examination of Reading the prosecuting attorney offered and there was received in evidence the indictment under which defendant was convicted, as he had related in his direct examination. Obviously this was within the proper scope of cross-examination in that it tended to reveal to the jury and to enable the prosecutorto ascertain whether or not plaintiff had made a full, fair and complete statement of the nature of the prosecution wherein he had been convicted on his plea of guilty in the federal...