People v. Redmond, 46128

• Decision Date: 27 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 46128,46128
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Andrew REDMOND, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 321

320 N.E.2d 321

59 Ill.2d 328

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Andrew REDMOND, Appellee.

No. 46128.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 27, 1974.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and Barry Rand Elden, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County defendant, Andrew Redmond, was convicted of aggravated battery, deviate sexual assault, armed robbert and indecent liberties with a child. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for concurrent terms of 4 to 8 years, 6 to 12 years, 10 to 15 years and 12 to 20 years, respectively. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that sufficient evidence of insanity had been introduced at trial to require the State to prove defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt and that the State had not satisfied this burden. (People v. Redmond, 13 Ill.App.3d 604, 300 N.E.2d 786). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal, which challenges the evidentiary evaluation applied by the appellate court. Defendant has broadly attacked our jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal under our present constitution (Ill.Const. (1970), art. VI, sec. 6) and Supreme Court Rules 604(a) and 315(a) (53 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1), (2) and 315(a)), effective November 30, 1972. He also claims that an appeal to this court is prohibited by the double jeopardy clauses of the State (Ill.Const. (1970), art. I, sec. 10) and Federal (U.S.Const. amend. V) constitutions.

On April 7, 1971, about noontime, the 12--year-old victim and his companion boarded a southbound train in downtown Chicago to go to a local museum. Several minutes later the defendant approached and asked the victim for money, and the victim gave him one dollar. Defendant repeated his request to the victim's companion but he did not obtain any money. Thereupon he again asked the victim for money and produced a knife when the victim hesitated. After the victim gave defendant another dollar, defendant forced the victim to perform an act of fellatio. These events were corroborated by the victim's companion, who further testified that defendant did not appear to be drunk or under the influence of drugs.

Officer Ernest Robinson testified that he and his partner were assigned to the mass-transit detail. They were in the adjoining car of the train, and Robinson was able to see several of the events occurring between the victim and defendant. These policemen entered the car, disarmed the defendant and placed him under arrest. In response to the trial court's inquiry Robinson said that defendant did not seem 'quite normal' because he moved slowly, but he later qualified his description and attributed this to defendant's muscular build. Robinson further said that defendant's speech was erratic, but, after defendant had been placed in handcuffs, he was cooperative and seemed lucid and coherent.

Officer James Dvorak, who investigated the occurrence, saw defendant in police headquarters that day and he advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant said that he understood, and in response to Dvorak's inquiry about the incident defendant stated, 'I just lost my mind.'

Defendant testified in his own behalf. When questioned as to any conversation he may have had on the day he was arrested, defendant said, 'Well, the spirits and the voices told me to play with little boys.' He explained that this was the only time he had heard these 'voices' and that he could have been under the influence of drugs. Defendant further testified that after the 'spirits' had spoken he did not recall anything until he was arrested.

During closing argument defense counsel maintained that defendant was not guilty because at the time of the occurrence defendant was insane or in a drugged or intoxicated condition. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, pars. 6--2 and 6--3(b).) These affirmative defenses (par. 6--4) had not been previously disclosed to the State in response to its discovery motion, which was filed about two weeks prior to trial. 50 Ill.2d R. 413(d), effective October 1, 1971.

First, defendant contends that the appellate court decision in this case amounted to a judgment of acquittal because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of his sanity. He urges that section VI of article 6 of the 1970 Constitution thereby prohibits this court's consideration of the appeal. That section provides, in pertinent part:

'Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court * * * except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal.'

In support of this position he primarily relies upon People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97, wherein the State successfully petitioned for leave to appeal from an appellate court decision which had reversed a conviction on the ground that the information did not charge an offense. It is maintained that in Blanchett the State's appeal was permitted because the appellate court decision was not, in effect, an acquittal. Thus, by implication defendant argues that Blanchett prohibits this appeal because the present case involves a judgment of acquittal.

The constitutional provision presently at issue is identical, insofar as pertinent to this appeal, with that set forth in Blanchett. However, we cannot ascribe the broad constitutional interpretation to that opinion as the defendant suggests. Our reading of Blanchett indicates that it was not decided upon constitutional grounds but rather upon the effect of the appellate court decision as applied to Rule 27 then governing appeals by the State. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 110, par. 101.27(4).) We found that the actual basis of the appellate court decision was within the category set forth in that rule, thereby permitting a State appeal. Other decisions which defendant cites were also predicated upon the application of Rule 27. People v. Kurtz, 37 Ill.2d 103, 110, 224 N.E.2d 817 (value of stolen property); People v. Ritchie, 36 Ill.2d 392, 397--398, 222 N.E.2d 479 (multiple convictions); People v. Petropoulos, 34 Ill.2d 179, 181, 214 N.E.2d 765 (speedy trial).

Defendant's argument relating to section 6 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution is without merit. The plain unequivocal language of that provision proscribes appeals in criminal cases from the circuit court where judgments of acquittal have been rendered. This section does not apply to appeals to this court from judgments of the appellate court which might be construed as acquitting a defendant in a criminal matter. People v. Schwartz, Ill., 319 N.E.2d 23.

Section 4(c) of article VI of the 1970 Constitution states that this court 'may provide by rule for appeals from the Appellate Court' as in the instant case. Defendant further contends that Supreme Court Rules 604(a) and 315(a), as amended in 1972 (53 Ill.2d R. 604(a) and 315(a)), did not alter out prior Rule 604(a) (50 Ill.2d R. 604(a)), thereby precluding a State appeal in this matter. As relevant to this appeal the applicable rules provide:

Rule 604(a):

'(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment, the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.

(2) The State may petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315(a).' 53 Ill.2d R. 604(a).

Rule 315:

'(a) Petition for Leave to Appeal; Grounds. A petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court may be filed by any party, including the State, in any case not appealable from the Appellate Court as a matter of right. * * *' 53 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

The underscored portions of these rules reflect the 1972 modifications.

Defendant would appear to argue that the provisions of Rule 604(a)(1) are controlling and that they impose a limited basis upon which the State may appeal. Rule 604(a)(1) is former Rule 27(4), which we construed in People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97. S.H.A., ch. 110A, par. 604, Committee Comments, at p. 154 (1974 Pocket Supp.).

Historically the right of the State to appeal in a criminal matter was statutorily prohibited. (People v. Barber, 348 Ill. 40, 180 N.E. 633.) In 1933 the legislature adopted the requisite statute enabling the State to appeal 'any order or judgment quashing or setting aside an indictment or information.' (Smith-Hurd Rev.Stat.1933, ch. 38, par. 747.) The State's right to appeal was subsequently broadened to include the quashing of an arrest warrant or search warrant and the suppression of evidence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, par. 747.) After adoption of the Judicial Article (Ill.Const. (1870), art. VI, effective January 1, 1964 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963)), Rule 27(4) was adopted (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 110, par. 101.27(4)) and, as previously noted, is presently incorporated within Rule 604(a)(1). It is easily recognized that the right of the State to appeal from an adverse judgment of a lower court has been expanded by statute or more recently by Supreme Court Rule.

The 1972 amendments to Rules 604(a)(2) and 315(a) require an interpretation conformable with the broadening of the State's right to appeal in this instance, and we reject defendant's contrary suggestion that we lack jurisdiction to decide this case. To merely say that no substantive change was intended by these rule modifications would be to adopt the position that the amendments were superfluous and are of no meaning. This construction cannot generally be...