People v. Reed

• Decision Date: 27 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41267,41267
• Citation: 246 N.E.2d 238,42 Ill.2d 169
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Commodore REED, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 238

246 N.E.2d 238

42 Ill.2d 169

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Commodore REED, Jr., Appellant.

No. 41267.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 27, 1969.

William J. Sheridan, Oak Park, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Thomas J. Immel, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, a petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 122--1 Et seq.

On July 15, 1958, Commodore Reed, Jr., was found guilty, in a bench trial, of the unlawful sale and possession of narcotic drugs. This court, on writ of error, reviewed and affirmed the conviction. (People v. Reed, 21 Ill.2d 416, 173 N.E.2d 422, cert. den. 368 U.S. 990, 82 S.Ct. 606, 7 L.Ed.2d 527. Petitioner then sought a writ of Habeas corpus in the United States District Court which, on April 30, 1962, declined to issue the writ. Petitioner took an appeal from that order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (United States ex rel. Reed v. Pate (7th cir.), 314 F.2d 458) which affirmed the District Court after a consideration of the merits of the case, and on March 26, 1963 denied a rehearing.

Reed filed his post-conviction petition on July 13, 1967, more than four years and three months after the conclusion of his Habeas corpus proceedings in the Federal courts, and more than six years and three months after this court had reviewed his conviction.

The threshold question in this case is the application of the statutory limitations for the filing of petitions under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. At the time of Reed's conviction, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows: 'No proceeding under this Act shall be commenced more than five years after rendition of final judgment, or more than three years after the effective date of this act, whichever is later, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.' Ill.Rev.Stat., 1957, ch. 38, par. 826.

In 1963 the statute was amended and renumbered, with the adoption of the revised Code of Criminal Procedure, as section 122--1 Et seq. of chapter 38. The legislature at that time deleted the alternative time limitation of 3 years from the statute which had been in effect since 1949. In 1965 the statute was again modified. At the time of the filing of the petition in this case the statute read as follows: 'No proceeding under this Article shall be commenced more than 20 years after rendition of final judgment, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 38, par. 122--1.

Central to the issue, therefore, is whether this court should apply the 20-year statute in effect when the petition was filed, or the 5-year statute in effect on the date of conviction. Once before a similar question was before us in the case of People v. Lansing, 35 Ill.2d 247, 220 N.E.2d 218. A...