People v. Reed

• Decision Date: 19 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39251,39251
• Citation: 213 N.E.2d 278,33 Ill.2d 535
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Thomas W. REED, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 278

213 N.E.2d 278

33 Ill.2d 535

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Thomas W. REED, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 39251.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 19, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1966.

Mort A. Segall, Champaign, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Bresee, State's Atty., Urbana (Fred G. Leach and William A. Bomp, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendant in error.

HERSHEY, Justice.

Defendant, Thomas W. Reed, was indicted for burglary in the circuit court of Champaign County, and upon his plea of guilty, was sentenced to a term of seven to twenty years in the penitentiary. On this appeal, defendant contends: (1) that section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 under which he was indicted is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, rendering the indictment void; (2) that the indictment is void for the further reason that it did not specify the street address of the building which was allegedly burglarized; (3) that defendant was deprived of competent counsel during the trial court proceedings; and (4) that prior to accepting defendant's plea of guilty, the trial court did not comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 26(3). Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 110, par. 101.26(3).

Section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that 'A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters into, or without authority remains within a building, house trailer, watercraft, aircraft, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft'. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 19-1(a).) The indictment in this case followed the general form of section 19-1(a). Count I alleged that defendant 'on July 16, 1963, at and within the said County of Champaign, and State of Illinois, aforesaid, committed the offense of Burglary, in that he, the said Thomas W. Reed, without authority, knowingly entered a store building of Charles M. Black, doing business as City Television, with intent to commit therein a 'Theft ". Count II of the indictment contained the identical language of count I and also contained the additional allegation that the store was entered with intent to commit a theft 'of the goods, property, and chattels of the said Charles M. Black, doing business as City Television'.

Defendant first argues that the meaning of the terms 'without authority' and 'theft' in section 19-1(a) are so complex and hypertechnical that not even experts in the law can agree as to their meaning, and that a fortiori a man without legal training could certainly not understand their meaning. Defendant further contends that since the statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, an indictment which uses the language of the statute must of necessity also be void.

In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996, the United States Supreme Court stated that, 'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed'. We do not agree with defendant's contention that the words 'without authority' and 'theft' as they appear in section 19-1(a) are so difficult of comprehension that they could not be reasonably understood by a man of ordinary intelligence without further definition. (People ex rel. Armstrong v. Huggins, 407 Ill. 157, 171, 94 N.E.2d 863.) Rather, we think that any person of ordinary intelligence, after reading section 19-1(a), could readily understand what conduct was proscribed by that section. We conclude, therefore, that the statute is constitutional and that the indictment is not void insofar as it employs the language of section 19-1(a).

Defendant next argues that the indictment was fatally defective since it did not specify the street address of the building which was burglarized. In essence, defendant contends that the lack of such an address constituted a 'jurisdictional' defect which was not waived by his plea of guilty. This argument finds support in certain language in our opinion in People v. Williams, 30 Ill.2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483.

We agree with defendant's premise that a plea of guilty does not waive defects in an indictment which are truly jurisdictional in nature; i. e., defects which render the indictment void and insufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the subject matter. Only defects which are not jurisdictional in the above sense may be waived. However, we do not agree with defendant's conclusion that the indictment in this case contains such a fatal defect.

In determining the validity of this indictment reference must be made to section 6 of division XI of the Criminal Code of 1961, which section was in effect at the time of defendant's indictment and plea of guilty, but which has now been repealed. Section 6 provided that, 'Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of the statutes creating the offense, or so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury'. That section further required the indictment to allege the 'time and place of committing the (offense,) with reasonable certainty'. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 716.) The indictment in...