People v. Reed

• Decision Date: 31 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1–12–2610.,1–12–2610.
• Citation: 25 N.E.3d 10
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Devin REED, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

25 N.E.3d 10

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Devin REED, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–12–2610.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Dec. 31, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, Heidi Lynn Lambros, State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for Appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Douglas P. Harvath, Tasha-Marie Kelly, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice REYES

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, petitioner Devin Reed was found guilty of first degree murder, armed robbery and residential burglary. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Reed's conviction for murder and his natural life sentence, but reversed his convictions and sentences for armed robbery and residential burglary. People v. Reed, 405 Ill.App.3d 279, 286, 344 Ill.Dec. 930, 938 N.E.2d 199 (2010)

. Pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2010)), Reed thereafter initiated the instant postconviction proceeding by filing a pro se petition asserting various trial errors, as well as claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. On July 26, 2012, the circuit court entered a memorandum order dismissing Reed's petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Reed now appeals, contending his petition stated the gist of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Reed also contends his natural life sentence for first degree murder is void. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Reed's Trial

¶ 4 The facts adduced at Reed's trial were fully set forth in this court's opinion on Reed's direct appeal. Reed, 405 Ill.App.3d at 281–84, 344 Ill.Dec. 930, 938 N.E.2d 199

. We briefly summarize those proceedings and note additional facts here to the extent necessary to address the issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 5 On January 1, 2002, after midnight, Reed, Anthony Williams, India Williams, and Kimberly Thompson drove to Timothy Kollar's residence near 25th Street and Kildare Avenue in Chicago, where they all smoked cocaine. When the drugs ran out, Reed, Anthony, and India left to purchase more cocaine, during which time they agreed they would rob Kollar.

¶ 6 At some time after Reed, Anthony, and India returned to Kollar's home, Thompson left the house to place a telephone call. Approximately 20 minutes later, while Kollar and India were smoking cocaine, Reed wrapped a porcelain statue in foam and struck Kollar on the right side of his head with the statue. The blow did not render Kollar unconscious. Anthony then grabbed an aluminum baseball bat and struck Kollar two or three times while Reed searched the bedroom for money. India bound Kollar's legs with an electrical cord, after which she and Anthony both struck Kollar more times with the bat. Reed exited the room but could hear the bat strike Kollar several more times. By the time Thompson returned, Reed, Anthony and India were removing items, including guitars, from Kollar's home. India also took money from Kollar.

¶ 7 Medical examiner Dr. Michelle Jordan testified Kollar died of cranial cerebral injuries

due to blunt force trauma, with strangulation a significant contributing factor to Kollar's death. Dr. Jordan characterized the death as tortuous based on the extent of the injuries, the degree of bondage and a wound to the neck.

¶ 8 Thompson, who testified at trial on behalf of the State, acknowledged that she was a prostitute in January 2002 and admitted that she was a drug addict. Thompson had difficulty identifying Reed as one of the men she was with at Kollar's house. She testified that she had memory problems as a result of her past addictions and because of her bipolar disease

. After Thompson learned from the televised newscast that Kollar had been killed, she contacted the police. Thompson subsequently met with police officers and identified Reed, Anthony, and India.

¶ 9 Retired Chicago deputy police chief of narcotics and gangs Michael Cronin testified that after Reed was identified in a lineup, he informed Reed of his Miranda rights and Reed recounted the events surrounding the incident. A few hours later, Cronin and Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Erica Dillon had another conversation with Reed. ASA Dillon testified she also informed Reed of his Miranda rights, whereupon Reed waived those rights and again discussed the circumstances of the incident. ASA Dillon further testified she informed Reed of various ways he could memorialize his statement, but Reed preferred to provide only an oral statement. ASA Dillon additionally testified she then dictated what Reed told her to her supervisor, who was not present for Reed's oral statement. According to ASA Dillon, she reviewed her supervisor's transcription, but she acknowledged Reed did not have the opportunity to review the transcription.

¶ 10 During the conference regarding jury instructions, Reed's counsel objected to the verdict forms and requested that the jury be given separate verdict forms for felony murder and intentional or knowing murder. The court denied the defense counsel's request.

¶ 11 The jury returned guilty verdicts for first degree murder, armed robbery and residential burglary. The jury also found that the armed robbery was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

¶ 12 On October 24, 2008, defense counsel filed a posttrial motion for a new trial. On October 31, 2008, Reed also filed two pro se posttrial motions, one seeking a new trial and one seeking new counsel.

¶ 13 In his pro se supplemental motion for a new trial, Reed argued he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel had failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress Reed's statement to the police. Reed asserted the transcription of his “alleged” statement raised questions regarding its validity. Reed noted Cronin's testimony that ASA Dillon transcribed the statement conflicted with ASA Dillon's testimony that she related the statement to her superior. Reed also contended his trial counsel interfered with his right to testify on his own behalf. Reed asserted he would have testified: he told an ASA named Chung he did not wish to give a statement; he never gave the police a statement; and the police never informed him of his Miranda rights. Reed further contended his trial counsel failed to present other defense witnesses, including ASA Dillon and ASA Chung.

¶ 14 Reed's pro se supplemental motion additionally asserted that trial counsel failed to subpoena any records of complaints against Cronin. Moreover, Reed complained that trial counsel failed to object to or strike several of the jurors. Trial counsel was also allegedly ineffective in the impeachment of Thompson. Reed's pro se supplemental motion further claimed the trial court erred in allowing death photographs of the victim to be shown to the jury, allowing the in-court identification of Reed by Thompson, and overruling objections to allegedly inadmissible evidence. In addition, Reed's supplemental motion contained general allegations that the State failed to prove Reed guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and was contrary to the evidence in the record.

¶ 15 In his other pro se posttrial motion, Reed argued his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel created a conflict of interest requiring the appointment of new counsel. Reed asserted his trial counsel otherwise would be unable to testify regarding Reed's claims at a hearing on Reed's pro se supplemental motion for a new trial.

¶ 16 The trial court denied Reed's posttrial motions. After reviewing Reed's allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court stated it did not “see that the motion would be granted in any event,” and observed Reed had presented nothing but the allegation that ASA Chung would have testified as alleged by Reed. The trial court further observed there was nothing in the proceedings establishing either of Reed's trial counsels' performance was “so deficient that [it] would entitle [Reed] to a new counsel.”

¶ 17 Reed then waived a jury for sentencing purposes. The trial court found that Reed was eligible for the death penalty. In particular, the trial court found: the murder occurred during the course of a felony; the acts causing Kollar's death were inflicted at least in part by Reed; and Reed acted with the knowledge his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Kollar. After hearing arguments in aggravation and mitigation of the offense, the trial court initially observed the victim's death “was brutal and heinous beyond the most person's [sic ] capacity to understand probably or even imagine,” noting the victim's “horrible death” would “in many cases” “qualify someone to receive the ultimate penalty.” The trial judge also observed Reed had a dozen convictions related to automobile theft, which suggested Reed was unlikely to “change his ways.” The trial judge noted in mitigation of the offense that Reed's family background was “quite horrible.” In addition, Reed had obtained a G.E.D., was arguably not present at the killing, and had no convictions for violent crimes. The trial judge also considered Reed's statement that he had wrapped the statue in foam before striking the victim, which arguably suggested some concern for the damage to be caused to the victim by the blow. The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to natural life imprisonment for felony murder, a concurrent extended-term sentence of 60 years for armed robbery, and a concurrent 15–year sentence for residential burglary. Id. at 285, 344 Ill.Dec. 930, 938 N.E.2d 199

.

¶ 18 On November 7, 2008, Reed filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence, which the trial court denied. The record indicates Reed's trial counsel also filed a motion to reduce sentence on November 14, 2008. The...