People v. Reed
| Decision Date | 21 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 12,12 |
| Citation | 224 N.W.2d 867,393 Mich. 342 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ike Lawrence REED, Defendant-Appellant. 393 Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d 867 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Atty., Research, Training & Appeals, John L. Thompson, Jr., Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before the Entire Bench.
Blood stains and drag marks led police from two bound and gagged dead bodies found in an alley to defendant's apartment. On request of the police to enter and look around, defendant opened his apartment door resulting in the search of the apartment's rooms and defendant's questioning and arrest.
Defendant claimed 11 different trial errors, of which we find it useful to discuss only the following five:
(1) Was there error in instructing the jury that the killings were murder in the first degree as a matter of fact and law?
(2) Was it error to limit the scope of a Brady hearing so as to preclude cross-examination of one prosecutor and the appearance of another requested by the defense concerning alleged promises to a prosecution witness?
(3) Was it erroneous for the trial judge to refuse to rule whether defendant's suppressed confessions could be used to impeach him if he testified?
(4) Where the trail of evidence seemed to lead to defendant were Miranda warnings required before the police began questioning defendant?
(5) Was error committed in admitting evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search of defendant's apartment?
We answer all but question (5) in the affirmative and reverse and remand for a new trial.
Following their discovery of two bodies in an alley early in the morning of June 8, 1971, Detroit police officers followed a trail of blood stains and drag marks into a nearby apartment building. With the assistance of the apartment manager, they searched the basement and three of the four apartments without a warrant. Upon reaching the fourth apartment, belonging to defendant, the officers testified they 'stated (to defendant) that we would like to come in and take a look around.' (78a) The police thereupon entered and made an extensive search. They found a pair of blood-stained trousers soaking in the sink. When the police first asked defendant about the trousers, he said they were his, and the blood was his from a cut from a lawn mower. A policeman then said 'if the blood on those trousers matched the blood from the two bodies found in the alley, he (defendant) was going to be in trouble.' (201a) Defendant then changed his story and said he had found the trousers and taken them because they appeared to fit. Defendant was then arrested and after that given his Miranda warnings.
Defendant was tried by a jury for first-degree murder on separate informations for each decedent. Among witnesses for the prosecution were two individuals who testified they had assisted defendant. Apparently neither was ever imprisoned for his role, and the case against at least one was dropped. Defendant did not testify.
The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree in both cases on March 21, 1972. The Court of Appeals affirmed on August 30, 1973. 49 Mich.App. 308, 212 N.W.2d 41 (1973). Defdendant claimed 11 errors including the five heretofore set forth above.
In instructing the jury, the trial judge stated:
'I am going to describe for you or define for you briefly what the change of murder encompasses. The reason I am not going to go into it with you in any more extensive detail is the fact that There has been no dispute about the fact here that the offense charged, that is murder in the first degree, is the offense that was committed. The issue, of course, will be whether the defendant is guilty of committing that offense.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant objected to this instruction.
The Court of Appeals, in finding no error, emphasized certain statements of defense counsel in his opening remarks as follows:
(Emphasis added.) 49 Mich.App. 308, 327, 212 N.W.2d 41, 50.
The Court of Appeals then pointed out that the defense theory throughout was alibi. It concluded that that theory and defense counsel's above statement created no prejudice, although the court's instructions 'limited the jury's consideration to a question of identification of the perpetrator of the crime, where the fact that the crime had been committed was not in dispute.' 49 Mich.App. 308, 328, 212 N.W.2d 41, 51.
This is not the law.
Once a plea of not guilty is entered, the defendant United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425, 430 (CA 7, 1965). (Footnote omitted.)
The trial judge must carefully ensure that there is no trespass on this fundamental right.
The instruction to the jury must include all elements of the crime charged, People v. Liggett, 378 Mich. 706, 714, 148 N.W.2d 784 (1967); People v. Pepper, 389 Mich. 317, 322, 206 N.W.2d 439 (1973), and must not exclude from jury consideration material issues, defenses or theories if there is evidence to support them. 22 Michigan Law & Practice, Trial, § 236, p. 386.
In the instant case, the trial court charged:
'. . . there has been no dispute about the fact here that the offense charged, that is murder in the first degree, is the offense that was committed.'
Such an instruction is patently wrong. The presence of two dead bodies alone cannot reveal the state of mind of the killer nor the full circumstances of the killing. Without such additional evidence it is impossible to know what degree of homicide was committed.
Obviously it cannot be presupposed, as the instruction did, that first degree murder was involved for two reasons. First, it cannot logically be presumed that it was murder in the first degree without knowing that the killer had the necessary premeditation and intent. This would require proof beyond the existence and condition of the dead bodies. Second, it cannot legally be presumed for the reason that the necessary premeditation and intent are elements of the crime the prosecution must prove. By instructing as she did, the trial judge incorrectly removed these problems from jury consideration.
The prosecution urges us to accept the rule of People v. Griffen, 36 Mich.App. 368, 194 N.W.2d 104 (1971), and cases relying thereon. 1 In Griffen, the trial judge instructed:
'I may say that I don't believe this jury is going to have much difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that a felonious homicide was committed, and that the homicide was second degree murder.' 36 Mich.App. 368, 371, 194 N.W.2d 104, 105.
The Court of Appeals with a strong dissent by Justice (then Judge) Levin on another issue, found that, if there was error, it was not reversible, inasmuch as the only dispute at trial was over who committed the homicide.
We find that the right of the jury to determine all elements of an offense is so fundamental a right that the harmless error rule is not appropriate where the judge invades that province. There is a difference between commenting on the evidence and making a finding of fact for the jury. When the trial judge, as in the instant case, instructs that an essential element of a criminal offense exists, as a matter of law, we will find reversible error. Insofar as Griffen and progeny contravene this principle, they are overruled.
A principal witness against defendant was John Zellner. Zellner was charged as defendant's accomplice in the murder of Glenn Williams. Zellner's motion for bail was originally denied, but subsequently both bail and severance from defendant were granted. Zellner thereafter testified against defendant. (Ultimately, after this trial his case was dismissed.) On the basis of these suggestive facts defendant asked for a Brady 2 hearing to determine whether any promises had been made to Zellner to testify against defendant.
In the Brady hearing, Zellner's counsel stated he had advised a police officer and the trial prosecutor that Zellner was willing to testify against defendant but denied receiving any consideration therefor. Both the police officer and his partner...
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