People v. Reese

• Decision Date: 28 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 60914,60914
• Citation: 331 N.E.2d 316,29 Ill.App.3d 568
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith William REESE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 316

331 N.E.2d 316

29 Ill.App.3d 568

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith William REESE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 60914.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

May 28, 1975.

Allan A. Ackerman, Ackerman, Durkin & Egan, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, (Laurence J. Bolon, Scott W. Petersen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Keith William Reese pled guilty to a one-count indictment charging him and another individual ¹ with burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, § 19--1). After the trial judge accepted the guilty plea and found the defendant guilty, he was sentenced to 1 to 3 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. Reese appeals and presents the following issues for review: (1) Whether a guilty plea may stand to an indictment where there is a fatal variance between the stipulated proof of the offense and the indictment; and (2) whether the failure of the trial judge to adhere to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 402 mandates vacation of the guilty plea.

On January 3, 1974, Reese withdrew a plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to burglary. Prior to accepting the plea, the trial judge admonished the defendant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 402). The trial judge advised defendant that if he pled guilty to burglary the court would sentence him to 1 to 3 years in the state penitentiary as agreed by the parties during the pre-trial conference. The trial judge informed defendant that he must knowingly and intelligently waive his rights in order for the court to accept his plea. Defendant was also informed that he had a right to a trial by jury. In response to the trial judge's question, do you wish to waive the right to a jury trial, the defendant answered yes. Then the trial judge explained to defendant that he could be sentenced to the penitentiary from 1 to 20 years. The defendant stated that he knew that and still wished to plead guilty. Defendant was then informed that he had a right to appeal the matter by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days. The trial judge reminded the defendant that he had a right to a presentence investigation, but defendant waived that right. Defendant was asked if anybody promised him anything or threatened him to enter the plea, and he answered, 'No.' The trial judge then inquired as to whether the defendant was acting freely and voluntarily, and Reese replied, 'Freely and voluntarily.' In concluding, the trial judge stated that he thought the defendant was knowledgeable; that he was intelligent enough to know his rights; and that he voluntarily waived them.

The prosecutor and defendant's attorney then stipulated to the facts the State intended to prove. The trial judge then accepted the defendant's plea, made a finding of guilty, and entered a judgment on the finding.

The defendant first contends that his burglary conviction should be reversed because there was a 'fatal variance' between the stipulated proof and the indictment. The indictment states that Keith William Reese committed the offense of burglary in that he without authority, knowingly entered the MacMillan Science Co. building. The stipulated proof, on the other hand, refers to the corporation as McMillan Sons Company, Inc. We take notice of the fact that MacMillan Science Company is referred to by a different name in the stipulated proof. This discrepancy raises the question of whether this is a fatal variance for which the conviction must be overturned. In People v. Bristow (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 805, 291 N.E.2d 189, a case where this court was faced with an alleged fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof, at 808, 291 N.E.2d at 192, the court laid down the following criteria for determining whether the variance was fatal:

'Variances between allegations of a charge and evidence which can affect a criminal trial are limited to differences between the pleading of essential elements of a crime and the proof. (Citations.) To vitiate a criminal trial, however, a variance must be material and of such character that it misleads a defendant in the making of his defense or exposes him to double jeopardy. (Citations.) The variance must result in substantial injury to a defendant either by causing a jury to be misled or by hindering the defendant in the intelligent presentation of his case. (Citations.)'

When we apply the Bristow rules to the facts in the instant case, we discover that the variance is not fatal. The defendant was not misled by the fact that MacMillan Science Company was referred to by a different name in the prosecutor's proferred proof. Defendant's attorney stipulated to this proof and did not object to it. Moreover, the court was not misled and the defendant was not hindered in the presentation of his case because he pled guilty, and if a second prosecution were brought for the same offense, the defendant could refer to the record of these proceedings to establish jeopardy. Since the facts leave no doubt as to the identity of the burglarized store and no showing has been made that the variance prejudiced the defendant, the conviction will not be overturned on this ground.

The defendant's next contention is that the record failed to show that MacMillan Science Company, a corporation, was in lawful possession, either as owner or lessee of any of the described premises in Cook County, Illinois. Then he argues that since there is no allegation of ownership of the dwelling burglarized, the indictment in this case is fatally defective. (People ex rel. Ledford v. Brantley (1970), 46 Ill.2d 419, 263 N.E.2d 27.) However, Brantley, the case relied on by the appellant, was overruled in People v. Gregory (1974), 59 Ill.2d 111, 319 N.E.2d 483. In Gregory, the Illinois Supreme Court, when considering the question of the necessity of an indictment for burglary to identify the owner of the building, held at 114, 319 N.E.2d at 485:

'While at one time it was necessary that an indictment for burglary identify the owner of the building concerned, if it was known, such an allegation of ownership is no longer required. (Citations.) We would point out that a majority did say in People ex rel. Ledford v. Brantley, 46 Ill.2d 419, 263 N.E.2d 27, that an indictment's failure to allege the ownership of the burglarized premises will render an indictment fatally defective. While the indictment in Ledford provided no identification whatever of the 'dwelling' which was burglarized, that omission did not justify the statement that ownership must be alleged. The holding simply cannot be supported. It must be regarded as erroneous, and accordingly it is overruled.'

Therefore, Gregory does away with the necessity of an indictment alleging ownership. Consequently, the defendant's argument falls. Moreover, defendant's argument also...