People v. Reese
Decision Date | 24 September 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 1–12–0654.,1–12–0654. |
Citation | 42 N.E.3d 389 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Willis REESE, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and David T. Harris, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Following trial, a jury found defendant, Willis Reese, guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape.The trial court subsequently sentenced him to concurrent extended-term sentences of, respectively, 50, 30, 30, and 14 years in prison, to be served consecutively to the natural life sentence defendant was serving on a prior murder conviction.Defendant appeals, arguing (1)the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, as it failed to show that he dispossessed the victim of the bus, (2)the State failed to prove him guilty of vehicular invasion, as it failed to show he used force to enter the bus, (3) a fatal variance existed between his attempted armed robbery indictment and conviction, (4)he was deprived of due process when he was shackled during jury selection without the trial court articulating the reasons for his shackling, (5)the State introduced excessive and irrelevant details regarding his prior murder conviction, (6)the trial court failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)(eff. July 1, 1984), thereby rendering his waiver of counsel invalid, (7)the court erroneously imposed extended-term sentences on offenses that were not among the most serious class of felony, and (8) his convictions for both aggravated vehicular hijacking and vehicular invasion violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine.
¶ 2 For the following reasons, we reverse defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated vehicular hijacking, and affirm his convictions for vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape.We affirm defendant's 30–year sentences for vehicular invasion and attempted armed robbery, and reduce his sentence for escape to 7 years.
¶ 4 On March 19, 2007, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder.Three days later, before he was sentenced for that offense, defendant was taken to an appointment at Stroger Hospital (Stroger).Following his appointment, defendant went into a restroom, removed a shank he had hidden in his shoe, and fled the building, injuring several people during his escape.Based on the events that transpired that day, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with, among other offenses, aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, escape, disarming a peace officer, and aggravated kidnapping.The indictment also charged him with multiple counts of attempted first-degree murder, which the State later nol-prossed.
¶ 6The public defender was appointed to represent defendant, and, in October 2008, defendant told the trial court that he wished to “exercise [his] constitutional right” to proceed pro se.He expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender's office and stated he was making his “decision knowingly and intelligently.”The court advised defendant that two of his attempted first-degree murder counts alone carried 20– to 80–year prison sentences and possible extended-term sentences of 40 to 160 years' imprisonment.The court stated, “Basically, you are looking at massive time if you are convicted.”Defendant indicated that he understood.The court then advised defendant of the normal and extended-term sentences that Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class X felonies carried.When asked whether he understood the penalties and sentencing ranges, defendant responded, “Perfectly, Your Honor, perfectly.”The court did not admonish defendant that any possible sentence in his case would run consecutively to the sentence he was serving on his murder conviction.After completing its admonishments, the court permitted the public defender to withdraw.
¶ 8 In November 2011, the parties appeared before the trial court for jury selection.Defendant indicated he was “ready to change into [his] clothes and get out of [his] shackles” so he could “prepare [his] paper work.”The court started to explain the voir dire procedure, and defendant stated, The court told defendant that “[l]ater on,” his hands would be free and both tables would be covered with drapery so that the jurors would not be able to see defendant's leg shackles.The following exchange then occurred.
¶ 9 After the trial court further explained voir dire to defendant and a recess took place, defendant again brought up his shackles.The following exchange took place.
Defendant told the court, The court indicated it would take the matter under consideration and make a decision the next day.
¶ 10 Later, jury selection commenced.The first panel of six potential jurors consisted of Tiffany Fourkas, Danielle Quinn, Alvin Hunt, Aaron Perry, Quinn McSorley, and Melissa Myles.1When asked whether he accepted the panel of Fourkas, Quinn, Perry, and McSorley, defendant stated, “No, I don't accept three individuals.”The court asked defendant who he would not accept, and he indicated Fourkas.He then asked if the trial court could “possibly have him dismissed for a moment” because an “issue” was “going on” and he did not think the court“would want” the jurors to hear about it.The court asked whether defendant was only dismissing Fourkas, and defendant stated After the court dismissed the prospective jurors, defendant explained that Fourkas, McSorley, and Myles were The court asked defendant which people saw the shackles, and defendant stated Fourkas and McSorley.
¶ 11The trial court asked that Fourkas and McSorley be brought back into the courtroom separately.Upon questioning, Fourkas said she could not see behind the drapes.Nonetheless, defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Fourkas.
¶ 12The trial court then questioned McSorley, who indicated he could see behind the drapery and saw “a little belt on [defendant]'s strap between his feet.”He denied that what he saw would affect his ability to be fair.Defendant then asked the following questions, and McSorley provided the following responses.
The other members of the panel returned to the courtroom, and the court asked whether anything about defendant's appearance would affect their ability to be fair.The court explained that it was referring to “[h]is appearance with this drapery in front of him.”Quinn stated, “No I guess” and asked whether there was “something we should know that we don't know because now I am confused.”The court said there was nothing the jury should know.The record does not contain a response from any of the other...
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People v. Reese
..."cause[s] the victim to part with possession or custody of [the vehicle] against his will." ' " 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 58, 397 Ill.Dec. 474, 42 N.E.3d 389 (quoting People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 526, 182 Ill.Dec. 551, 609 N.E.2d 1366 (1992), quoting People v. Smith , 78 Ill. 2......
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People v. Wilson
...courts. The decisions of foreign courts are not binding on Illinois courts. See People v. Reese, 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 70, 397 Ill.Dec. 474, 42 N.E.3d 389. Instead, we are required to follow our supreme court precedent, which has interpreted Roper, Graham , and Miller to apply “only i......
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People v. Applewhite
...2014). The decisions of foreign courts are not binding on Illinois courts (People v. Reese , 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 70, 397 Ill.Dec. 474, 42 N.E.3d 389 ), and we are required to follow our supreme court precedent, which has interpreted Miller , Roper , and Graham to apply "only in the ......
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People v. Kindhart
...in Comage, defendant's reliance on a Wisconsin Supreme Court case is misguided. See People v. Reese, 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 70, 42 N.E.3d 389 ("this court is not bound by *** out-of-state decisions" and "reliance on *** out-of-state cases is particularly problematic, because courts in ......