People v. Reid, No. 67893

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtCALVO
Citation136 Ill.2d 27,143 Ill.Dec. 239,554 N.E.2d 174
Docket NumberNo. 67893
Decision Date18 April 1990
Parties, 143 Ill.Dec. 239 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Darryl REID, Appellee.

Page 174

554 N.E.2d 174
136 Ill.2d 27, 143 Ill.Dec. 239
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Darryl REID, Appellee.
No. 67893.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
April 18, 1990.

Page 176

[136 Ill.2d 32] [143 Ill.Dec. 241] Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley and Cecil A. Partee, State's Attys., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Inge Fryklund, James E. Fitzgerald, Susan J. Crane and William D. Carroll, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for people.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Karen Daniel, Asst. App. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice CALVO delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury found defendant, 15-year-old Darryl Reid, guilty of armed robbery and murder. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress two statements he made to the police and assistant State's Attorney. After a hearing, the circuit court of Cook County denied the motions and admitted the statements during the trial. The circuit court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 20 years for murder and 9 years for armed robbery. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. (174 Ill.App.3d [136 Ill.2d 33] 1009, 124 Ill.Dec. 609, 529 N.E.2d 590.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). Defendant has raised two issues on cross-appeal (107 Ill.2d Rules 318(a), 343(b)(i)).

The State's case at trial consisted of, inter alia, defendant's two pretrial statements, and the testimony of several witnesses, including eyewitnesses, police detectives, police officers, a firearms examiner, a pathologist, a medical doctor and an assistant State's Attorney. Defendant called a school psychologist, Saul Levy, as a witness.

During the afternoon of July 26, 1984, defendant, Joanne Reid (defendant's sister), 14-year-old Joseph Brooks, and 18-year-old Robert Davis (Joanne's boyfriend), were in defendant's family's apartment. Brooks had a .22-caliber gun with him. In defendant's presence, Brooks and Davis discussed robbing a "pappy." Brooks and Davis informed defendant a "pappy" was an old man. Brooks gave Davis the gun and they, along with defendant, left the apartment.

The trio saw Herbert Madison, age 65, enter a nearby apartment building and they followed him in. Madison spoke with Gladys Drew at the doorway to her apartment. In the meantime, defendant and Brooks went across the hall, knocked on the door of an acquaintance, Michelle Matthews, and asked for a man named Nate, the brother of Matthews' girlfriend. Matthews advised them Nate was absent. In

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[143 Ill.Dec. 242] defendant's pretrial statements, defendant stated that before he left the apartment building, Davis and Brooks stopped and approached Madison just outside the building. Defendant then left the building and all three of them stood around Madison. Davis pointed the gun at Madison, and Brooks held an umbrella with both hands. At Davis' direction, defendant put his hand into one of Madison's pockets and found some change, but defendant did not remove the change. Davis then grabbed Madison's wallet, and [136 Ill.2d 34] Davis and Madison struggled over it. During the struggle, Davis fatally shot Madison in the stomach. Davis told defendant to run, and the trio fled.

Defendant returned to his apartment and found Davis and Brooks there counting the money taken from Madison's wallet. Davis gave Brooks $13. Davis said that after he obtained change for a $20 bill he would also give defendant $13. Defendant, however, never received any money.

The police arrested defendant at his third-floor apartment later that afternoon. They found the gun and $13 in the apartment. They also recovered Madison's wallet and several pieces of Madison's identification from the ground and a windowsill just outside and directly below the apartment.

I. Jury Question

The first issue raised by the State concerns a question the jury submitted to the circuit court during the jury's deliberations. The jury began deliberating at 5:40 p.m. on Thursday, May 16, 1985. The jury considered two charges--murder and armed robbery. Later that evening, the jury sent its first question to the circuit court. The jury asked whether it could find defendant guilty of one charge and not the other. The circuit court contacted both parties by telephone and everyone agreed to the circuit court's response. The circuit court told the jury to continue its deliberations on the basis of the instructions it had previously received. The circuit court subsequently sequestered the jury for the evening.

The jury continued its deliberations the next morning. During the day, the jury submitted a second, different question to the circuit court. After the circuit court and both parties discussed the circuit court's response to the second question, defense counsel asked the circuit court to directly answer the jury's first question:

[136 Ill.2d 35] "MR. BRADLEY [Defense Counsel]: * * * This morning I was able to review the jury instructions, and perhaps it's my lack of diligence last night, or lateness of the hour, but I did not realize there was not a separate instruction in the pattern instructions. At that point--and I'm not saying that I did not agree to the procedure last night. But I think as we're going to answer one question that in your Honor's mind is clear and concise, we ought to answer the other question that was asked last night, which is very clear and succinct, and tell the jury they find him guilty of one charge and not guilty of the other.

MR. WARNICK [Assistant State's Attorney]: Obviously, your Honor, I would be opposed to that. I think at this time this is, since they have not sent that question, or renewed that question in any way after approximately eight hours of deliberation today, to send that accompanying their question which was just given would be in our view certainly a--could be interpreted by some members of the jury as pointing them to a decision or a conclusion one way or the other, which I think would be improper.

And I think that this is not now the time to do such a thing, and certainly counsel last night, it was totally in agreement by all parties as to the position, and that the Court did, and no objection, and I think to do so now would be improper."

The circuit court refused defense counsel's request, stating:

"Well, the question is no longer pending. It's been responded to, and it's been responded to based on the agreement of everyone that the jury should continue its deliberations.

What motivated that response from everyone will be difficult to determine.

Clearly the jury might have been asking whether or not they compromise by

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[143 Ill.Dec. 243] entering a guilty on one but not the other. That clarification could be detrimental to the position of either the State or the defense."

The jury asked two more questions, different from the first question, during the course of its deliberations.

[136 Ill.2d 36] The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts at 6:37 p.m. on the second day of deliberations. During a post-trial hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, one of the jurors testified that on the first day of deliberations the jury voted 11 to 1 to convict defendant of armed robbery. The next morning, the jury agreed to convict defendant of armed robbery, and began deliberating the murder charge. The jury initially voted 9 to 3 to acquit defendant of murder. By 6 p.m., the vote was 9 to 3 in favor of convicting defendant of murder.

The appellate court held that the circuit court committed reversible error by not explicitly answering the jury's first question. The appellate court held that even if defendant waived his objection to this error, it could address the issue under the plain error doctrine because the evidence in the "case was closely balanced, as the length of the jury's deliberations indicated." 174 Ill.App.3d at 1014, 124 Ill.Dec. 609, 529 N.E.2d 590.

The appellate court then stated that although a circuit court may exercise its discretion and refrain from answering a jury's question, a circuit court has a duty to answer the question, if clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, the jurors are manifestly confused, or the question concerns a point of law arising from the facts over which no doubt or confusion exists. In applying those principles to the facts before it, the appellate court held:

"The jury manifested its confusion in this case when it asked the question, and the legal issue is clearly pertinent to this case. The jury had received no instruction explicitly stating that a finding of guilty on one count did not require a finding of guilty on the other count. The State contends that the original instructions were adequate to answer the jury's question because the trial court submitted four verdict forms: guilty and not guilty of murder, and guilty and not guilty of armed robbery. We believe that this is not an adequate substitute for an explicit response[136 Ill.2d 37] to the jury's question. The State also argues that the trial court exercised its discretion properly because it could not have answered the jury's question without becoming involved in an extended discussion with the jury. We disagree. The trial court could readily have answered the question by stating that the jury could find defendant guilty on one count and not guilty on the other count. [Citation.] We find that the trial court erred when it failed to answer the jury's question of law arising from the facts of the case when the instructions previously given provided no direct answer to the question.

The State contends that evidence regarding the jury deliberations establishes that the error did not prejudice defendant. At a post-trial hearing a juror testified that after the jury had received the judge's response to its question, and after...

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237 practice notes
  • People v. Braggs, No. 1-01-0110.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 8, 2002
    ...evidence that the defendant validly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. (See People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 56 [143 Ill. 779 N.E.2d 486 Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174]). To be valid, the waiver must reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment ......
  • People v. Scott, No. 64287
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1992
    ...case, the burden shifts to defendant to show that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary." People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 51, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174. In this case, defendant does not argue that his statements were coerced by the police or that he was not ......
  • People v. Shaw, No. 80378.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • October 22, 1998
    ...whether a trial court responds to a jury inquiry concerning instructions lies within the discretion of the court. People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 39, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). Where "[the jury] has posed an 713 N.E.2d 1172 explicit question or requested clarification on a......
  • People v. Goins, Docket No. 1–11–3201.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 23, 2013
    ...the Miranda waiver was the product of (1) an uncoerced choice and (2) the requisite level of comprehension. Id. ; People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 54, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). Once the State has established its prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to show that waiv......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
234 cases
  • People v. Braggs, No. 1-01-0110.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 8, 2002
    ...evidence that the defendant validly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. (See People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 56 [143 Ill. 779 N.E.2d 486 Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174]). To be valid, the waiver must reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment ......
  • People v. Scott, No. 64287
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1992
    ...facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to show that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary." People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 51, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174. In this case, defendant does not argue that his statements were coerced by the police or that he was not......
  • People v. Shaw, No. 80378.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • October 22, 1998
    ...whether a trial court responds to a jury inquiry concerning instructions lies within the discretion of the court. People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 39, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). Where "[the jury] has posed an 713 N.E.2d 1172 explicit question or requested clarification on a poin......
  • People v. Goins, Docket No. 1–11–3201.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 23, 2013
    ...the Miranda waiver was the product of (1) an uncoerced choice and (2) the requisite level of comprehension. Id. ; People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 54, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). Once the State has established its prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant to show that waiv......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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