People v. Reimnitz
Decision Date | 30 May 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 78-724,78-724 |
Parties | , 29 Ill.Dec. 117 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry REIMNITZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
O'Donnell & Murphy, Chicago (Arthur J. O'Donnell and Sheila M. Murphy, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Nicholas P. Iavarone, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
On January 16, 1975, Larry Reimnitz found the strangled body of his wife, Linda, in their car inside the open garage of their home. Eight months later, after a day-long, intensive interrogation by the police, he confessed to murdering her. Although at trial he recanted this confession, a jury convicted Reimnitz of the murder.
On appeal, Reimnitz maintains that the use of his confession at trial was reversible error. He claims that the circumstances surrounding his confession rendered it "Per se involuntary," and that its use at trial violated his constitutional protections. Reimnitz alleges that he was induced to visit the police station by false pretenses, and in that way he was deprived of the benefits of his attorney's presence; that prior to being interrogated, he was not given Miranda warnings; and that his confession was obtained by police promises of leniency and beneficial treatment.
Reimnitz also claims that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of evidence that he engaged in a homosexual act 71/2 months after the murder. The act took place with a close friend of Reimnitz while they were on vacation together and the friend was sleeping and unconsenting. The friend had been visiting Reimnitz in his home at the time Linda's body was found. The State was allowed to elicit testimony regarding this incident from three witnesses (two police officers and the friend) despite repeated objections by Reimnitz's counsel. Besides objecting on the basis of its prejudicial nature, Reimnitz's counsel argued that such testimony was irrelevant because of the length of time between the murder and this incident. Although the trial judge recognized the prejudicial character of the testimony, he allowed its admission on the stated assumption that its relevancy would subsequently be established.
Arguing in support of the admissibility of the evidence, the State maintains that such testimony revealed Reimnitz's motive for killing his wife his homosexual preference. Under the facts of this case, we believe that the probative value of a single act which occurred 7 months after the murder introduced to establish a homosexual preference at the time of the murder, let alone a motive for the murder, is far outweighed by its inflammatory effect upon the jury. Therefore, this evidence should not have been admitted.
Otherwise acceptable evidence should be excluded if it tends to unduly prejudice the jury. As stated in McCormick, Evidence § 185, at 438-9 (2d ed., 1972):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Johnson
... ... (Linscott, 159 Ill.App.3d at 85, 111 Ill.Dec. 8, 511 N.E.2d 1303.) In addition, we have held that the probative value of evidence of a defendant's alleged homosexuality is "outweighed by its inflammatory effect upon the jury." People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 761, 763, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 102 S.Ct. 1751, 72 L.Ed.2d 162; see ... Page 1259 ... [159 Ill.Dec. 199] also People v. Sales (1987), 151 Ill.App.3d 226, 233, 104 Ill.Dec. 561, 502 N.E.2d 1221 ... There are ... ...
-
Reimnitz v. State's Attorney of Cook County
... ... The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Reimnitz's conviction, holding that evidence of the Silver Lake incident should not have been admitted, since it had a prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value. People v. Reimnitz, 72 Ill.App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380 (1st Dist.1979) ... On remand, before a new trial judge, Reimnitz moved for dismissal, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. The general rule, of course, is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not ... ...
-
Thorsen v. City of Chicago, s. 77-753
... ... (See Ill. Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 85, pars. 3-102 (city has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for people exercising ordinary care in the use of the property in a reasonably foreseeable manner), 3-103 (city is liable if after execution of a plan of ... ...
-
People v. Neumann
...in his brief that evidence which would unduly arouse the passions of the jury is properly excluded. (People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 102 S.Ct. 1751, 72 L.Ed.2d 162. Matecki's self-serving statement was not pro......