People v. Rembo, Docket No. 25297

Decision Date17 January 1977
Docket NumberDocket No. 25297
Citation73 Mich.App. 339,251 N.W.2d 577
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel A. REMBO, Defendant-Appellant. 73 Mich.App. 339, 251 N.W.2d 577
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[73 MICHAPP 341] Sidney S. Baron, Pontiac, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Appellate Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P. J., and T. M. BURNS and BEASLEY, JJ.

BEASLEY, Judge.

In a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of Secobarbital in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. M.C.L.A. § 335.341(4)(b); M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(4)(b). After being placed on two years probation with the first four months in jail plus costs, defendant appeals as a matter of right.

Defendant claims that it was error to admit a vial containing the Secobarbital into evidence over his objection, where it was taken from his car without a warrant after his arrest for drunk driving.

The facts are not in dispute. On January 9, 1975, an Allen Park police officer observed the defendant pick up a hitchhiker on Southfield Road and then drive erratically upon re-entering traffic, twice hitting the curb. Observing this, the officer stopped the defendant, and when defendant rolled down the window on the driver's side, the officer smelled the odor of alcohol and marijuana. The [73 MICHAPP 342] officer then asked the defendant to surrender his drivers license and to exit the vehicle. In so doing, defendant stumbled from his car, displaying further symptoms of inebriation, and told the officer he had had a few beers and "a joint". About this time, the officer also observed the top of a plastic prescription bottle tucked between the cushions of the front seat. The officer then informed the defendant that he was under arrest for driving under the influence of liquor. A pat-down search of the defendant led to the discovery of a quantity of marijuana, a small scale, and some rolling papers. At this time, a back-up police officer arrived on the scene and, after being advised of the circumstances, entered the defendant's vehicle, searched the same, finding more marijuana in the ashtray, and seized the vial from between the seats. Defendant's name was on the bottle. The contents of the bottle were subsequently identified as being Secobarbital and this prosecution arose. The hitchhiker was released at the scene after limited questioning.

Upon these facts, the defendant asserts that his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated. U.S.Const. Am. IV, and Const.1963, art. I, § 11. He claims that the Secobarbital was discovered as a result of an unlawful search and seizure and, therefore, should have been suppressed.

Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See South Dakota v. Opperman, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). In People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 682, 213 N.W.2d 116, 121 (1973), the Supreme Court set forth the following rules with [73 MICHAPP 343] respect to the stopping, searching and seizing of motor vehicles and their contents:

"1. Reasonableness is the test that is to be applied for both the stop of, and the search of moving motor vehicles.

2. Said reasonableness will be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case.

3. Fewer foundation facts are necessary to support a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved, than if a house or a home were involved.

4. A stop of a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes may be based upon fewer facts than those necessary to support a finding of reasonableness where both a stop and a search is conducted by the police."

Applying these principles to this case, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to justify the stopping of the defendant's car by the police. Standing where he had a right to be, the officer saw the top of the plastic prescription bottle.

Thus, the plain view doctrine became applicable. This simply means that an officer standing where he was entitled to be had a right to see and take objects within his plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); iPeople v. Carl Smith, 39 Mich.App. 337, 341, 197 N.W.2d 528 (1972). Whether or not he was then entitled to open it and to ascertain its contents depended upon whether, under all the circumstances existing here, determination of the contents of the bottle was reasonable.

The surrounding facts, namely, the defendant's intoxication, the discovery of the marijuana and its paraphernalia, the presence of the vial, and the odor of marijuana in the car, justify concluding that the police officers had ample probable cause to believe that the defendant's car contained additional narcotics or evidence of intoxication. Consequently,[73 MICHAPP 344] they could legally search the defendant's car and seize the vial. People v. Hunter, 72 Mich.App. 191, 249 N.W.2d 351 (1976); People v. Dorner, 66 Mich.App. 298, 238 N.W.2d 845 (1975); People v. Kremko, 52 Mich.App. 565, 569-571, 218 N.W.2d 112 (1974); People v. Tisi, 384 Mich. 214, 218-219, 180 N.W.2d 801 (1970). The search and seizure in the present case was reasonable and the evidence seized was properly admitted at trial.

The defendant also claims that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to require the prosecutor to produce the hitchhiker as a res gestae witness. However, at trial, the defendant did not object to the hitchhiker's nonproduction nor did he move for a new trial on this ground. Under these circumstances, no reversible error occurs. See People v. Robinson, 390 Mich. 629, 213 N.W.2d 106 (1973); People v. Baines, 68 Mich.App. 385, 242 N.W.2d 784 (1976); People v. Winhoven, 65 Mich.App. 522, 237 N.W.2d 540 (1975).

AFFIRMED.

T. M. BURNS, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent for two reasons. I believe that the majority utilizes an improper scope of inquiry in judging the legality of the searches and seizures involved in this case. Further, I reach a different conclusion than the majority regarding the existence of probable cause.

A warrantless...

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3 cases
  • People v. Chernowas
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • January 26, 1982
    ... ... James CHERNOWAS, Joseph Chernowas, and Richard Hernandez, ... Defendants-Appellees ... Docket No. 51987 ... 111 Mich.App. 1, 314 N.W.2d 505 ... Court of Appeals of Michigan ... Submitted June ... 3 ...         The people also cites People v. Rembo, 73 Mich.App.[111 MICHAPP 7] 339, 251 N.W.2d 577 (1977); People v. Ridgeway, 74 Mich.App. 306, 253 ... ...
  • People v. Ridgeway
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • March 28, 1977
    ...absolutely nothing about the scenario which suggests a crime. A valid distinction may be drawn between this case and People v. Rembo, 73 Mich.App. 339, 251 N.W.2d 577 (1977). [74 MICHAPP 313] Rembo was stopped because he was driving in a dangerously erratic manner. The officer who approache......
  • People v. Lynn
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • July 9, 1979
    ...which was inadvertently discovered on top of defendant's dresser, was proper under the "plain view doctrine". People v. Rembo, 73 Mich.App. 339, 343, 251 N.W.2d 577 (1977). Defendant next contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the asportation element of the kidnappin......

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