People v. Reveles-Cordova

Decision Date19 November 2020
Docket NumberDocket No. 124797
Citation2020 IL 124797,450 Ill.Dec. 454,181 N.E.3d 806
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Alejandro REVELES-CORDOVA, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Brian W. Carroll, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Alejandro Reveles-Cordova, was found guilty of criminal sexual assault ( 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2010)) and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-11(a)(6)). On appeal, defendant contended that his criminal sexual assault conviction was a lesser-included offense of home invasion and, therefore, had to be set aside under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The appellate court rejected this contention. 2019 IL App (3d) 160418, 429 Ill.Dec. 704, 125 N.E.3d 410. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant's convictions stem from an incident involving his former girlfriend, J.B. At trial, J.B. testified she and defendant had a 15-year relationship, during which time they purchased a home together in Romeoville, Illinois, and had three children. In January 2010, defendant moved from the home. Later that year, J.B. was granted an order of protection against defendant. The order prohibited defendant from having any contact with J.B. or the children and prohibited him from entering the Romeoville home.

¶ 4 J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, she was getting ready in her home for a date with a new boyfriend. After she exited the shower, she heard someone walking from the first floor to the second floor. She stood waiting and heard someone trying to get into her locked bedroom door. She then heard the door being kicked in and saw defendant enter the room. According to J.B., defendant was "going crazy." He pushed J.B. and called her a "bitch" and asked why she had taken his children away. He started hitting the walls and himself and grabbed a vase of flowers on J.B.'s dresser and threw it to the floor. He also threatened to kill J.B. and take the children to Mexico.

¶ 5 J.B. stated that, at one point, defendant grabbed her cell phone from the nightstand and started going through it. While doing so, a text came in from J.B.'s new boyfriend. Defendant called the number and had a brief conversation with the boyfriend. After this, defendant became very aggravated. He pushed J.B. onto an ottoman at the end of her bed and started pulling down his pants. J.B. attempted to fight him off and told him to leave. Defendant then penetrated her vagina with his penis. J.B. testified that she was crying and repeatedly told defendant to stop.

¶ 6 After defendant finished, he pulled up his pants and again threatened to kill J.B. and take the children to Mexico. He then pushed J.B. onto the bed and began choking her. J.B. attempted to push defendant off and fight him, but when she could no longer breathe, she stopped fighting. J.B. stated that defendant only let go of her when her cell phone rang. After that, defendant told J.B. he was going to come back and then left.

¶ 7 J.B. testified that she got dressed and went to her neighbor's house and called the police. After the police arrived, J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. J.B. stated she asked defendant repeatedly throughout the incident to leave.

¶ 8 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he and J.B. spoke on November 19 and arranged to meet the next day so he could retrieve some of his mother's items from the Romeoville home. He denied arguing with J.B., pushing her, or choking her and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Defendant denied J.B. fought him off or told him to stop.

¶ 9 At the close of trial, a jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-13(a)(1) ) and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-11(a)(6)). Defendant was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment for home invasion and 9 years' imprisonment for criminal sexual assault, with the sentences to run consecutively. Thereafter, defendant filed a posttrial motion in which he argued, in part, that his criminal sexual assault conviction was a lesser-included offense of home invasion and, therefore, under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 10 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (3d) 160418, 429 Ill.Dec. 704, 125 N.E.3d 410. Relying on People v. Fuller , 2013 IL App (3d) 110391, 371 Ill.Dec. 694, 990 N.E.2d 882, the appellate court rejected defendant's one-act, one-crime argument. 2019 IL App (3d) 160418, ¶ 65, 429 Ill.Dec. 704, 125 N.E.3d 410. In Fuller , the court observed that the offense of home invasion is committed when a person acting without authority knowingly enters the dwelling place of another, knowing that someone is present, and then commits one of several predicate acts. Fuller , 2013 IL App (3d) 110391, ¶ 21, 371 Ill.Dec. 694, 990 N.E.2d 882. These predicate acts include, for example, threatening the use of force with a knife or firearm or committing criminal sexual assault. Id. Given this structure of the home invasion offense, the Fuller court reasoned that it is possible in some instances to commit home invasion without committing criminal sexual assault. Id. ¶ 22. Therefore, the court concluded, criminal sexual assault should not be considered a lesser-included offense of home invasion. Id. The appellate court below declined to find that Fuller was wrongly decided and affirmed defendant's convictions. 2019 IL App (3d) 160418, ¶ 65, 429 Ill.Dec. 704, 125 N.E.3d 410.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 In People v. King , 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), this court held that, when the State charges a defendant with multiple offenses that arise "from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses," multiple convictions and sentences can be entered. This has come to be known as the one-act, one-crime doctrine. People v. Miller , 238 Ill. 2d 161, 165, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498 (2010). The one-act, one-crime doctrine requires a two-step analysis. Id. First, the court must consider whether the defendant's conduct involved multiple acts or a single act. Multiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act. Second, if the conduct involved multiple acts, the court must determine whether one offense is a lesser-included offense of another. If an offense is a lesser-included offense, multiple convictions are improper. Id.

¶ 13 In Miller , this court held that, when determining when one offense is a lesser-included offense of another under King , courts should employ the "abstract elements" approach. Id. at 163, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498. This approach requires the court to examine the statutory elements of the two offenses. "If all of the elements of one offense are included within a second offense and the first offense contains no element not included in the second offense, the first offense is deemed a lesser-included offense of the second." Id. at 166, 345 Ill.Dec. 59, 938 N.E.2d 498. We observed this was the "strictest approach in the sense that it is formulaic and rigid, and considers ‘solely theoretical or practical impossibility.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Novak , 163 Ill. 2d 93, 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994) ). In other words, it must be impossible to commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense. Id.

¶ 14 The present case requires us to determine how the abstract elements approach applies to the offense of home invasion. In general, a defendant commits home invasion when

"without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present"

and he or she engages in a separate predicate act, listed in one of six subsections. 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 2010). These predicate acts include using force or threatening to use force while armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon (id. § 12-11(a)(1), (3)); intentionally causing injury (id. § 12-11(a)(2) ); using force or threatening to use force and discharging a firearm (id. § 12-11(a)(4) ); personally discharging a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm (id. § 12-11(a)(5) ); and, relevant here, committing one of five sexual offenses, including criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-11(a)(6) ). The question we must answer here is whether, under the abstract elements approach, a court looks only to the specific statutory subsection of home invasion with which a defendant is charged and convicted, or whether the court looks to the entire statutory provision.

¶ 15 A split among the districts of the appellate court has arisen as to this question. One line of decisions, identified by defendant as the Bouchee line, interprets Miller as requiring courts to consider all of the statutory sections of the two relevant offenses, not just the particular subsection under which the defendant was charged and convicted. See People v. Bouchee , 2011 IL App (2d) 090542, ¶ 11, 356 Ill.Dec. 671, 962 N.E.2d 15 ; Fuller , 2013 IL App (3d) 110391, ¶¶ 20-22, 371 Ill.Dec. 694, 990 N.E.2d 882. Under this interpretation, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • State v. Family Vision Care, LLC
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 19, 2020
    ... ... 5(c)). 2019 IL App (1st) 180697, 37, 39, 431 Ill.Dec. 752, 128 N.E.3d 422. The appellate court also relied on People ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb , 18 Cal.App.5th 801, 226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 889 (2017), which stated the California statute does not limit standing to ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT