People v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 11 July 1888
• Citation: People v. Reynolds, 71 Mich. 343, 38 N.W. 923 (Mich. 1888)
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. REYNOLDS.

38 N.W. 923

71 Mich. 343

PEOPLE v. REYNOLDS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 11, 1888

Error to circuit court, Tuscola county; WATSON BEACH, Judge.

Information against De Elbert A. Reynolds for obtaining goods by false pretenses. Trial and conviction, and respondent brings error.

Moses Taggart, Atty. Gen., for the People.

LONG J.

The respondent in this cause was tried and convicted in the circuit court for the county of Tuscola for obtaining a stock of drugs and groceries of one Florence L. Coy by false pretenses, and brings the case into this court upon exceptions. The information was filed under section 9161 of Howell's Statutes, which provides: "Every person who, with intent to defraud or cheat another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or by any other false pretense, cause any person to grant," etc "or obtain from any person any money, personal property or valuable thing," etc., "shall be punished," etc. A copy of the information will be found in the margin. ^[1] On the trial, Mr. Coy was called as a witness for the people, and gave testimony tending to show that his wife, Florence L. Coy, was engaged in the drug and grocery business at Unionville, in 1886 and 1887, and that he was her agent in carrying on the business, and had exclusive charge of the same. He was then asked by the prosecuting attorney: " Question. Do you know De Elbert A. Reynolds? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. When did you first become acquainted with him? Mr. McGarry, Respondent's Attorney. I object to that. I object to any evidence, under this information, seeking to charge the respondent with any crime, because the information is not sufficient in itself to authorize any evidence to be received connecting the respondent with the alleged crime- First, because it is not pretended that the respondent pretended to make any pretenses whatever; the indispensable requirement has been left out in that respect. Neither is it alleged that the pretenses stated by Mr. Atwood to the jury were false in fact; it simply alleges that the respondent knew them to be false, without alleging the further necessary requirements that, in point of fact, they were false. Before any evidence whatever can be introduced connecting this respondent with the crime charged, there must be an information sufficient in itself to warrant the court in rendering judgment upon it. By the Court. There is a doubtful question upon the face of the information, but I am inclined to think that these subsequent allegations aid the omission of that word 'pretend' in there, so that the information on its face really works no injury to the defendant. I think I will hold it sufficient in this court." The only allegations in the information showing the falsity of the pretenses are: "Whereas, in truth and in fact, the said De Elbert A. Reynolds well knew that the said real-estate mortgage was not a gilt-edged mortgage," etc. These are not allegations that the pretenses were false in fact. A false pretense was defined in a Massachusetts case to be "a representation of some fact or circumstance calculated to mislead, which is not true." Com. v. Drew, 19 Pick. 179. The statute, like all criminal statutes, must be construed strictly, and nothing not within its words be held to be within its meaning. The most obvious proposition is that the pretense must be false, (People v. Tompkins, 1 Park. Crim. R. 224); and the doctrine undoubtedly is that if it is not false, though believed to be so by the person employing it, it is insufficient. It being, therefore, necessary to prove the falsity of the pretense, it is necessary to aver it in the information. State v. De Lay, (Mo.) 5 S.W. 607. In this respect the information is fatally defective, and no conviction could be sustained under it. The verdict and judgment of the court below must be set aside, and the respondent discharged.

The other justices concurred.

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Notes:

^[1] State of Michigan, County of Tuscola ss.-The Circuit Court for the County of Tuscola.

Theron W. Atwood, prosecuting attorney for the county of Tuscola aforesaid, for and in behalf of the people of the state of Michigan, comes into said court in the September term thereof, A. D. 1887, and gives it here to understand and be informed that on the 10th day of March, A. D. 1887, at the township of Columbia, in said county, Florence L. Coy was engaged in the business of selling drugs and groceries at retail; and on said day, at said place, she had and owned in her store building, in which she carried on said business, a stock of drugs and groceries of the value of $2,146.36. That the said business of Florence L. Coy, and the exclusive management of the same, and the said stock of drugs and groceries, was under the control of John S. Coy, who was acting as the agent of said Florence L. Coy. That on, to-wit the said 16th day of March, A. D. 1887, at said township of Columbia, De Elbert A. Reynolds, late of Lyons, Ionia county Mich., with intent to cheat and defraud her,...