People v. Rhodes

• Decision Date: 18 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. A102776.,A102776.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Chad RHODES, Defendant and Appellant.

24 Cal.Rptr.3d 834

126 Cal.App.4th 1374

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Chad RHODES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A102776.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1.

February 18, 2005.

Review Denied June 8, 2005.

Matthew Zwerling, Richard Such, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Allen R. Crown, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SWAGER, J.

We conclude in this appeal that the sentence imposed upon defendant of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the second degree murder of a peace officer in the performance of his duties does not offend equal protection principles or constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We therefore affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged in count one with murder (Pen.Code, § 187),¹ with personal use of a semiautomatic firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)), and personal infliction of great bodily injury upon a peace officer with a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.5, subd. (b)), along with the special circumstance and aggravating factor that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties (§ 190, subds. (a) & (c)(4)); in count two with attempted murder (§§ 187/664), with personal use of a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (b), 12022.53, subd. (d)); in count three with assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (b)), with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)); and in count four with assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). After 53 days of jury trial but prior to the commencement of jury deliberations, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of the lesser included offense of second degree murder with personal use of a firearm, and the lesser included offense of assault with a firearm upon a peace officer.² The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for second degree murder of a peace officer.

The evidence presented at trial before the plea was entered, considered as it must be in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1),³ showed that on the night of January 9, 1999, defendant and some friends drove around Oakland in two cars, a Nissan Maxima and a Chevrolet Caprice, apparently with the objective of retaliating for injuries inflicted during a prior fight. They had been drinking heavily, and firearms were present in both cars. Defendant was in the Chevrolet with three other occupants, and was armed with an assault rifle.

Defendant and his friends in the Chevrolet observed a police vehicle pass them and initiate a pursuit of the Nissan, before they briefly lost sight of both cars. During the police pursuit of the Nissan on Interstate 580 in Oakland, an officer noticed that one of the occupants of the vehicle threw a shotgun out of the window onto the fast lane of traffic near the 38th Avenue exit. The Nissan subsequently crashed and its occupants were apprehended. Officers and evidence technicians arrived at the scene to seize the shotgun and collect evidence.

While the collection of evidence continued, defendant and his friends in the Chevrolet parked above the freeway at an overpass. Defendant left the car, and with his assault rifle fired shots at the officers below on the freeway, killing Officer James Williams and injuring Officer John Oare. In a subsequent interview with the police, defendant stated that he fired at the police vehicles and a wall behind them to frighten the police away from his friends in the Nissan, not to hurt anyone. The defense also adduced evidence that defendant had poor vision, particularly at night.

DISCUSSION

I. The Sentence of Life Without Possibility of Parole as a Violation of Equal Protection and Due Process of Law.

Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the homicide sentencing scheme that punishes second degree murder of a peace officer "while engaged in the performance of his or her duties" with a sentence of life without possibility of parole upon an additional finding of specified facts (§ 190, subd. (c)), while the "more serious offense" of "first degree murder of a non-peace officer or of a peace officer not in the performance of his or her duties and without other `special circumstances'" imposes a lesser sentence of 25 years to life (§ 190, subd. (a)). He points out that he was charged with first degree premeditated murder, but upon entry of a guilty plea to the "less serious" second degree murder offense with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5),⁴ was "given greater punishment than he would have received if he had been found guilty of the more serious one." Defendant therefore argues that his "sentence was arbitrary, in violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection."

"`Guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution prohibit the state from arbitrarily discriminating among persons subject to its jurisdiction.'" (People v. Chavez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1, 4, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 556.) "The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws has been defined to mean that all persons under similar circumstances are given `"equal protection and security in the enjoyment of personal and civil rights ... and the prevention and redress of wrongs...."' [Citation.] The concept `"`compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.'"' [Citation.]" (Pederson v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 931, 939, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 289.) "`Under the equal protection clause, "[a] classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'"' [Citations.]" (People v. Wilder (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 104, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 247.)

"`The equality guaranteed by the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions is equality under the same conditions, and among persons similarly situated. The Legislature may make reasonable classifications of persons and other activities, provided the classifications are based upon some legitimate object to be accomplished.' [Citation.]" (People v. Spears (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1683, 1687, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 634.) "`The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' [Citations.]" (People v. Dial (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 573; see also People v. Calhoun (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 519, 529, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 166.) "The `similarly situated' prerequisite simply means that an equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distinction is justified." (People v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, 714, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173.) "Persons who are similarly situated must be treated alike. [Citation.] There is, however, no requirement that persons in different circumstances must be treated as if their situations were similar." (People v. McCain (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 817, 819, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 779.)

"This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but `whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.'" (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654.) "`The use of the term "similarly situated" in this context refers only to the fact that "`[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.' ..." ... There is always some difference between the two groups which a law treats in an unequal manner since an equal protection claim necessarily asserts that the law in some way distinguishes between the two groups.'" (People v. Jones (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 220, 227, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 10; see also People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558.) "The analysis will not proceed beyond this stage if the groups at issue are not `"similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law,"' or if they are similarly situated, but receive "`like treatment.'" Identical treatment is not required." (In re Jose Z. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 953, 960, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 842.)

"`If it is determined that the law treats similarly situated groups differently, a second level of analysis is required. If the law in question impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. All other legislation satisfies the requirements of equal protection if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.'" (People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 12-13, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 247, quoting from People v. Goslar, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 277, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558.)

We find that defendant has failed to demonstrate that two similarly situated groups have been treated in an unequal manner by the sentencing laws. His claim of denial of equal protection is based upon the imposition of different levels of punishment upon defendants convicted of distinctly classified homicides. The particular second degree murder committed by defendant...