People v. Rice, 1-90-1433

Decision Date25 August 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1-90-1433,1-90-1433
Citation234 Ill.App.3d 12,599 N.E.2d 1253
Parties, 175 Ill.Dec. 239 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin A. RICE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., County of Cook, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Matthew L. Moodhe, Susan Schierl, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Rita A. Fry, First Asst. Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Michael Davidson, Alison Edwards, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Justice DiVITO delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury found defendant Melvin A. Rice guilty of aggravated battery and he was subsequently sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the State improperly elicited testimony in violation of a motion in limine regarding a pending sex offense charge against him the circuit court improperly restricted his cross-examination of a State witness; the circuit court erroneously admitted alleged prejudicial hearsay; he was denied a fair trial by several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct; the circuit court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense over his objection; and the circuit court improperly sentenced him to an extended term.

Evidence at trial showed that in November 1989, Demetra Anderson met defendant while both were students at Harold Washington College in Chicago. Thereafter, they began a relationship which ended during the first week of December 1989.

According to Anderson, on December 11, 1989, while she was home alone in her apartment, defendant telephoned three times between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m., wanting to talk about renewing their relationship. During each of defendant's calls, he asked Anderson if he could come to her apartment that evening; Anderson repeatedly told defendant that he could not. At approximately 5 a.m., Anderson was awakened by someone ringing her doorbell; when she went to the door, she saw defendant, who told her that he needed a place to sleep because he could not go home, but that he did not desire sex. Although Anderson did not want defendant to stay with her, she "felt sorry" for him and allowed him to enter her apartment. Once inside, Anderson told him to sleep on a mattress on the floor of the living room; defendant, however, wanted to sleep with Anderson in her bedroom. Anderson again told defendant to sleep in the living room and he again refused. Not wanting to argue with defendant, Anderson went to her room. Defendant then followed her into the bedroom; when defendant asked Anderson if they could have sex, she refused.

At that point, defendant "snapped" and became "violent"; he yelled at Anderson and, when she sat on the bed, hit her in the face three times. She fell back onto the bed and began screaming and hitting the bedroom wall in order to summon her neighbors for help. When she began screaming, though, defendant pushed a pillow onto her face and told her to stop. Because she was suffocating and gasping for breath, Anderson struggled with defendant, scratching him in the face.

After Anderson told him that she would stop screaming, defendant removed the pillow from her face, though he still was on top of her. When Anderson began yelling again and reached for the phone, defendant choked her and hit her twice more, near the eye and nose.

Still screaming, Anderson begged defendant to let her get some ice for her face, which was bleeding. Defendant, however, refused and just looked at her face, stating, "Fucked up your pretty face, didn't I." Defendant then ordered Anderson to stay in the bedroom.

Shortly thereafter, while Anderson was in the bedroom, crying and wiping up her blood, the doorbell rang. Defendant told her not to move while he went to answer the door; Anderson, however, ran to the window adjacent to the front door and, pulling back the towel that covered the window, began screaming, "Help, somebody please call the police. He's trying to kill me." Defendant then told her, "Well, you got your police," and opened the door after about two or three minutes, letting the police in. After the police arrived, Anderson was taken to the hospital, treated, and released.

On cross-examination, Anderson acknowledged that she had recently pled guilty in federal court to unlawful secretion of the mail. She further admitted that she had once had a drug problem, but stated that she had not taken any drugs for 18 months and was not under the influence of drugs during the fight with defendant. She explained that, though she had regained custody of her son, she allowed her son to live with her great aunt because "it's the best place for him because I'm not working and I'm a full time student." Defense counsel attempted to question Anderson about her drug use; however, the court limited the examination regarding any recent drug use, stating that defendant was unable to present any evidence or offer proof to support his accusation that Anderson did not have custody of her son because she continued to use drugs.

The court further limited defendant's cross-examination of Anderson concerning discrepancies between what she had said her follow-up instructions were when she left the hospital and what what was contained in her written instructions on the hospital's discharge instruction sheet. Defense counsel attempted to show that, although Anderson testified that the doctor had told her to return to the hospital for treatment, the written instructions required her to return for treatment only "if needed." Thus, defendant attempted to show that Anderson's injuries were not as severe as she had led the jury to believe. The circuit court sustained the State's objection to the admission of the discharge instruction sheet from the hospital, noting that it was inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

Chicago police officer Marie Watkins testified that, on December 12, 1989, at approximately 5:15 a.m., she and her partner responded to a battery in progress call occurring at Anderson's apartment. Upon arrival, Watkins heard a woman screaming, "God, help me. Somebody, please help me. He's trying to kill me." Watkins then ran to the front window where she saw Anderson with a bloody face, screaming. The two officers knocked on the apartment door and announced their office; after several minutes defendant opened the door.

While Watkins' partner isolated defendant from Anderson, Watkins attempted to calm Anderson, who was hysterical and screaming and whose face was bloody and swollen. Shortly thereafter, Anderson was taken to South Chicago Hospital for emergency treatment.

Placing defendant under arrest, Watkins and her partner transported him to the police station. While in the squad car, defendant voluntarily told Watkins, "Do you want to know what happened? * * * That bitch scratched me on my face. That's why I hit her. * * * I don't let no bitch hit me in the face and get away with it." Defendant also told Watkins that if he did not have handcuffs on he would "kick [her] ass," because "every woman needs to get their ass kicked * * * once in a while." After arriving at the station, Watkins told defendant that hospital personnel had informed her that Anderson might lose an eye, to which defendant responded, "I don't give a fuck if that bitch lose her eye. She shouldn't have scratched me in my face." Watkins noticed that defendant had a small scratch on his face, less than an inch long and not bleeding.

Assistant State's Attorney Laura Lambur testified that she spoke with defendant while he was at the police station. There, defendant told Lambur that he had hit Anderson because she had scratched his face. Lambur noticed that defendant had two or three "small marks" on his cheeks; according to Lambur, defendant's "skin wasn't broken. Rather it looked like if you take a nail and scratch your own skin when your skin is dry."

Mohammed S. Baig, M.D., the emergency room physician at South Chicago Hospital, testified that he treated Anderson immediately after her arrival; he observed that her eye was extremely swollen, tender to the touch, discolored, and she had a laceration over her left eyebrow which required four stitches to close. Anderson also suffered from a blow-out fracture of the left orbit of her eye, consistent with a severe blow to the eye. Before she was released, Anderson was given a cold pack and two non-prescription Tylenol tablets.

Defendant testified that, after meeting Anderson, he began an affair with her despite being married and having a five-year-old child. On the night of December 11, 1989, he called Anderson three times; during the last call, sometime between 10 and 11 p.m., she asked him to come over. Because defendant did not arrive at Anderson's apartment until about 3:30 or 4 a.m., she became upset. After telling Anderson that he just needed a place to sleep, she told him to sleep on a mattress in the living room; defendant, however, explained to her that he did not want to sleep there because it was very cold and the heat was not on. Following their disagreement as to where he would sleep, defendant followed Anderson into her bedroom, where he took off his coat and shoes and began to get into bed, as he had done in the past. Anderson, unprovoked, then scratched defendant's face. Defendant reflexively reacted by hitting Anderson three times within a five second period, unaware that he was hitting her in the face.

Defendant panicked when Anderson began screaming because he did not want anyone to think that he had hurt her intentionally. He reacted by placing a pillow over Anderson's face, but removed it when he realized that it was not the right thing to do. He then began consoling Anderson and asked to see her eye, suggesting that he get a towel to clean her face. Approximately four or five minutes later, while defendant was on his way to the bathroom to get a towel, the police arrived and Anderson...

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16 cases
  • Degren v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • January 14, 1999
    ...Several other courts have reached comparable results with respect to similar issues. See People v. Rice, 234 Ill.App.3d 12, 26, 175 Ill.Dec. 239, 599 N.E.2d 1253, 1263, 1264, appeal denied, 147 Ill.2d 635, 180 Ill.Dec. 156, 606 N.E.2d 1233 (1992) (noting that "[i]t is not improper to call t......
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    ... ... (People v. Rice ... Page 900 ... [190 Ill.Dec. 870] (1992), 234 Ill.App.3d 12, 20, 175 Ill.Dec. 239, 599 N.E.2d 1253.) The trial court sustained the State's ... ...
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    ...preparing its witnesses to ensure that Cope did not volunteer improper and prejudicial testimony. See People v. Rice, 234 Ill.App.3d 12, 19, 175 Ill.Dec. 239, 599 N.E.2d 1253, 1259 (1992) (“It is axiomatic that prosecutors have a certain amount of control over their witnesses; in the instan......
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