People v. Richeson

• Decision Date: 23 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 35425,35425
• Citation: 24 Ill.2d 182,181 N.E.2d 170
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Richard RICHESON, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 170

181 N.E.2d 170

24 Ill.2d 182

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Richard RICHESON, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 35425.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 23, 1962.

John P. Ewart, and Craig & Craig, Mattoon, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., and Frank H. Schiederjon, State's Atty., Effingham (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendant in error.

HOUSE, Justice.

Defendant, Richard Richeson, entered a plea of guilty to burglary in the circuit court of Effingham County and after a hearing in aggravation and mitigation was sentenced to 12 to 40 years in the penitentiary.

On this writ of error he contends that the trial judge erred in failing to summon a jury on his own motion to determine defendant's sanity. On March 5, 1959, defendant, age 23, was charged by information with the crime of burglary. Counsel was appointed for him and he entered a plea of guilty. At the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, an FBI report and defendant's testimony disclosed that he was committed to the Illinois State Hospital in Jacksonville, Illinois, by the county court of Coles County on August 28, 1957, and that about a month later he walked away. He was never returned. A month after his escape he was sentenced on a charge of issuing a false check in the same county from which he had been committed, and was sent to the penal farm rather than to a mental institution.

Where facts that give rise to a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's sanity are brought to the attention of the trial court before or during trial, either from observation of defendant or from suggestion by counsel, the court has the duty to impanel a jury to determine whether the accused is capable of understanding the nature of the charges against him and of co-operating with his counsel. (People v. Robinson, 22 Ill.2d 162, 174 N.E.2d 820; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239.) Bona fide doubt is not necessarily raised, however, by the mere revelation that an accused had been declared a psychopath some years prior, (People v. Zerba, 20 Ill.2d 269, 170 N.E.2d 97,) nor by knowledge that a defendant has been placed in a prison psychiatric ward. Withers v. People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203.

There was no request here by defendant or by his counsel for a sanity hearing. The only evidence concerning his sanity was that he had been committed to the Illinois State Hospital in Jacksonville where he spent a month. The test to be applied in determining a defendant's mental capacity to stand trial is whether he understands the nature and object of the charges against him and can, in co-operation with his counsel, conduct his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. (Withers v. People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203; People v. Bender, 20 Ill.2d 45, 169 N.E.2d 328; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239.) If defendant meets this test, he is mentally competent to stand trial although his mind may not be sound on other subjects. (Withers v. People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239.) Although commitment to an institution may indicate that the individual needs some form of psychiatric treatment, it does not follow that he lacks the mental capacity to stand trial. Here, the trial...