People v. Richmond, Docket No. 8691

• Decision Date: 23 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 8691,3
• Citation: 192 N.W.2d 372,35 Mich.App. 115
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Allen RICHMOND, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 372

192 N.W.2d 372

35 Mich.App. 115

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Allen RICHMOND, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 8691.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

July 23, 1971.

Released for Publication Dec. 17, 1971.

John W. Mitzel, Wickett, Erickson & Beach, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William C. Buhl, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before R. B. BURNS, P.J., and FITZGERALD and J. H. GILLIS, JJ.

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of felonious driving by a jury in the Van Buren County Circuit Court pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 752.191 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.661) on September 18, 1969, and sentenced on November 3, 1969, to a term of 15 months to 2 years in prison. Defendant appeals as of right.

The accident giving rise to the offense in question occurred on May 30, 1968. The record reveals that on that date defendant and Timothy Sage were seen by a gas station attendant at approximately 9 p.m. in the vicinity of the station, located near the Mattawan exit of highway I--94. They then proceeded toward Mattawan at a high rate of speed in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. Two state troopers patrolling traffic on the east-bound ramp of highway I--94 and the Mattawan exit, hearing tires squeal and seeing the Sage vehicle coming over an overpass nearby, gave chase. The troopers testified that the Sage vehicle, prior to the accident, was traveling at a speed of approximately 80 to 90 miles per hour. Approximately one mile from the point at which the troopers gave chase, the Sage vehicle struck another vehicle attempting to turn off the county road.

The troopers, upon arrival at the scene approximately half a minute after the crash, observed a passenger from the Sage vehicle, identified as Timothy Sage, staggering across the roadway and observed defendant pinned in the automobile. Defendant's feet were in the automobile while the trunk of his body was on the ground, his legs pinned in the vehicle by the position of the driver's door which was sprung.

Testimony at the trial of this case conflicted regarding the question of whether Sage or defendant was driving the Sage vehicle at the time of the accident. While defendant did not take the stand in his own behalf, Sage testified. His testimony indicated that defendant was driving the Sage vehicle with the permission of Sage. That testimony was corroborated by that of prosecution witness Manuel Cagle who stated that while the Sage vehicle was in the vicinity of the gas station, he saw the defendant behind the wheel of the vehicle as it departed for Mattawan.

Another prosecution witness, David Hiscock, owner of the vehicle struck by the Sage car, testified however, that after the accident, Sage was located in the driver's position and that Sage thereupon climbed over the console and exited from the vehicle's passenger side.

Defense witness William Cutler testified that prior to the accident he had observed the two men in the Sage vehicle at the gas station and that defendant, both upon arrival at and departure from the station, was located on the passenger side while complainant Sage did the driving.

On appeal, two issues are under consideration. The first issue stems from the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to impeach the prosecution's chief witness Sage to show the interest or bias of that witness. More precisely, when defense counsel asked Sage whether he had retained counsel to process a personal claim on the case being tried, an objection by the prosecutor thereto was sustained.

Later, out of the hearing of the jury, defense counsel again made an offer of proof that Sage had retained private counsel to institute and follow up on a personal injury action as a result of the accident in question. Counsel explained to the court that the proofs were offered to show prejudice on the part of complainant, affecting his testimony against defendant. The court ruled such testimony would be improper as impeachment on collateral matters and irrelevant.

Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to allow the foregoing questioning was improper in that a full cross-examination as to interest or bias of a witness is essential to a fair trial and that, while the trial court instructed the jury that they might properly consider the witness' interest, if any, in the verdict, no opportunity was granted defense counsel to show such interest.

He claims further that inasmuch as the proofs regarding guilt or innocence were very close, the denial of full cross-examination as to contemplated as well as commenced civil actions on the part of Sage is all the more meaningful and decisive in determining the outcome of the case.

In support of his position that the trial court's refusal to allow full cross-examination of Sage was erroneous, defendant relies upon People v. Field (1939), 290 Mich. 173, 287 N.W. 422, which concerned cross-examination of the people's chief witness regarding settlement of a civil action which had been instituted against the defendant.

Defendant also relies...