People v. Ricili
| Decision Date | 20 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 30550.,30550. |
| Citation | 400 Ill. 309,79 N.E.2d 509 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. RICILI. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Elmer J. Schnackenberg, judge.
Sam Ricili was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and he brings error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, of Chicago (H. J. Goldberger, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William J. Tuohy, State's Atty, of Chicago (John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, and W. S. Miroslawski, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error, Sam Ricili, hereinafter called the defendant, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County for the crime of assault with intent to commit rape against the person of the prosecutrix. He entered a plea of not guilty, was tried before a jury and at the close of all the evidence was found guilty as charged in the indictment. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than five nor more than eight years. He brings this cause here on writ of error contending that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court erred in its refusal of certain instructions.
The facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence are as follows: On May 30, 1946, around 11:00 or 12:00 at night, the prosecutrix was sitting in front of her apartment at 1633 North LaSalle Street in the city of Chicago, when an automobile with two men drove up and stopped in an alley adjacent to her premises. The driver remained in the car and the other man, not identified other than having reddish-blonde hair, got out, came up to prosecutrix, and, at the point of a gun, forced her to get into the car. They immediately drove away, she being seated between them. When the car started moving her assailant put his gun away and attempted to rape her but she successfully fought him off. They drove around and into an alley where they stopped the car and the unidentified man got out and locked the car, at which time the driver attempted to rape her. She screamed and fought him off and was pushed from the car and given a severe beating by both men, after which they drove off.
The prosecutrix testified to the above facts and stated further that at the time she was being beaten in the alley a woman opened a window nearby and asked what the trouble was and she replied that two men were trying to rape her. She also testified that a man and woman coming down the street came to where she was, picked her up, placed her on a table on the sidewalk and called the police; that when the police arrived she was taken to the Henrotin Hospital and afterwards to Cook County Hospital, where it was found she was injured in the eye, arm and knee. She remained in the hospital for about ten days.
On June 11, 1946, prosecutrix was called to the police station for the purpose of viewing parties in a showup. She went to nine or ten showups but was not able to identify anyone until Thursday evening, June 27. She testified that on that date there must have been about twelve or thirteen line-ups and she picked out Sam Ricili, the defendant; that there were nine in the line-up and she was sitting about four rows back when picked him out; that she had a conversation with the detective, who took her into the back room and she said, When they brought him in, prosecutrix looked at him and said, ‘Yes, that is him.’ In her examination, she was asked, ‘Did you say something to this defendant?’ Her answer was, “Sam,' I said, ‘Why did you do this to me,’ and he says ‘I don't know you and never saw you before.” This was the only testimony given for the prosecution with the exception of a police officer, who testified he sent defendant to the showup on June 27, 1946, and, on the following day questioned prosecutrix and defendant in the presence of each other; that at that time she told the story of being picked up by these two men, one displaying a gun, forcing her into a car and being taken for a ride on streets she did not know and their subsequently attempting to attack her and then being beat up and thrown into the alley. The defendant denied the charges and said he had never seen her before and was not the man that did it. The officer further testified the defendant said he was at home on May 30. When asked on examination, ‘Did you inquire where he was between the hours of twelve midnight and one A.M. on May 31, 1946?’ the officer answered, Evidence was offered for the defendant as to his good reputation and as to the alibi that he was at home on the night of the alleged assault, playing cards with his brother, Tony Ricili, and a friend, Carlo Giandalia.
The defendant contends the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because the testimony of the prosecutrix is not corroborated, either by any facts shown or by any circumstances, and that this court held in the case of People v. Kazmierczyk, 357 Ill. 592, 192 N.E. 657, that a conviction cannot stand on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix alone. In that case, however, it was pointed out that in exceptional cases, where no other evidence was available, and where the fact that rape has been committed was established by clear and convincing proof, the testimony of the prosecutrix, uncorroborated by other witnesses, might be sufficient to justify a conviction. People v. Sciales, 353 Ill. 169, 187 N.E. 169;People v. Andreanos, 323 Ill. 34, 153 N.E. 707. We held in the late case of People v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591, that where the testimony of the prosecutrix is clear and convincing it is not necessary that she be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction. People v. Vanghn, 390 Ill. 360, 61 N.E.2d 546;People v. Polak, 360 Ill. 440, 196 N.E. 513;People v. Sciales, 345 Ill. 118,117 N.E. 689.
In the Kazimierczyk and DeFrates cases the principal question involved was not that of identification, but the question whether or not a rape had actually been committed. We are of the opinion that the question in the instant case hinges on identification, and it is defendant's contention that his identification is insufficient. In the case of People v. Gold, 361 Ill. 23, 196 N.E. 729, 732, cited by defendant, the court said, ‘No man should be deprived of his liberty unless his identification as the party charged with a crime is under such circumstances and with such positiveness that there can be no reasonable doubt of its correctness.’ And further, ‘Where the conviction of a defendant rests upon an...
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People v. Nims, 85-1707
...there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a judgment of conviction will not be permitted to stand. (People v. Ricili, 400 Ill. 309 [79 N.E.2d 509]; People v. Gold, 361 Ill. 23 [196 N.E. 729].) Where the conviction of a defendant rests upon identification which is doubtful,......
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People v. Barber
...... Defendant points out that plausible alibi evidence cannot be disregarded where the only evidence contradicting it rests upon the identity of defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. (People v. Ricili (1948), 400 Ill. 309, 79 N.E.2d 509.) Defendant correctly points out that his activities early in the evening and before the occurrence in question were corroborated by Marlin Cobb and were uncontradicted. Defendant further argues, however, that sufficient consideration was not given to his ......
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