People v. Riley

• Decision Date: 23 April 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121751.
• Citation: 468 Mich. 135,659 N.W.2d 611
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert RILEY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

659 N.W.2d 611

468 Mich. 135

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert RILEY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 121751.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 23, 2003.

Michael E. Duggan, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Joseph A. Puleo, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, MI, for the people.

Mark R. Hall, Detroit, MI, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION AFTER REMAND

PER CURIAM.

The prosecutor sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant's first-degree murder conviction on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a directed verdict of acquittal. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant's conviction of felony murder. Because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief to support a finding that defendant was guilty of felony murder as an aider and abettor, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a directed verdict.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(b), arising out of the death of Mark Seaton. Defendant was observed at the victim's apartment along with David Ware, whose whereabouts are unknown. Defendant gave a statement to the police, admitting that he brought Ware to the victim's apartment and admitting to being present in the victim's apartment at the time of the charged offense. Defendant claimed that he observed Ware commit the murder. Specifically, defendant told the police that he observed Ware strangle the victim, bind the victim's hands and feet together, and then strangle the victim a second time after the victim resumed breathing. Shortly afterward, a neighbor knocked on the door.

In addition to the admission of defendant's statement, the prosecution presented the testimony of several neighbors, including Gloria Hollis. Hollis testified that she sensed something was wrong and knocked on the victim's apartment door twice. On both occasions, defendant answered the apartment door, claimed that he and Ware were cousins of the victim and that the victim was not home. After her first visit to the victim's apartment, Hollis observed electronic components being carried out of the apartment to the victim's car. Another neighbor testified that he observed defendant leaving the apartment with stereo equipment. Defendant and Ware attempted to leave the scene in the victim's car, but eventually fled on foot because the car would not start. The victim was found dead in his apartment with his wrists and ankles bound with duct tape and electrical cord.

In his appeal of right, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction on the basis that the trial court had erred in admitting hearsay testimony.¹ This Court reversed that judgment in an opinion per curiam, holding that defendant had knowingly waived his right to challenge the admission of the hearsay testimony. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider defendant's remaining issues.²

On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed defendant's murder conviction in an unpublished opinion per curiam.³ A majority of the Court of Appeals panel held that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, "a rational trier of fact could find the elements of first-degree murder proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 2002 WL at *1.

However, the majority found merit in defendant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move for a directed verdict of acquittal after the prosecution presented its proofs. The majority held that "the prosecution failed to present evidence that could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the principal or that he aided and abetted in the commission of felony murder." Slip op at 4. The majority further held that the failure to move for a directed verdict fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there was a reasonable probability that defendant would have been acquitted of the felony-murder charge had the motion been made. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment of conviction for larceny in a building, M.C.L. § 750.360.

The concurring judge opined that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. However, because the issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence without the defense witnesses' testimony was decided in the previous Court of Appeals opinion, the concurring judge believed that the holding became the law of the case and was not subject to further review.

II. Standard of Review

Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. A judge must first find the facts and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. People v. LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002).

Counsel's alleged deficiency relates to the failure to move for a directed verdict. Because a Ginther⁴ hearing was not conducted, our review of the relevant facts is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v. Nantelle, 215 Mich.App. 77, 87, 544 N.W.2d 667 (1996).

In assessing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, a trial court must consider the evidence presented by the prosecution to the time the motion is made and in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979).

III. Analysis

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 302-303, 521 N.W.2d 797 (1994). In order to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must show that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's performance constituted sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 687, 521 N.W.2d 557 (1994).

To prove felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecution must show that the defendant (1) performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result, (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of the predicate felony. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 755, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999).

In order to satisfy the malice standard required under People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), the prosecution must show that the aider and abettor either intended to kill, intended to cause great bodily harm, or wantonly and willfully disregarded the likelihood that the natural tendency of his...