People v. Rinehart, 111719.

Citation962 N.E.2d 444,2012 IL 111719,356 Ill.Dec. 759
Decision Date20 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 111719.,111719.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Thomas S. RINEHART, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and C. Steve Ferguson, State‘s Attorney, of Charleston (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman and Luke McNeill, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Karen Munoz, Deputy Defender, and Colleen M. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[356 Ill.Dec. 761] ¶ 1 In 2007, defendant Thomas Rinehart was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence, but remanded with instructions for the circuit court of Coles County to select a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) within the range of three years to natural life contained in section 5–8–1(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d)(4) (West 2006)). 406 Ill.App.3d 272, 348 Ill.Dec. 90, 943 N.E.2d 698. The State appealed.

¶ 2 The central issue before us, then, is whether the appellate court erred in holding that section 5–8–1(d)(4) requires the trial court to set a determinate MSR term within the statutory range. In his request for cross-relief, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to pose various questions during voir dire. We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence, and vacate the appellate court's order on MSR.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 2006, the defendant lived with his girlfriend, Hope Scott, and her children, one of which was A.A., a then–17–year–old girl with developmental disabilities. Sometime in August of that year, the defendant borrowed Scott's minivan to help her friends move to Mattoon from Charleston, Illinois. A.A. rode alone with the defendant on one trip. Several weeks later, she told Scott's friends' daughters that the defendant had forced her to have sex in the back of the minivan on the day they moved. Subsequently, the police arrested the defendant, and charged him with criminal sexual assault.

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a jury trial. During jury selection, the parties were permitted to question venire members pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 431 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 431 (eff. May 1, 2007)). The State asked 5 of the 25 potential jurors who were questioned why a sexual assault victim might delay in reporting an incident. The exchanges between the prosecutor and the jurors were short.

“MS. KIGER [Assistant State's Attorney]: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might not immediately report an incident?

MR. WHITE [Prospective Juror]: Why they would not report an incident?

MS. KIGER: Right away.

MR. WHITE: The victim?

MS. KIGER: Correct.

MR. WHITE: Well, they probably may say it really didn't happen, and then the falling out with the parents. Maybe there was a relationship, you know, age difference relationship. Then the parents found out about it, convinced, you know. Children are children.

MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim who had had some things happen to them might not immediately go to an adult or report it?

MR. WHITE: Scared.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a victim of sexual assault might not immediately report it to someone?

MS. FULLER [Prospective Juror]: Fear, shame.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim might delay in reporting being raped or being a victim of sexual assault?

MS. HANFT [Prospective Juror]: Shame, embarrassment, fear.

* * * MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might not automatically come forward?

MR. RALSTON [Prospective Juror]: Oh, I think maybe fear, and think you would be a lesser person if something like that happened to you.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might not immediately report that?

MR. AYERS [Prospective Juror]: Yeah.

MS. KIGER: Can you tell me what some of those reasons would be?

MR. AYERS: Same, fear and scared to come forward.”

Defense counsel did not object to any of these questions. The State and the defense each excused one of these jurors, so only three of those five venire members ultimately served on the jury.

¶ 6 At trial, A.A. testified for the State, and recounted the details of the attack. According to A.A., while she and the defendant were between towns, he pulled the minivan off a familiar state highway and onto an unfamiliar rural side road. He stopped the van and turned off its engine. A.A. could see trees and a fence, and a distant house. She stated that the defendant ordered her to get into the back of the van, where the rear seats had been removed, and take off her clothes. She was scared and complied. She further stated that the defendant joined her there and took off his clothes, then forced her to have sex. Afterwards, they got dressed, and he instructed her not to tell anyone before resuming the trip to Charleston. A.A. identified the defendant as the man who attacked her.

¶ 7 Detective James Hite of the Coles County sheriff's department also testified for the State. He stated that he received a call on August 27, 2006, to investigate a sexual assault by the defendant against A.A. Detective Hite contacted the Department of Children and Family Services, who arranged an interview between a child advocacy center staffer and A.A. He watched the interview and observed A.A.'s demeanor. Detective Hite also took photographs of the site of the attack, which were submitted into evidence by the State.

¶ 8 The defendant presented no evidence on his behalf. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment, but not to a specific MSR term. Instead, the court stated:

“I further order that the defendant will serve a period of [MSR] after serving his sentence as mandated by statute.

Counsel, [it is] a little bit unclear to me what that period would be. There's been some recent legislation that would suggest to me that the applicable time upon the defendant for this offense is not less than three and could be up to natural life, as the statute indicates, regarding the mandatory supervised release period. I don't think I have to make that as part of my finding. It's what the Department of Corrections will impose upon him, but there is a minimum three-year mandatory supervised release period. As I understand the statute, it could be beyond that period.”

The written sentencing judgment also did not mention MSR. Thereafter, the Illinois Department of Corrections calculated the defendant's sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term of three years to natural life. The defendant appealed.

¶ 9 The appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction, vacated his MSR term, and remanded with directions to set an MSR term within the statutory range. 406 Ill.App.3d 272, 348 Ill.Dec. 90, 943 N.E.2d 698. The appellate court first addressed the defendant's argument that the State's questions for prospective jurors asked them to prejudge A.A.'s credibility and predisposed them to believe her testimony, thus denying him a fair trial. The appellate court noted that the defendant had forfeited review of that issue, but considered whether it was plain error. Id. at 276, 348 Ill.Dec. 90, 943 N.E.2d 698. The court concluded that allowing the questions was, indeed, error. According to the appellate court,

[The questions were] designed to expose whether a juror would automatically perceive a delay in reporting to mean the victim was lying about the incident. A negative response to the State's question could have indicated potential bias against the veracity of the victim's testimony. While questions designed to discover bias are proper, these questions to prospective jurors asked jurors to speculate as to reasons why a victim might not come forward. While the subject could be raised in voir dire through artful questions, the questions asked by the prosecutor crossed the boundary of acceptable voir dire. Id.

¶ 10 The appellate court, however, refused to excuse the defendant's procedural default. First, the court held that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Id. at 277, 348 Ill.Dec. 90, 943 N.E.2d 698. The State, through A.A.'s testimony, presented evidence of the attack and its location, while the defendant presented no evidence. Id. Second, the court held that the error did not affect the fairness of the trial. Id. The appellate court stated:

[W]hile the voir dire questions crossed the line of propriety, they did not indoctrinate the jury and deny defendant a fair trial. The State's questions, though improper, were not pervasive. In addition, the jurors, during the same questioning, recognized defendant's innocence until proved guilty and asserted they would be impartial. During trial, the jurors heard the victim testify she was afraid to tell her mother, who was defendant's live-in paramour, because she feared her mother would not believe her and would punish her. The jurors did not have to rely on speculation for determining the reason for A.A.'s delay in reporting the offense.” Id.

The appellate court further held that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not show prejudice from his attorney's failure to object to the State's questions. Id. at 278, 348 Ill.Dec. 90, 943 N.E.2d 698.

¶ 11 The appellate court then addressed the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to an MSR term within the statutory range. The appellate court concluded that the Unified Code of Corrections contains a...

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