People v. Ringland

Decision Date29 June 2017
Docket NumberDocket No. 119484
Citation89 N.E.3d 735,2017 IL 119484
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Cara M. RINGLAND et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Brian J. Towne, State's Attorney, of Ottawa (Carolyn E. Shapiro and David L. Franklin, Solicitors General, Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People.

Stephen M. Komie and Brian E. King, of Komie & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee Cara Ringland.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Dimitri Golfis, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee James Saxen.

Douglas B. Olivero, of Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru, for appellee Steven L. Harris.

George Mueller, of Mueller Anderson & Associates, of Ottawa, for amicus curiae Freddy Sizemore, an Individual.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendants, Cara Ringland, Steven Pirro, James Saxen, Steven Harris, and Matthew Flynn, were separately charged with felony drug offenses in the circuit court of La Salle County. In each case, a controlled substance was discovered during a traffic stop. These traffic stops were conducted by a special investigator appointed by Brian Towne, then State's Attorney of La Salle County, pursuant to section 3–9005(b) of the Counties Code ( 55 ILCS 5/3–9005(b) (West 2012)).

¶ 2 The circuit court granted each defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the conduct of the special investigator exceeded the scope of section 3–9005(b). 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, 393 Ill.Dec. 276, 33 N.E.3d 1020. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Jeffrey Gaither, a special investigator for the La Salle County State's Attorney, conducted a traffic stop against each defendant, beginning with Ringland on January 31, 2012, and continuing through Flynn on March 12, 2013. Each traffic stop occurred on Interstate 80 in La Salle County and resulted in the discovery of a controlled substance. Defendants Ringland, Pirro, and Flynn were each charged with felony possession with intent to deliver cannabis, and defendants Harris and Saxen were respectively charged with felony possession with intent to deliver cocaine and methamphetamine.

¶ 5 Each defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence contending, inter alia , that Gaither lacked the authority to conduct a traffic stop. Defendants Ringland, Harris, and Saxen specifically argued that Gaither lacked such authority because Towne failed to comply with section 3–9005(b)' s mandatory procedures in hiring Gaither and, alternatively, that section 3–9005(b) did not authorize Gaither to conduct traffic stops.

¶ 6 The circuit court held a hearing on each motion to suppress. Ringland called Towne and Gaither as witnesses. The other defendants and the State stipulated to the following testimony. Towne testified that in late 2011, he formed a team of special investigators, which he named the State's Attorney's Felony Enforcement (SAFE) unit. According to Towne: "Basically I was looking to have a drug interdiction team primarily on Interstate 80 with officers who had previous extensive experience in drug interdiction on Interstate 80 ***." Towne authorized the SAFE unit to operate on the Interstate "[t]hrough the statute for the duties and powers of the State's Attorney." On January 21, 2012, Towne swore in Gaither as a SAFE investigator and "then authorize[d] him to go out and enforce the law." Gaither testified that SAFE investigators "were hired to work on *** I–80 and look for narcotics traffickers and criminals" and "[t]o arrest people who were smuggling narcotics or proceeds from narcotics up and down the interstates in Illinois in La Salle County." Gaither received his paychecks from La Salle County, and he viewed himself "as an employee of the State's Attorney of La Salle County." He never took an oath as a deputy sheriff of La Salle County, and he never took an oath from the county sheriff in any regard. Gaither was provided a Ford Explorer equipped with emergency lights and a video camera. When asked what the purpose of that vehicle was, Gaither answered: "To make traffic stops."

¶ 7 At the suppression hearings for defendants Ringland and Pirro, Gaither further testified that, by prearranged plan, when a SAFE investigator would broadcast the initiation of a traffic stop, a drug-detection canine unit would automatically proceed to that location. Gaither also testified as to the factual circumstances surrounding the traffic stops for defendants Ringland, Pirro, and Saxen at their respective suppression hearings.1

¶ 8 The circuit court granted each defendant's motion to suppress. The court ruled that section 3–9005(b) required strict compliance with its background verification procedures prior to Gaither's appointment. According to the court, the statute unequivocally required that Gaither's fingerprints be taken and transmitted to the Illinois State Police, which would examine its records and relate any conviction information to the State's Attorney. The court found that these requirements were not met. For this reason, the court concluded that Gaither lacked the authority to conduct these traffic stops.

¶ 9 The State filed a notice of appeal from each suppression order ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2006)), and the appellate court consolidated the cases for review. 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, ¶ 6, 393 Ill.Dec. 276, 33 N.E.3d 1020. The appellate court likewise concluded that Gaither lacked the authority to conduct the instant traffic stops. However, the appellate court based its conclusion on a different reason. "Leaving aside the issue of whether the State's Attorney either strictly or substantially complied with the fingerprint requirement of the statute, *** the conduct of both the SAFE unit and Gaither exceeded the scope of section 3–9005(b), rendering the traffic stops and arrests unlawful." Id. ¶ 34. For that reason, the appellate court affirmed each suppression order.

¶ 10 On August 16, 2015, the Illinois Attorney General, the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and Towne filed a petition for leave to appeal on behalf of the State, which we allowed on November 25, 2015.2 During briefing in this court, Karen Donnelly defeated Towne in the November 2016 general election. On December 1, 2016, Donnelly took office as La Salle County State's Attorney. Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Before this court, the State assigns error to the appellate court's affirmance of the circuit court's suppression orders. The State contends, inter alia , that section 3–9005(b) authorized Towne to create his SAFE unit and empower his special investigators to conduct traffic stops. We apply the two-part standard of review adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Under this standard, the circuit court's factual findings are upheld unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. "The reviewing court then assesses the established facts in relation to the issues presented and may reach its own conclusions as to what relief, if any, should be allowed. Accordingly, the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo ." People v. Hunt , 2012 IL 111089, ¶ 22, 360 Ill.Dec. 774, 969 N.E.2d 819 ; People v. Harris , 228 Ill. 2d 222, 230, 319 Ill.Dec. 823, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008). Resolution of this issue requires us to construe the relevant statutory language. Our review is de novo also because the construction of a statute is a question of law. People v. Gutman , 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621.

¶ 13 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Also, a court presumes that the General Assembly did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Perez , 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9, 385 Ill.Dec. 41, 18 N.E.3d 41 ; People v. Hunter , 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 13, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185.

¶ 14 Section 3–9005(b) of the Counties Code provides in relevant part: "The State's Attorney of each county shall have authority to appoint one or more special investigators to [ (1) ] serve subpoenas, [ (2) ] make return of process and [ (3) ] conduct investigations which assist the State's Attorney in the performance of his duties." 55 ILCS 5/3–9005(b) (West 2012). Section 3–9005(b) expressly limits its investigation authorization to those investigations that assist a State's Attorney in the performance of his or her duties. Id. Further, based on its plain language, the appellate court correctly observed that this is an exclusive list ( 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, ¶ 37, 393 Ill.Dec. 276, 33 N.E.3d 1020 ), and the State does not argue otherwise before this court.

¶ 15 Towne and Gaither each testified that SAFE investigators did not serve...

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  • Beaman v. Freesmeyer
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 7, 2019
    ...). ¶ 43 This court has recognized that prosecutors ordinarily rely on police and other agencies to investigate criminal acts. People v. Ringland , 2017 IL 119484, ¶ 24, 417 Ill.Dec. 816, 89 N.E.3d 735. Significantly, " ‘it is the recognized practice that the State's Attorney sensibly defers......
  • Beaman v. Freesmeyer
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • July 29, 2021
    ...to defer to the investigative duties of the police. Beaman II , 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 43, 433 Ill.Dec. 130, 131 N.E.3d 488 (citing People v. Ringland , 2017 IL 119484, ¶ 24, 417 Ill.Dec. 816, 89 N.E.3d 735 ). Thus, prosecutors are greatly dependent on the detectives assigned to a particular cas......
  • Kelly v. Vill. of Kenilworth
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 21, 2019
    ...require that law enforcement agencies in this state cooperate with one another to investigate and prosecute crime. See People v. Ringland , 2017 IL 119484, ¶ 24, 417 Ill.Dec. 816, 89 N.E.3d 735 (stating that "[t]he State's Attorney's duty to investigate suspected illegal activity acknowledg......
  • Beaman v. Freesmeyer
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 17, 2019
    ...and other agencies to investigate criminal acts." Beaman , 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 43, 433 Ill.Dec. 130, 131 N.E.3d 488 (citing People v. Ringland , 2017 IL 119484, ¶ 24, 417 Ill.Dec. 816, 89 N.E.3d 735 (also observing state's attorneys defer to the investigative duties of the police)). Unlike in......
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