People v. Rissley

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 82536.,82536.
• Citation: 795 N.E.2d 174,276 Ill.Dec. 821,206 Ill.2d 403
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jeffrey D. RISSLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

795 N.E.2d 174

206 Ill.2d 403

276 Ill.Dec. 821

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jeffrey D. RISSLEY, Appellant.

No. 82536.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 2003.

Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, John J. Hanlon, Assistant Defender, Springfield, and Anna Ahronheim, Chicago, all of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, and David J. Bradford and Christine A. Hill, of Jenner & Block, L.L.C., Chicago, for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Marc P. Bernabei, State's Attorney, Princeton (Barbara A. Preiner and Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitors General, and William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Lawrence C. Marshall and Karen L. Daniel, Chicago, for amici curiae 44 Concerned Illinois Attorneys & Law Professors.

Locke E. Bowman and Jean Maclean Snyder, Chicago, for amici curiae Leaders of the Religious Community.

J. Timothy Eaton, Dennis A. Rendleman, Mary T. McDermott and Selina S. Thomas, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Bar Association. Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Jeffrey Rissley, pled guilty in the circuit court of Bureau County to charges of aggravated kidnapping and murder. At his capital sentencing hearing, a jury found him eligible for the death penalty and further concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death on the charge of murder and to a term of 15 years' imprisonment on the charge of aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d 364, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133 (1995). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Rissley v. Illinois, 516 U.S. 992, 116 S.Ct. 525, 133 L.Ed.2d 432, (1995).

Defendant thereafter filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which was later amended by his appointed counsel. The State moved to dismiss the petition. The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss in part, and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the claims which had not been dismissed. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied defendant postconviction relief, and defendant appealed to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651.

On March 15, 2001, this court issued an opinion in which we affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that defendant's late filing of his petition could not be excused under the culpable negligence exception contained in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Following the issuance of our decision, defendant filed a petition for rehearing, in which he argued that our opinion failed to define the term "culpable negligence" and therefore rendered the exception illusory. While defendant's petition was pending, this court took under advisement People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89 (2002), a case in which the constitutionality of section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was called into question on several levels. In light of this fact, we granted defendant rehearing and ordered the parties to file additional briefs. 155 Ill.2d R. 367.

Subsequent to our granting of rehearing, then-governor George Ryan commuted defendant's death sentence to natural life imprisonment without possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss his appeal. We denied the motion on April 4, 2003. As we will explain, the commutation renders moot the sentencing issues that defendant has raised in this appeal. We therefore will confine our discussion to the procedural issue raised by the State and the guilt-phase issues raised in the circuit court. Although we adhere to our original construction of the statute, and find that defendant's petition was untimely filed, we agree with defendant that our original opinion failed to provide a workable definition of the term "culpable negligence" so as to provide the necessary guidance to our lower courts.

BACKGROUND

This court previously detailed the facts surrounding the crimes for which defendant stands convicted in our opinion on direct appeal. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d 364, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133. Instead of repeating them here, we will note the pertinent facts from the original proceedings where necessary throughout the body of this opinion.

In October 1995, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)). The circuit court subsequently appointed counsel to assist defendant, and counsel filed an amended petition on March 1, 1996. Defendant's pro se petition and the amended petition contained, in total, some 21 different claims, including a single claim in which it was argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to incorporate and brief the 56 issues raised in the various postsentencing motions filed at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. The amended petition also realleged each issue that had been raised in defendant's direct appeal. Taken together, the pleadings presented a wide variety of claims regarding the allegedly ineffective assistance of both defendant's trial and appellate counsel.

The State initially moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred, arguing that it was filed beyond the time required by section 122-1 of the Act. In response, defendant maintained that his petition had been timely filed. Defendant also argued, in the alternative, that if his petition were to be deemed untimely, the petition need not be dismissed because the delay in filing was not the result of defendant's culpable negligence, an exception provided for in section 122-1. Defendant contended that he had relied on the advice of his appellate counsel on direct appeal, who informed him that he had three years from the date of his sentencing to file a postconviction petition. Defendant submitted an affidavit from his appellate counsel in which counsel corroborated defendant's allegations regarding the advice counsel gave to defendant. After a hearing on the issue, the circuit court denied the State's motion to dismiss the petition.

The State thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss defendant's petitions. In this motion, the State argued that defendant's claims were barred by principles of res judicata and waiver. In addition, the State contended that defendant's claims failed to allege a substantial constitutional violation such that an evidentiary hearing was warranted. The circuit court heard arguments on the motion, and ultimately dismissed, without an evidentiary hearing, all but four of defendant's claims. Specifically, the court determined that under this court's precedent, an evidentiary hearing had to be held with respect to defendant's claims concerning his ingestion of psychotropic drugs and his failure to receive a fitness hearing. The court further ruled that a hearing was necessary with respect to defendant's allegations that his trial counsel, John Hedrich, had lied to him in conversations leading up to defendant's decision to plead guilty. According to defendant's allegations, Hedrich misrepresented to defendant that his co-counsel, J.D. Flood, and another attorney, Andrea Lyon, both concurred in the decision to plead guilty. Moreover, the court also found that defendant's allegations that Hedrich omitted certain facts from defendant's motion to vacate the guilty plea also necessitated an evidentiary hearing, as did defendant's claim that Hedrich labored under a conflict of interest.

The circuit court thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on each of the claims noted above. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied postconviction relief, and defendant filed the instant appeal.

ANALYSIS

We begin first by noting the familiar principles regarding postconviction proceedings. A postconviction action is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill.2d 236, 242, 207 Ill.Dec. 442, 647 N.E.2d 935 (1995); People v. Free, 122 Ill.2d 367, 377, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184 (1988). As such, the remedy "is not a substitute for, or an addendum to, direct appeal." People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill.2d 325, 328, 202 Ill.Dec. 279, 637 N.E.2d 1015 (1994). The scope of the proceeding is limited to constitutional matters that have not been, nor could have been, previously adjudicated. Any issues which could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted (People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 9, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989)) and any issues which have previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the doctrine of res judicata (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 365, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987)). In addition to these procedural bars, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations set forth in the petition, as supported by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 381, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). In making that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits are to be taken as true, but nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which merely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require a hearing under the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 381,233 Ill.Dec. 789,701 N.E.2d 1063. The dismissal of a postconviction petition is warranted only when the petition's allegations of fact—liberally construed in favor of the petitioner and in light of the original trial record—fail to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 382,233 Ill.Dec. 789,701 N.E.2d 1063. On appeal, the circuit court's decision to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing is subject to plenary review. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 388-89,233...