People v. Rivera, No. 98609.
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | Karmeier |
| Citation | 221 Ill.2d 481,852 N.E.2d 771 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Michael RIVERA, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 18 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 98609. |
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v.
Michael RIVERA, Appellant.
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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
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James K. Leven, Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, James E. Fitzgerald, Mary L. Boland, Alan J. Spellberg, Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:
The defendant, Michael Rivera, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with two counts of first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 85 years' incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised a reverse-Batson (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)) challenge to his use of a peremptory challenge during jury selection, (2) the procedure resulting in the imposition of his extended-term sentence violated the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and (3) the procedure resulting in the imposition of his extended-term sentence violated his right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. A divided appellate panel rejected those contentions and affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. 348 Ill.App.3d 168, 284 Ill.Dec. 476, 810 N.E.2d 129. We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.
On appeal, defendant advances multiple arguments, all of which are merely facets of the same Batson and Apprendi arguments defendant raised below. Specifically, defendant submits that (1) trial judges do not have third-party standing to raise Batson challenges sua sponte; (2) the trial court's sua sponte Batson challenge to defense counsel's peremptory strike of juror Deloris Gomez was incompatible with the three-step Batson process; (3) the trial court erred in proceeding to the second
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step of the Batson process where no inference of a prima facie case of discrimination had been established; (4) the trial judge erred in his ultimate determination that defense counsel discriminated against juror Gomez; (5) the trial court's improper denial of defense counsel's peremptory strike of juror Gomez was reversible error; (6) the trial court's "violation of state statutory and constitutional guarantees to jury trial" are not amenable to harmless-error review; (7) Apprendi violations are not subject to harmless-error review; and (8) Apprendi violations in this case are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's individual contentions will be addressed, as warranted, in the context of the broader Batson and Apprendi issues he has raised. We will set forth only those facts pertinent to the issues defendant has raised.
During jury selection, defense counsel questioned juror Deloris Gomez, a business office supervisor at Cook County Hospital's out-patient orthopedic clinic. In the course of that questioning, Gomez acknowledged that Cook County Hospital is known for the treatment of gunshot victims and, as a part of her employment at the clinic, she has contact with patients, "checking them in." Gomez said her interaction with the victims of violent crime would not affect her ability to serve as a juror in the case. Following voir dire, and apparently in the presence of Gomez and other prospective jurors, defense counsel announced his intention to use his fourth peremptory challenge against Gomez, as the following excerpt from the transcript indicates:
"MR. DECKER [Defense attorney]: Your Honor, with thanks, we would ask to excuse Mrs. Gomez.
THE COURT: I'm going to ask you to remain, Mrs. Gomez. I'm going to ask counsel to join me, if the court reporter will join me, and the defendant will join me in chambers. Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen."
In chambers, the court directed defense counsel to "kindly articulate a basis of why you are excusing Ms. Gomez." Defense counsel protested, "The court has done it on its own motion sua sponte." The trial court responded: "I will do it. It is the citizen's right to sit as a juror, and I will implicate myself sua sponte if I feel somebody's rights are being impinged upon * * *." Defense counsel then complied with the court's directive, responding:
"Mrs. Gomez has a connection to a hospital that on a daily basis probably sees more gunshot victims than any other hospital in the world * * *. Given that fact that she's in the orthopedic section, I think on a daily basis even though she's a supervisor, even though she's not a rehabilitative nurse, she on a daily basis sees those victims who are victims of violent crime. For those reasons it constrains me. I know she has some kind of Hispanic connection given her name. I'm pulled in two different ways. For those reasons I asked that the —."
At that point in defense counsel's explanation, the trial court interrupted counsel, noting that "Mrs. Deloris Gomez appears to be an African-American." The court then asked to "hear from" the State on the issue, the prosecutor having been totally silent and uninvolved to that juncture. After some initial observations regarding the theory of the case and the issue for the jury's consideration, the prosecutor echoed the court's sentiment that the offered cause for excusing Gomez was insufficient. Defense counsel then noted that he had previously accepted an African-American
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woman to sit on the jury, and the court quickly pointed out that Gomez was the second African-American woman that the defense had sought to exclude. The court stated it was the articulated reason given for the peremptory challenge of Gomez that was of particular concern. The court concluded:
"I've heard her answers to the questions. I've looked at her jury information form, and I'm quite frankly very much concerned, Counsel, as to why Mrs. Deloris is being excused — Mrs. Deloris Gomez is being excused. She works in a clinical division of this hospital. It may have a reputation of having many emergency cases, I presume, involving gunshot cases, but again she works in a business office, the very first line identifying her job.
I did this sua sponte because I was concerned about the right of Mrs. Gomez to be a juror and participate. If the State in fact had done this, I certainly would have found they would have established a prima facie case by the very reason — what I'm going to do is allow Ms. Gomez — allow her to be seated, not excuse her on the basis of your peremptory.
I feel under these circumstances the reasons given by you, Mr. Decker, do not satisfy this Court. As far as I'm concerned, it's more than a prima facie case of discrimination against Mrs. Gomez. I'm not going to allow her to be excused. She will be seated as a juror over objection."
Defense counsel then asked for, and was granted, leave to conduct further questioning of Gomez, and noted defendant's objection of record. Further questioning of Gomez was conducted by defense counsel in chambers. Gomez again acknowledged the "great number of patients" who are seen in Cook County Hospital's emergency room "as a result of violent crimes"; however, Gomez pointed out that the clinic where she works is a separate building. Defense counsel's questioning of Gomez continued:
"MR. DECKER: But the individuals that are seen there at Fantus Clinic, I know they are not seen in the emergency room on an emergency room basis; you don't have the facilities there. It's mainly appointments that people are awaiting and people picking up medications. I believe there is a pharmacy also, I believe, there on the first floor?
JUROR GOMEZ: Yes, it is.
MR. DECKER: Certainly some of those victims are — certainly some of those patients were victims of gun violence?
JUROR GOMEZ: Yes, they were.
MR. DECKER: Does that fact set you off against my client as opposed to if he was charged with something else, you know, suppose if he was a defendant charged with theft or possessing a stolen motor vehicle, that's our concern?
JUROR GOMEZ: No, it does not. It does not affect me in that way.
MR. DECKER: Do you still feel you'd be able to fairly view the evidence and follow the instructions and the law that his Honor, Judge Fiala, will be giving you?
JUROR GOMEZ: Yes, I do."
With the conclusion of counsel's questioning, the trial court directed Gomez to resume her seat in the jury box. Subsequently, out of juror Gomez's presence, the trial court inquired of defense counsel whether counsel wished to say anything further. Counsel responded:
"Yes, your Honor. My feeling [sic] are still the same. I feel that I'm trying
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to modify the composition of this panel. I'm not trying to exclude a woman because of her race, but — strike that — not trying to excuse a juror because of her race. But also I think I can also factor in the fact that she would now be out of the — by the fact that the jury is predominantly women, I'm trying to get some impact from possibly other men in the case. I just don't feel that under these circumstances my client should be precluded from his reason to exercise a peremptory challenge."
Defense counsel asked the trial judge if he had ever been to Fantus Clinic, and the court advised counsel that the court could not comment on that. Defense counsel then told the court: "It's wall to wall victims and patients coming in there, and I could see it's a disturbing place for me to be there when I've been there."
The court concluded:
"I had the opportunity to question Deloris Gomez who I find is a very intelligent lady. I considered her statements very carefully, her testimony very carefully,...
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Mack v. Anderson, No. 1-04-1477.
...trial court rules on the ultimate question and finds valid, race-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenges. People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 304 Ill. Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006); see also People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 427-28, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993), citi......
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People v. Taylor, No. 1–09–0517.
...A trial court's third step finding on the ultimate issue of discrimination rests largely on credibility determinations. People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 502, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006) (citing McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill.2d 505, 527, 249 Ill.Dec. 636, 736 N.E.2d 1074 (2000......
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People v. Davis, No. 105092.
...its finding of a prima facie case." People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 5, 316 Ill.Dec. 488, 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007), quoting People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 515, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006). Here, the trial court never even explained whether it had found a prima facie case of discr......
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People v. Rivera, No. 98609.
...raise a Batson issue sua sponte, but "it may do so only when a prima facie case of discrimination is abundantly clear." People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 515, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006). We stated, when a court acts sua sponte, "the trial court must make an adequate record cons......
-
Mack v. Anderson, No. 1-04-1477.
...trial court rules on the ultimate question and finds valid, race-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenges. People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 304 Ill. Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006); see also People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 427-28, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993), citi......
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People v. Taylor, No. 1–09–0517.
...A trial court's third step finding on the ultimate issue of discrimination rests largely on credibility determinations. People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 502, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006) (citing McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill.2d 505, 527, 249 Ill.Dec. 636, 736 N.E.2d 1074 (2000......
-
People v. Davis, No. 105092.
...its finding of a prima facie case." People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 5, 316 Ill.Dec. 488, 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007), quoting People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 515, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006). Here, the trial court never even explained whether it had found a prima facie case of discr......
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People v. Rivera, No. 98609.
...raise a Batson issue sua sponte, but "it may do so only when a prima facie case of discrimination is abundantly clear." People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 515, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006). We stated, when a court acts sua sponte, "the trial court must make an adequate record cons......
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Illinois Civil Practice Guide - 2022 Edition
...an objection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). The trial court may also raise a Batson challenge. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 504 (2006) (holding that courts have standing to “raise Batson issues sua sponte”). A Batson challenge triggers “a methodical three-step ......