People v. Rivera, No. 112467.
Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Writing for the Court | Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court |
Citation | 369 Ill.Dec. 321,986 N.E.2d 634,2013 IL 112467 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jose RIVERA, Appellee. |
Decision Date | 25 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 112467. |
2013 IL 112467
986 N.E.2d 634
369 Ill.Dec. 321
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Jose RIVERA, Appellee.
No. 112467.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Feb. 22, 2013.
Rehearing Denied March 25, 2013.
[986 N.E.2d 636]
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Donna Hickstein-Foley, Foley & Foley, Chicago, for appellee.
Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
[369 Ill.Dec. 323]¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Jose Rivera was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, three counts of criminal sexual assault, five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and one count of possession of child pornography. The appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial based on the improper admittance of plea-related statements at trial. 409 Ill.App.3d 122, 349 Ill.Dec. 805, 947 N.E.2d 819. On appeal to this court, the State argues that defendant's custodial statements were not plea related and, thus, were admissible. Defendant argues that we should affirm [369 Ill.Dec. 324]
[986 N.E.2d 637]
the appellate court's judgment. In the alternative, he cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly disqualified his defense counsel. For reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting defendant's statements because they were not plea-related discussions. We also reject defendant's claim in his cross-appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the appellate court to address the remaining issues raised by defendant.
¶ 3 At trial, the State presented testimony that defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted and sexually abused his stepdaughter, J.M., beginning when J.M. was 11 years old, and continuing until J.M. was 14 years old. The State also introduced testimony that defendant sexually abused J.M.'s friend, 13–year–old J.T. The appellate court opinion describes in detail the evidence introduced at trial. For purposes of this appeal, we will set forth only those facts which are necessary to resolve the issues raised by the parties.
¶ 4 Defendant filed a written pretrial motion to suppress certain statements made to a police officer and an assistant State's Attorney after he was in custody but before any charges had been filed against him. Prior to the suppression hearing, the State moved to disqualify defendant's counsel, Michael Clancy, who was listed as a witness in defendant's motion to suppress. Attorney Michael Goggin appeared on defendant's behalf at the suppression hearing. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify Clancy as defendant's attorney of record, finding that the written motion to suppress rendered Clancy a material witness. The court ordered Goggin to substitute on the motion to suppress.
¶ 5 Clancy testified at the suppression hearing as defendant's only witness. He testified that he went to the police station twice to meet with defendant, and that defendant signed a form prepared by Clancy which stated defendant was asserting his right to remain silent. The State presented testimony that defendant waived his rights prior to the two interviews in which defendant made statements. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making the statements. The defense subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the court's disqualification of Clancy, which the court denied.
¶ 6 At trial, Franklin Park Police Detective Michael Jones testified that defendant was taken into custody at the police department on October 22, 2004. At 6:06 p.m., Detective Jones read defendant his Miranda rights in an interview room, and defendant agreed to speak with him. Detective Jones stated that he was in and out of the room as the investigation was ongoing. On October 23, at 2:04 a.m., Detective Jones went back into the interview room with defendant. Only the two of them were present. Detective Jones testified that the following conversation occurred:
“Q. What did you say to him?
A. I told him that his troubles had just gotten bigger. That not only was there one victim that we knew about[,] his stepdaughter that he had been having sex with, now we knew there was a girlfriend of hers, [J.T.], that he also had been having sex with.
Q. After you said this to the defendant, what if anything did the defendant do or say?
[986 N.E.2d 638]
[369 Ill.Dec. 325]A. He asked me if he gave a confession what guarantees would he have and I told him that he could have no guarantees whatsoever. I couldn't promise him anything.
With that he said, I will tell you what. I will give you a confession. Just go get me another glass of water. With that I left the room.”
After Detective Jones left the room to get defendant a glass of water, the conversation with defendant was terminated.
¶ 7 Detective Jones testified that, later the same day, at approximately 9:14 p.m., he had another conversation with defendant, along with Assistant State's Attorney Brad Giglio.1 Detective Jones again read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and agreed to speak with them. Detective Jones testified to the following conversation:
“Q. Now, after the defendant agreed to speak with you and the assistant state's attorney in the interview room, what if anything did the defendant say to the two of you?
A. He wanted to know that he had guarantees that he was not going to jail if he spoke to us.
Q. What did the assistant state's attorney say about that?
A. Told him that he could not be given any guarantees.
Q. And when he was told by the assistant state's attorney that he would not be given any guarantees, what did the defendant say at that point?
A. He said he was torn. That he wanted to do the right thing but that he was scared that he was going to go to jail.
Q. And did you or the—excuse me.
Did you or the assistant state's attorney indicate to him that you could not offer guarantees to him?
A. That's correct.
Q. At that time was the interview terminated?
A. Yes.”
¶ 8 Giglio testified that in October 2004, he was an assistant State's Attorney assigned to the child exploitation unit of the sex crimes division. He testified that he and Jones met with defendant on October 23 at approximately 9 p.m. Giglio identified himself to defendant as an assistant State's Attorney and told him that he was a prosecutor and not defendant's lawyer. Defendant read and signed a form waiving his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with them. Giglio testified that the following conversation occurred:
“Q. All right.
And after you got that established, what did the defendant say to you?
A. He said he wanted to talk about what happened. That he wanted guarantees from us.
Q. Did he tell you what kind of guarantees he wanted from you and Investigator Jones?
A. Yes. He was adamant about not wanting to do any jail, about wanting to get probation. He said he would talk to us about what we were there to talk to him about if he had those guarantees. I told him that I couldn't give him that guarantee. I tried to find out basically what he wanted to talk about specifically, and I told him that I had talked with [J.M.] and that she had told me what happened.
[986 N.E.2d 639]
[369 Ill.Dec. 326]I told him that I had talked with [J.T.] and she had told me what happened and I asked him to tell me about that. He is like, well, I will talk to you about it. I don't want to go to jail. I don't want to go to jail.
I said, well, if you don't want to tell me about that, then just tell me where the hard drive is. He said, I want a guarantee. I told him, I can't give you a guarantee.
Q. Did you tell him why you couldn't give him a guarantee?
A. Yes.
I told him I wanted to hear what he had to say specifically. I told him that I don't want to give him a guarantee so that his—what he tells me is only because he is getting this guarantee. Like I don't want it to be coerced. I don't want it to be presented at a trial that he was promised this and that's the only reason he said X, Y, Z.
I did tell him that I spoke with both of the girls separately. That they told me that he had done the same things. I said, you know, to try and get him to tell me. And he said, I want a guarantee. I want probation. I don't want jail.
Q. Well, was there a reason in terms of your job description or your employment why you could not give a guarantee or make deals with the defendant?
A. Well, I don't want whatever statement that I get from him to be useless if it is not freely given, if it is not something that he is choosing to give me, you know, outside of any coercion on my part.
I took my job very seriously. Obviously from my previous jobs, it is pretty clear that, I mean, I am a straight arrow. I do things, you know to the best of my ability by the book and I wanted to make sure that any statement that he gave to me was—would be admissible, would not be tainted, would be, you know, something that he chose to give.
Q. And did he make any statement pertaining to—did he say anything else regarding the situation of the case only?
A. No.
At a certain point he terminated the dialogue.”
Defendant did not object to any of the aforementioned testimony given by Jones and Giglio on the basis that the statements were part of a plea-related discussion.
¶ 9 Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant denied that any sexual activities, sexual assault, or sexual abuse occurred with J.M. or J.T. He denied making any statements to Detective Jones or Assistant State's Attorney Giglio and further denied that he had ever met Giglio.
¶ 10 The State made several references to defendant's custodial statements during opening statements and closing arguments. In its opening...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Himber, No. 1-16-2182
...or unreasonable such that no reasonable person would agree with the court's conclusion. People v. Rivera , 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634. ¶ 31 The difference between first degree murder and the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter is the defendant's m......
-
People v. Burgund, No. 5–13–0119.
...fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it." People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634.¶ 144 In the present case, in analyzing whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding this testimony, we turn to th......
-
People v. Temple, No. 1–11–1653.
...in closing argument.” However, the cases on which defendant relies do not support his argument. See People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634 ; People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, 356 Ill.Dec. 725, 962 N.E.2d 410 ; People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, 353 Ill.Dec. 517, 956......
-
People v. McDonald, Docket No. 118882
...fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it. People v. Rivera , 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634. The question is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same decision if it were acting as the lower tribunal. 77 N.E......
-
People v. Himber, No. 1-16-2182
...or unreasonable such that no reasonable person would agree with the court's conclusion. People v. Rivera , 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634. ¶ 31 The difference between first degree murder and the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter is the defendant's m......
-
People v. Burgund, No. 5–13–0119.
...fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it." People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634.¶ 144 In the present case, in analyzing whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding this testimony, we turn to th......
-
People v. Temple, No. 1–11–1653.
...in closing argument.” However, the cases on which defendant relies do not support his argument. See People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634 ; People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168, 356 Ill.Dec. 725, 962 N.E.2d 410 ; People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, 353 Ill.Dec. 517, 956......
-
People v. McDonald, Docket No. 118882
...fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it. People v. Rivera , 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634. The question is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same decision if it were acting as the lower tribunal. 77 N.E......
-
A Fool for a Witness: The Testifying Lawyer
...in this rationale becomes apparent when you drill down. Is a lawyer-witness less credible or too credible? In People v. Rivera , 986 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 2013), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that “the trier of fact may grant undue weight to the attorney’s testimony, unfairly disadvantagi......