People v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 25 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S158528.,S158528. |
| Citation | 47 Cal.4th 1104,224 P.3d 55 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL EUGENE ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
v.
PAUL EUGENE ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.
[47 Cal.4th 1111]
Cara DeVito, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, Michael Chamberlain, Stephanie A. Mitchell, Doris A. Calandra and Enid A. Camps, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHIN, J.
A jury convicted defendant Paul Eugene Robinson of five felony sexual offenses, all perpetrated against Deborah L. on August 25, 1994. Each was punishable by imprisonment in state prison for a maximum of eight
years. Therefore, the prosecution had to commence "within six years after commission of the offense[s]" to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. (Pen. Code, § 800.)1
Once the statute of limitations for an offense expires without the commencement of prosecution, prosecution for that offense is forever time-barred. (Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 615-616 [156 L.Ed.2d 544, 123 S.Ct. 2446].)2 As relevant here, a prosecution for an offense commences when an arrest warrant is issued and "names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for [a] complaint." (§ 804, subd. (d), italics added.)3 The charging and arrest provisions permit the use of a fictitious name. (§§ 959, par. 4, 815.) However, "[i]f a fictitious name is used the warrant should also contain sufficient descriptive material to indicate with reasonable particularity the identification of the person whose arrest is ordered [citations]." (People v. Montoya (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 137, 143 [63 Cal.Rptr. 73] (Montoya), relying on West v. Cabell (1894) 153 U.S. 78 [38 L.Ed. 643, 14 S.Ct. 752] (Cabell); see Cal. Const., art. I, § 13 [a warrant may issue only on probable cause "particularly describing" the persons or things to be seized].)
In this case, on August 21, 2000,4 four days before the statute of limitations would have expired, the Sacramento County District Attorney
filed a felony complaint against "John Doe, unknown male," describing him by his unique 13-loci deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile. The next day, a John Doe arrest warrant issued, incorporating by reference the same DNA profile. On September 15, defendant was arrested based on an amended warrant that included his name. It was subsequently discovered that defendant's DNA profile in the state's DNA database, which linked defendant to the crimes committed against Deborah L., had been generated from blood mistakenly collected from defendant by local and state agencies in administering the DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998, as enacted (the Act). (§ 295 et seq.)
We granted review to decide (1) whether the issuance of a "John Doe" complaint or arrest warrant may timely commence a criminal action and thereby satisfy section 800's limitation period5; (2) whether an unknown suspect's DNA profile satisfies the "particularity" requirement for an arrest warrant; and (3) what remedy exists, if any, for the unlawful collection of genetic material under the 1998 version of the Act.6
(1) For the reasons stated below, we conclude that, in cases in which the warrant identifies the perpetrator by his or her unique DNA profile only, the statute of limitations is satisfied if the prosecution is commenced by the filing of the "John Doe" arrest warrant within the limitations period.7 In reaching this conclusion, we find that an unknown suspect's unique DNA profile satisfies the "particularity" requirement for an arrest warrant. (§ 804, subd. (d).) Although defendant's blood was mistakenly collected under the Act, we conclude that the law enforcement personnel errors in this case do not trigger the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.
On August 25, 1994, 24-year-old Deborah L. awoke to find a male adult stranger standing in her bedroom doorway wearing gloves and holding a knife. He told Deborah to be quiet and that he was there "to get some pussy." When she screamed, he called her a "white bitch" and threatened to kill her if she did not shut up. Based on his distinctive voice, his skin color, and his silhouette, Deborah thought the man was African-American.8
The man climbed on top of Deborah and held the knife to her chest; she cut her hand when she instinctively grabbed at the knife. The man directed Deborah to cover her face with a pillow. He then fondled her breasts, placed his mouth on her vagina, inserted his fingers in her vagina and rectum, and raped her. After losing and regaining an erection, he raped her a second time; this time he withdrew his penis, ejaculated on her legs, and rubbed his semen on her stomach. As the man dressed, he said he would kill Deborah if she looked at him. Once he was gone, she called 911.9
Police officers promptly took Deborah to a medical facility where a rape kit was prepared, vaginal swabs were collected, and her cut hand was stitched. The physician assistant who collected the vaginal swabs saw sperm on them. Jill Spriggs, an assistant criminal laboratory director for the California Department of Justice (Department), also found semen present on a swab collected from Deborah's vagina. In early August of 2000, Ms. Spriggs assayed that sperm to generate a genetic profile of the unknown male suspect as determined by the presence or absence of markers at 13 distinct DNA loci. Ms. Spriggs then used statistics to estimate, with respect to three racial groups, the probability that more than one person would harbor that same series of markers.
The parties stipulated that, prior to September 2000, defendant's blood had been collected, his DNA was profiled at 13 loci, and his profile had been entered into the Department's offender database. A Department criminalist testified the database is kept in the hope of matching DNA samples from
unsolved crimes with known profiles, and that such a match is called a "cold hit."
Four days before the six-year statute of limitations would have expired, a felony complaint was filed against "John Doe, unknown male," describing him by his 13-loci DNA profile. The next day, the trial court found probable cause in the complaint, and an arrest warrant issued for "John Doe," incorporating by reference that DNA profile. As relevant here, "John Doe" was identified as an "unknown male with Short Tandem Repeat (STR) Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profile at the following Genetic Locations, using the COfiler and Profiler Plus Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification kits: D3S1358 (15, 15), D16S539 (9, 10), THO1 (7, 7), TPOX (6, 9), CSF1PO (10, 11), D7S820 (8, 11), vWa (18, 19), FGA (22, 24), D8S1179 (12, 15), D21S11 (28, 28), D18S51 (20, 20), D5S818 (8, 13), D13S317 (10, 11), with said Genetic Profile being unique, occurring in approximately 1 in 21 sextillion of the Caucasian population, 1 in 650 quadrillion of the African American population, 1 in 420 sextillion of the Hispanic population."
In September, a criminalist who searched the Department's offender database using the DNA profile Ms. Spriggs had developed in the Deborah L. case generated a "cold hit" match between the 13-loci DNA profile in the John Doe arrest warrant and defendant Robinson's profile in the state's DNA database. Based on the match, an amended arrest warrant with Robinson's name issued; it was executed on September 15.
After defendant's arrest on September 15, his blood was collected, and Ms. Spriggs conducted an independent DNA analysis using that new blood sample. Comparing defendant's DNA profile from that blood with the DNA profile obtained earlier from the evidentiary semen from the vaginal swab, Ms. Spriggs found the two profiles matched "at all 13 loci." Based on her statistical calculations made to determine the frequency of a genetic profile in a random unrelated population, Ms. Spriggs testified that she estimated that the probability that two people would share identical DNA patterns at each of the 13 loci tested is one in 650 quadrillion (650 followed by 15 zeros) in the African-American population, one in six sextillion (6 followed by 21 zeros) in the Caucasian population, and one in 33 sextillion (33 followed by 21 zeros) in the Hispanic population.10 Ms. Spriggs testified that there had been no reported cases of two people who are not identical twins matching at all 13 loci.
Defendant was found guilty of one count of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)),11 two counts of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true allegations that defendant used and was armed with a deadly and dangerous weapon during all five counts. (Former § 12022, subd. (b)(1), as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 129, § 4; former § 12022.3, subds. (a), (b), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 109, § 1.)12 The trial court sentenced defendant to 65 years in state prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. We granted review limited to the issues set forth above.
A. Applicability of the Federal Exclusionary Rule to Unlawful Collection of Defendant's Genetic Material Under the Act
1. Introduction
The parties agree defendant's March 2, 1999 blood sample was collected in violation of the Act as it was originally enacted. Defendant contends the federal exclusionary rule is the appropriate "remedy to apply to the police personnel errors that occurred in this case." We disagree.
2. Background of the Act
The Act became effective January 1, 1999. (Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 4.)13 It created...
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Appendix E
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