People v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 07 June 2022
• Docket Number: A160994
• Citation: People v. Rodriguez, 79 Cal.App.5th 637, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 79 (Cal. App. 2022)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Earl Maurice RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

79 Cal.App.5th 637

295 Cal.Rptr.3d 79

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Earl Maurice RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

A160994

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed June 7, 2022

Law Offices of Karriem Baker and Karriem Baker, Folsom, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the First District Appellate Project, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano and Melissa A. Meth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

STREETER, Acting P. J. Defendant Earl Maurice Rodriguez appeals from a judgment that sentenced him to three years of probation, following his plea of no contest to assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. ( Pen. Code,¹ § 245, subd. (a)(4).) Rodriguez challenges this sentence based on Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950), which became effective on January 1, 2021, and limits the maximum probation term for felony offenses to two years. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).) The Attorney General concedes that Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively but argues that Rodriguez is not entitled to relief because he was convicted of a domestic violence offense that includes a specified term of probation, an exception to Assembly Bill 1950.

We conclude that Rodriguez is not entitled to reduce his probation to two years under Assembly Bill 1950 and affirm the trial court's ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 18, 2020, following an argument by text message, Rodriguez drove his vehicle into his girlfriend's vehicle three times while she was driving from her residence to a friend's house. Based on this incident, Rodriguez was charged with one count of assault with a deadly weapon. ( § 245, subd. (a)(1).) He pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the district attorney's office amended the information to allege a second count for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. ( § 245, subd. (a)(4).)

The case was resolved between the parties through negotiation. Rodriguez pleaded no contest to count two. In exchange, the district attorney's office agreed to dismiss count one, and Rodriguez was to be placed on formal probation for three years.

At the sentencing hearing, the Solano County Superior Court imposed a three-year state prison sentence. The court suspended execution of this sentence and placed Rodriguez on probation for three years. The court also ordered that Rodriguez attend a 52-week batterer's program as required by section 1203.097. Defendant objected to this condition of his probation. Overruling the objection, the trial court ruled that because there was a "domestic violence nexus" to Rodriguez's assault, imposition of section 1203.097 was required.

Rodriguez timely appealed the trial court's September 18, 2020 order.

II. DISCUSSION

Rodriguez argues that his term of probation should be modified from three to two years pursuant to Assembly Bill 1950, which took effect on January 1, 2021. Assembly Bill 1950 amended section 1203.1 to limit probation in most felony cases to two years. But there is an exception: This two-year limit does not apply to certain offenses, including those that include "specific probation lengths within its provisions." (Former § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1).)² The primary disputed issue in this appeal is whether the statute under which Rodriguez was convicted, section 245, subdivision (a)(4), includes a "specific probation length[ ] within its provisions" (former § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1) ) and therefore falls within the exception. We conclude that it does.

A. Background on Assembly Bill 1950

Assembly Bill 1950 went into effect on January 1, 2021. Assembly Bill 1950 amended sections 1203a and 1203.1 to limit the length of probation of most misdemeanors to one year ( § 1203a, subd. (a) ), and most felony cases to two years ( § 1203.1, subd. (a) ). Exempt from these limits are offenses that include "specific probation lengths within [their] provisions." ( §§ 1203a, subd. (b), 1203.1, subd. (l )(1).)

B. Domestic Violence Offenses Under Section 1203.097

Section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(1) states that "[i]f a person is granted probation for a crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the terms of probation shall include ... [¶] ... [a] minimum period of probation of 36 months, which may include a period of summary probation as appropriate." Section 6211, subdivision (c) of the Family Code includes in its definition of victim "[a] person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship."

Section 1203.097 "does not apply only to defendants charged with specified offenses; it encompasses defendants convicted of any crime of ‘abuse’ so long as the victim is a person identified in Family Code section 6211." ( People v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545, 550, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.) Section 1203.097, therefore, applies to offenses like assault, "so long as the facts underlying the assault involve a victim defined in Family Code section 6211." ( Cates , at p. 550, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.)

C. Statutory Interpretation Principles

Rodriguez argues that based on the clear language of section 1203.1, his probation term should be reduced to two years under Assembly Bill 1950 because assault under section 245, subdivision (a)(4) does not include a specific length of probation " ‘within its provisions.’ "

Guided by well-established principles of statutory construction, we begin with the premise that the language in a statute should be given its ordinary meaning, and "[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters)." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)

As a corollary, however, "statutory language, even if it appears to have a clear and plain meaning when considered in isolation, may nonetheless be rendered ambiguous when the language is read in light of the statute as a whole or in light of the overall legislative scheme." ( People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 360, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 230, 397 P.3d 936.)

Thus, "[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, the statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible." ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323.) "Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." ( Ibid. )

D. Rodriguez Is Not Entitled to Relief Under Assembly Bill 1950

Rodriguez argues that the language under former section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1) is unambiguous in that an offense must include " ‘specific probation lengths within its provisions’ " in order to be exempted from the two-year probation limit.

In his view, the only offenses exempt from the two-year probation limit under section 1203.1 are those that contain a specific probation length in the same statutory section as the underlying offense. Rodriguez points to section 273d as one such example in a footnote to his reply brief. Section 273d provides for a minimum probation of 36 months under subdivision (c)(1) for any person convicted of the offense of corporal punishment against a child under subdivision (a) of this same statute.

We reject this argument. First, although the language "specific probation lengths within its provisions" (former § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1) ) may appear to have a plain meaning when considered in isolation, it must be construed in context and harmonized with other related statutes to the extent possible. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. , supra , 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1386–1387, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323.) Given this, we must construe the language at issue in context and harmonize it to the extent possible with other related statutes regarding probation lengths.

A review of other statutes shows that there are numerous offenses that include mandatory probation terms found in a section that is separate from the section that defines the offense. For example, section 1203.047 provides for probation of not less than three years if a person is convicted of violating section 502 (computer crimes). Vehicle Code, section 23600, subdivision (b) provides for probation of not less than three years if a person is convicted of violating Vehicle Code, section 23152 or 23153 and is granted probation. Finally, section 273.5, subdivision (g) does not include a specific probation length but requires that if probation is granted to a person convicted under section 273.5, subdivision (a), the terms of the probation must be consistent with the provisions of section 1203.097.

With respect to domestic violence offenses, a leading treatise explains that "[b]ecause of section 1203.097, a conviction of a crime where the victim is listed in Family Code section 6211 is an offense ‘that includes [a] specific probation length[ ] within its provisions’ for the purposes of the exception under section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1)." (Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2021) § 8:15.30, (rev. 9/2021).) Indeed, "[t]he fact that the specification of the length of probation is expressed in a different code section than the crime itself does not appear material. The Penal Code frequently separates the punishment provisions from the crime." (Id. at fn. 2.)

In People v. Cates, supra , 170 Cal.App.4th at page 550, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, this court held that "the language of section 1203.097 is not ambiguous and affirm[ed] the trial court's determination that it applies to a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), so...