People v. Rodriguez

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Burke
• Citation: People v. Rodriguez, 891 N.E.2d 854, 229 Ill.2d 285, 322 Ill.Dec. 563 (Ill. 2008)
• Decision Date: 05 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 104679.,104679.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ, Appellant.

891 N.E.2d 854

229 Ill.2d 285

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jorge RODRIGUEZ, Appellant.

No. 104679.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 5, 2008.

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defenders, Emily E. Filpi, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Hareena Meghani-Wakely, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

At issue in this case is whether section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2006)), which provides for a 15-year sentence enhancement for any defendant who commits first degree murder "while armed with a firearm," applies to an unarmed defendant found guilty of first degree murder on a theory of accountability. The circuit court of Cook County held that subsection (i) applied to defendant. The appellate court affirmed. 372 Ill.App.3d 797, 310 Ill.Dec. 626, 866 N.E.2d 1228. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are not in dispute. On July 29, 2001, defendant was involved in the murder of Mario Avila. As part of a plan, defendant met with Avila under the premise of buying drugs, then brought his co-conspirator, Phonakone Sangathit, over to Avila's car. Defendant, who was unarmed, stood by while Sangathit shot and killed Avila. Defendant was later arrested and charged with first degree murder.

After trial, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder under a theory of accountability. The trial judge sentenced him to 35 years in prison for the murder, plus an additional 15 years pursuant to subsection (i) for committing the offense while armed with a firearm.

Section 5-8-1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides,

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years, * * *

* * *

(d)(i) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2006).

The appellate court affirmed the trial court. In response to defendant's argument that he should not receive the 15-year enhancement because he was not in physical possession of a firearm during the offense, the appellate court stated, "Had the legislature wished to limit the enhancement in section (i) to persons who personally discharge [sic] a firearm, it would have placed the word `personally' in the language of the statute, as it did in subsections (ii) and (iii)." 372 Ill.App.3d at 800-01, 310 Ill.Dec. 626, 866 N.E.2d 1228. According to the appellate court, by omitting the word "personally" from subsection (i), the legislature indicated that subsection (i) applied not only to those who are actually armed with a firearm during a first degree murder, but also to defendants found guilty of the same murder through an accountability theory, even if they were unarmed during the offense. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In 1999, the General Assembly added the 15-, 20-, and 25-year firearm sentence enhancements to section 5-8-1 (sections 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) through (a)(1)(d)(iii)) through Public Act 91-404. In the instant case, we must determine whether the legislature intended subsection (i) to apply to defendants guilty of first degree murder through an accountability theory, even if they were not armed during the offense. Our decision will depend on our determination of whether the principles of accountability and common design apply to subsection (i). This is a question of law, which we review de novo. Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill.2d 104, 321 Ill.Dec. 724, 890 N.E.2d 446 (2008).

We begin our analysis with a review of the principles of accountability and common design. "Accountability is not a crime in and of itself but, rather, a mechanism through which a criminal conviction may result." People v. Pollock, 202 Ill.2d 189, 210, 269 Ill.Dec. 197, 780 N.E.2d 669 (2002). Section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that "[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when * * * [e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2006).

Our accountability statute does not deviate from the common law rule of common design. People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill.2d 390, 399, 243 N.E.2d 825 (1968). The first decision from this court to discuss the common-design rule was Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511 (1854). In Brennan, we held an accomplice accountable for the murder that his codefendant committed. Brennan, 15 Ill. at 516. "If several persons conspire to do an unlawful act, * * * [t]he act of one of them done in furtherance of the original design, is, in consideration of law, the act of all." Brennan, 15 Ill. at 516. Through the years, the principles of accountability and common design have been utilized by this court to hold defendants involved in the commission of an offense accountable for the criminal conduct of any other codefendant. See Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34 (1885) (defendant who took part in a robbery liable for the felony murder committed by his co-conspirators during the robbery); People v. Tarver, 381 Ill. 411, 45 N.E.2d 630 (1942) (defendant who had a rifle with him when he left a truck that arrived at the scene of a gang confrontation, and was carrying the rifle when a shooting occurred, held to be a member of the gang and responsible for the acts done in carrying out the common purpose of the gang, namely, murder); People v. Kessler, 57 Ill.2d 493, 315 N.E.2d 29 (1974) (defendant who assisted in the planning of a burglary, then waited in an automobile while his codefendants committed a robbery that escalated into murder, held accountable for burglary and attempted murder).

In People v. Sangster, 91 Ill.2d 260, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625 (1982), we addressed the issue of whether the principles of accountability and common design apply not only to a determination of a defendant's culpability for a criminal act, but also to a calculation of a defendant's sentence in compliance with sentencing statutes. In Sangster, the defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping on an accountability theory. Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 262, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625. The defendant did not physically participate in the crimes, but it was undisputed that he was accountable for what occurred. Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 262, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 40, 30, and 15 years pursuant to section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provided:

"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, in which event the court may enter sentences to run consecutively. Sentences shall run concurrently unless otherwise specified by the court." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(a).

Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 264, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625.

On appeal, the defendant argued that principles of law mandated that the court construe "the defendant," as used in section 5-8-4, in his favor, with nothing taken by intendment or implication against him. Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 264, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625. The appellate court agreed with the defendant, stating that it saw "no reason to add after the word `defendant' in the phrase, `and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury' the phrase, `or someone for whose conduct the defendant is accountable.'" People v. Sangster, 95 Ill.App.3d 357, 364-65, 50 Ill. Dec. 864, 420 N.E.2d 181 (1981). The appellate court then vacated the defendant's consecutive sentences on the theory that the defendant, who did not physically take part in the crimes for which he was sentenced, did not "inflict severe bodily injury," as required by the sentencing statute. Sangster, 95 Ill.App.3d at 364-65, 50 Ill.Dec. 864, 420 N.E.2d 181.

We reversed the appellate court. Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 266, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625. We held that, at the time the legislature enacted the consecutive-sentencing statute, the accountability statute had been interpreted as meaning: "`where one aids another in the planning or commission of an offense, he is legally accountable for the conduct of the person he aids; and that the word "conduct" encompasses any criminal act done in furtherance of the planned and intended act.'" Sangster, 91 Ill.2d at 265, 62 Ill.Dec. 937, 437 N.E.2d 625, quoting Kessler, 57 Ill.2d at 497, 315 N.E.2d 29. We held that the legislature must be presumed to have known that the accountability statute had been so construed when it...