People v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 26 March 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1-15-1938,1-15-1938
• Citation: 431 Ill.Dec. 556,2019 IL App (1st) 151938 -B,127 N.E.3d 1089
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (1st) 151938 -B

127 N.E.3d 1089

431 Ill.Dec. 556

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Juan RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-15-1938

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SECOND DIVISION.

Filed March 26, 2019

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Michael Gentithes, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a 2013 discharge hearing, defendant Juan Rodriguez was found not not guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault on the basis of unfitness. The trial court held that Rodriguez was not required to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) ( 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2014) ) because he was incapable of understanding the registration requirements, but on appeal, we reversed. People v. Rodriguez , 2014 IL App (1st) 141255-U, 2014 WL 7465768.

¶ 2 On remand, the trial court ordered Rodriguez to register, and he appealed that ruling challenging the constitutionality of SORA both on its face and as applied to him. We affirmed ( People v. Rodriguez , 2018 IL App (1st) 151938, 2018 WL 1096109 ), and Rodriguez petitioned for leave to appeal to the supreme court. In November 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Rodriguez's petition for leave to appeal but issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate our January 2018 judgment and reconsider our decision in light of People v. Bingham , 2018 IL 122008, 425 Ill.Dec. 611, 115 N.E.3d 166. In accordance with the supreme court's direction, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider in light of Bingham to determine whether a different result is warranted. Finding Bingham inapposite, we again affirm.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The facts of this case were set forth in detail in our order of December 30, 2014, Rodriguez , 2014 IL App (1st) 141255-U, ¶¶ 4-17, and we describe here only those proceedings that occurred following remand to the trial court.

¶ 5 On April 16, 2015, the trial court held a hearing to notify Rodriguez, who was represented by counsel, of his obligation to register under SORA. The State read the registration requirements to Rodriguez on the record, and they were translated into Spanish. But when Rodriguez was asked to sign a document stating that he understood the registration requirements, he repeatedly stated, "I don't understand what is this. I don't know what this is." In response to his counsel's objection that Rodriguez was incapable of understanding what was required of him, the State struck the language indicating otherwise, but Rodriguez persisted in his refusal to sign. The trial court then ordered the State to indicate on the form that it was "read and translated in open court," that Rodriguez was present with his attorney and a translator, and that he refused to sign. The court stated on the record that Rodriguez must register under SORA within three days. This appeal follows.

¶ 6 ANALYSIS

¶ 7 The sole issue on appeal is the constitutionality of subjecting unfit defendants found not not guilty of sexual assault to SORA's "statutory scheme," which, according to Rodriguez, encompasses the duty to register ( 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2014) ), the penalty for noncompliance with the registration requirements and the failure to register (id. §§ 7, 10), the limitations on a sex offender's residence and presence in certain locations ( 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3, 11-9.4-1 (West 2014) ), the requirement that a sex offender must renew his driver's license yearly ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(o ) (West 2014) ), and the prohibition on name changes for sex offenders ( 735 ILCS 5/21-101 (West 2014) ).

¶ 8 In Bingham , the defendant argued before the supreme court that he was unconstitutionally subject to the registration requirement of SORA based on his conviction for felony theft. 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 14, 425 Ill.Dec. 611, 115 N.E.3d 166. The State contended that the court had no power on direct appeal to relieve defendant of his registration obligation when that obligation was not imposed by the trial court and was not related to his reasons for conviction or sentence in that court. Id. ¶ 15. The supreme court, relying on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), agreed. Bingham , 2018 IL 122008, ¶¶ 15-16, 425 Ill.Dec. 611, 115 N.E.3d 166. Pursuant to Rule 615(b), a reviewing court may (1) reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; (2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; (3) reduce the degree of offense of which the appellant was convicted; (4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or (5) order a new trial. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

¶ 9 Because the reviewing court in Bingham was not asked to exercise any of those delineated powers with respect to the defendant's argument regarding the constitutionality of SORA, the supreme court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the defendant's appeal. Bingham , 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 17, 425 Ill.Dec. 611, 115 N.E.3d 166. The court's decision rested in large part on the fact that "[t]he requirement that defendant register as a sex offender is not encompassed within the judgment or any order of the trial court," and so did not fall within the ambit of Rule 615(b)(1). Id. The court suggested that constitutional challenges to SORA could be mounted in one of two ways: "(1) through a direct appeal from a case finding a defendant guilty of violating the regulation he attempts to challenge as unconstitutional, such as the sex offender registration law [citation], or (2) by filing a civil suit seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality and relief from the classification as well as the burdens of sex offender registration." Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 10 What distinguishes this case from Bingham is that following the hearing on April 16, 2015, the court did order Rodriguez to register under SORA within three days (and it was this order from which Rodriguez appealed). Unlike Bingham , in which the requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender arose by operation of law and was not reflected in either the court's written or oral judgment ( id. ¶¶ 9-10 ), here, the court explicitly made an oral pronouncement that Rodriguez must register as a sex offender. Thus, we may reach the merits of Rodriguez's constitutional challenge pursuant to Rule 615(b)(1), allowing us to "reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken." Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Stated differently, this case presents a third avenue for a constitutional challenge to the Act aside from the two suggested by the supreme court.

¶ 11 Before turning to the merits, two additional preliminary matters require our attention. First, we address the State's argument that the law of the case doctrine bars Rodriguez's constitutional challenge to SORA. The State contends that we decided this issue in our 2014 order holding that Rodriguez was required to register as a sex offender. But contrary to the State's assertion, our holding did not rest on constitutional grounds. Rather, we relied on People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076, 369 Ill.Dec. 117, 986 N.E.2d 66, and engaged in statutory interpretation to conclude that, notwithstanding that he was found not not guilty of committing a sex offense, Rodriguez met the statutory definition of a sex offender and, as such, was required to register under SORA. Rodriguez , 2014 IL App (1st) 141255-U, ¶ 25. Because we did not rule on the constitutionality of the SORA statutory scheme, the law of the case does not preclude consideration of Rodriguez's constitutional challenge in this appeal.

¶ 12 Next, we turn to the issue of standing. The State contends that Rodriguez lacks standing to mount a challenge to all but section 3 of SORA, setting forth the registration requirements. In order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, a person must have suffered or be in imminent danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the statute's enforcement. People v. Greco , 204 Ill. 2d 400, 409, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846 (2003). In other words, a party may not raise a constitutional challenge to a statute that does not affect him or her. In re Veronica C. , 239 Ill. 2d 134, 147, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010).

¶ 13 We have previously considered and rejected the State's argument that a defendant sex offender lacks standing to challenge the limitations on presence and residence applicable to him as well as the other civil consequences he faces as a result of his sex offender status (yearly renewal of his driver's license and inability to change his name). See People v. Avila-Briones , 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶¶ 40-43, 401 Ill.Dec. 40, 49 N.E.3d 428 ; People v. Pollard , 2016 IL App (5th) 130514, ¶¶ 26-27, 403 Ill.Dec. 574, 54 N.E.3d 234. In Avila-Briones , 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 41, 401 Ill.Dec. 40, 49 N.E.3d 428, we explained that the restrictions on residency, presence, and name changes, as well as the requirement to renew one's driver's license annually, are all automatically applicable to a defendant classified as a sex offender. Merely because a defendant does not allege that he wishes to live in a certain prohibited location or change his name does not mean that he is not affected by these laws. Id. ¶ 42. Therefore, Rodriguez has standing to challenge these provisions.

¶ 14 We likewise reject the State's argument that Rodriguez lacks standing to challenge section 10 of SORA (prescribing the penalty for failure to register). In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that this court previously held that a juvenile respondent lacked standing to challenge the...