People v. Rogers

• Citation: 951 N.W.2d 50,331 Mich.App. 12
• Decision Date: 07 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 346348,346348
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deonton Autez ROGERS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

331 Mich.App. 12

951 N.W.2d 50

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Deonton Autez ROGERS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 346348

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 11, 2019, at Detroit

Decided January 7, 2020, 9:00 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.

David R. Cripps, Detroit, for defendant.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Christopher M. Allen, Assistant Solicitor General, Amici Curiae for the people.

Before: Gadola, P.J., and Servitto and Redford, JJ.

Gadola, P.J.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted¹ the trial court's November 7, 2018 order granting defendant Deonton Autez Rogers's motion to quash several counts of the information. Defendant was charged as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, with intentionally discharging a firearm in a building causing physical injury, MCL 750.234b(3) ; intentionally discharging a firearm in a building causing serious impairment, MCL 750.234b(4) ; assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82 ; possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b ; felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f ; fourth-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(7) ; and ethnic intimidation, MCL 750.147b. On defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the charges of intentionally discharging a firearm in a building causing physical injury, intentionally discharging a firearm in a building causing serious impairment, and ethnic intimidation. On appeal, the prosecution challenges only the trial court's dismissal of the ethnic-intimidation charge. We affirm the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to quash the ethnic-intimidation charge. We do so despite the fact that the trial court's reasoning constituted legal error. As detailed in our opinion, the trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of an altercation between defendant and the complainant on the night of July 23, 2018. The complainant is a transgender person, which she explained to the court means that she was assigned as a male at birth but now identifies as a woman, living her life and presenting herself as such in society. On the night of the incident, the complainant went to a gas station in Detroit to make a purchase. When she arrived at the gas station, she saw defendant inside the gas station with a woman. The complainant got in line, and defendant began talking to her, using derogatory terms. According to the complainant, defendant made various offensive statements to her, including, "[Y]ou're a nigga." The complainant responded that "nigga is somebody that identify [sic] themselves as a man, carry themselves as a man. I don't do that. I'm a transgender." Defendant then asked the complainant about her sex organs and asked if he could see "it." The complainant tried to ignore defendant, but he continued to make derogatory remarks, which the complainant described as "gay" in nature and included calling her a man and asking to see her penis. Defendant then pulled out a gun and threatened to kill her. The complainant was frightened that defendant would follow through on his threat to kill her. The woman with defendant told defendant to leave the complainant alone and to leave the gas station. While defendant was speaking to the complainant, a child who had arrived in the car with defendant entered the gas station. Defendant subsequently walked in close proximity to the complainant, gun in hand, moving toward the exit. The complainant testified that she feared that defendant would turn around and shoot her before leaving the gas station. The complainant further testified that transgender people are often attacked and harmed and that she feared for her life. Reacting to the threat from defendant, she grabbed at defendant's hand as he came near her in an attempt to get the gun away from him. A struggle between the two ensued, during which the complainant never had control of the gun. During this struggle, defendant kept his finger on the trigger. At some point during the struggle, the gun fired into the complainant's left shoulder. The complainant was then able to grab the gun from defendant. The woman with defendant took the gun from the complainant and moved toward the exit. Defendant then ran to the gas station exit, whereupon the woman with defendant gave him back the gun. Defendant then got into his car, and the child followed him out, climbing into defendant's car with him. The complainant was taken to the hospital, where she spent several days being treated for a shattered shoulder, including undergoing surgery.

At defendant's preliminary examination, surveillance footage was shown detailing the incident. Defendant objected to the court binding him over on the two charges of intentionally discharging a firearm, asserting that he did not intentionally fire a weapon at the complainant. With regard to the remaining charges (including the ethnic-intimidation charge), defendant conceded that there were "questions of fact for a jury[.]" Relevant to the appeal at hand, the district court ruled that "transgender" fell within the statutory definition of "gender"² for purposes of the ethnic-intimidation charge.

In the trial court, defendant moved to quash the district court's decision to bind him over on the two charges of intentionally discharging a firearm in a building and the charge of ethnic intimidation. With respect to the ethnic-intimidation charge, defendant argued that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendant committed a malicious physical act accompanied by a specific intent to harass the complainant because of her gender. In his amended motion to quash, defendant further contended that the ethnic-intimidation statute does not apply to situations involving transgender people. The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash, finding that with respect to ethnic intimidation, the preliminary-examination testimony established that the complainant, not defendant, caused the physical contact between the two by grabbing defendant's wrist. The trial court further concluded that because the term "gender" is defined³ in the Michigan Penal Code⁴ as including only masculine, feminine, and neuter genders, the ethnic-intimidation statute did not apply to protect transgender people.

As previously indicated, this Court granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal the trial court's decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a criminal statute is a question of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. People v. Flick , 487 Mich. 1, 9, 790 N.W.2d 295 (2010). Additionally, "[a] district court magistrate's decision to bind over a defendant and a trial court's decision on a motion to quash an information are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v. Dowdy , 489 Mich. 373, 379, 802 N.W.2d 239 (2011), see also People v. March , 499 Mich. 389, 397, 886 N.W.2d 396 (2016) ("A trial court's decision to quash an information is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v. Zitka , 325 Mich. App. 38, 43, 922 N.W.2d 696 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To the extent that a lower court bases its decision on a motion to quash an information on an interpretation of the law, our review of that interpretation is de novo. March , 499 Mich. at 397, 886 N.W.2d 396. When a trial court makes an error of law it necessarily abuses its discretion. People v. Duncan , 494 Mich. 713, 723, 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant was charged with ethnic intimidation under MCL 750.147b. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A person is guilty of ethnic intimidation if that person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, does any of the following:

(a) Causes physical contact with another person.

(b) Damages, destroys, or defaces any real or personal property of another person.

(c) Threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (a) or (b), if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in subdivision (a) or (b) will occur.

The most important goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Dowdy , 489 Mich. at 379, 802 N.W.2d 239. If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written and judicial construction is not required or permitted. People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 50, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008).

Relevant to the instant matter, the word "gender" is not specifically defined within MCL 750.147b. The trial court opined that irrespective of whether the prosecution brought the ethnic-intimidation charge against defendant under Subdivision (a) or Subdivision (c) of that statute, the lower court made an error of law by binding defendant over on the charge "based on the wording of MCL 750.147b and the definition of ‘gender.’ " The trial court concluded that because the word "gender" is defined in the Penal Code and that definition does not mention the term "transgender," see MCL 750.10, referring to dictionary definitions of the word "gender" to expand the statutory definition was impermissible. We thus begin our analysis by addressing whether the word "gender" in MCL 750.147b includes transgender people. We conclude that it does not, but for reasons wholly distinct from the trial court's rationale.

On its face, MCL 750.10 provides grammatical clarity and miscellaneous definitions for the entirety of the Michigan Penal Code. It states, in relevant part, that "[t]he masculine gender includes the feminine and neuter genders." It is readily...