People v. Rogers

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: DOWNING
• Citation: People v. Rogers, 327 N.E.2d 163, 27 Ill.App.3d 123 (Ill. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 18 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 59397,59397
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tommie Lee ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 163

327 N.E.2d 163

27 Ill.App.3d 123

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tommie Lee ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 59397.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

March 18, 1975.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Fred S. Rabishaw, Robert P. Isaacson, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Ferdinand Minelli, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

DOWNING, Presiding Justice.

Defendant Tommie Lee Rogers was indicted for the murder of Thomas Richardson. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term of 25--50 years plus a five-year parole.

We are asked to determine only whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.

Proper consideration of this issue requires a summary of certain testimony offered at trial.

Three friends of the deceased, Frank Chatman, Willie Rule and Willie Doggin, appearing on behalf of the State, recalled that in the very early morning hours of January 23, 1972 (approximately 1:30 A.M.), they and the deceased attended a party at 4022 South State Street, apartment 108, in the City of Chicago. During the course of the party they left the apartment and stood outside along the wall near the apartment door. Shortly thereafter defendant came from the apartment accompanied by a couple of other men and asked if anyone had a 'piece,' I.e., a gun. When Frank Chatman replied 'no one,' defendant pulled out a shotgun which he pointed at Rule, Doggin and finally at the deceased. At this moment Rule and Chatman ran. As Doggin attempted to do the same, defendant grabbed the back of his coat, threw him against a wall, and said he 'wasn't going nowhere.' Doggin managed to break loose, however, and run up a nearby stairway.

Each of the three witnesses testified that, within a few seconds after defendant had pointed the gun at the deceased, they heard a gunshot and returned to the apartment where they found the deceased lying on the ground, wounded. Both Chatman and Rule further stated that they noticed no weapons other than defendant's at the scene.

Defendant denied shooting the deceased and testified that, while he attended a party in apartment 108 on the evening in question, he left at 11:00 or 11:30 P.M. in the company of his nephew, Melvin Battie. The two proceeded by a city bus to defendant's apartment, a number of blocks distant, where they went to bed and slept until the police came at approximately 5:00 A.M. Melvin Battie's testimony corroborated defendant's alibi.

I.

Defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof since its witnesses were not present during the actual shooting and their opportunity to observe detail was poor. Defendant maintains the prosecution offered the testimony of no one who saw the shooting or who could state that the defendant and not one of the two men accompanying him had shot the deceased.

We recognize at the outset that, in a criminal case, the State must present evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed, and that the accused was the party who committed or participated in the commission of that crime. (People v. Benson (1960), 19 Ill.2d 50, 58, 166 N.E.2d 80; PEOPLE V. HISTER (1974), 20 ILL.APP.3D 933, 937, 314 N.E.2D 562.)¹ Defendant's argument suggests, however, that only the testimony of one who had witnessed the shooting could support his conviction.

In proving its case, the State is not limited to producing only direct evidence, for it is well-established that a conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence, '* * * it being necessary only that the proof of circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion and producing a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the crime.' People v. Marino (1970), 44 Ill.2d 562, 579, 256 N.E.2d 770, 780; People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, 367, 197 N.E.2d 436.

In the instant case the stories related by Frank Chatman, Willie Rule and Willie Doggin all coincided in their essential aspects, I.e., that, as they stood with the deceased outside apartment 108, a man came from the apartment and pointed a weapon at the group; that each member of the group but for the deceased ran away; and that they heard a shot within the next few seconds and returned to the apartment to find the deceased, bleeding, lying on the ground. Each of these young men identified the defendant as the man who came from the apartment. Assuming the credibility of the witnesses, their versions of the incident describe a set of circumstances from which the trier of fact could easily conclude with reasonable certainty that defendant shot the deceased.

Although defendant attempts to favorably compare the facts of the instant case with those presented in People v. Hister, Supra, and People v. Newson (1971), 133 Ill.App.2d 511, 273 N.E.2d 478, the comparison fails. In Histler and Newson this court reversed the convictions of two codefendants who had been convicted of murder. In so doing the court noted the abundance of contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's witnesses and, for that reason, concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish each defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, on the other hand, the witnesses' testimony agreed in all its essential elements.

Defendant also questions the sufficiency of the evidence to convict on the ground that the witnesses could not properly observe the man wielding the gun and firing the critical shot. In support of this position defendant points to testimony that the area where the witnesses encountered the man was dark, and that Frank Chatman, one of the State's identifying witnesses should have been wearing prescription eyeglasses to correct his vision but was not wearing them on the evening in question.

The sufficiency of identification testimony is a question for the trier of fact and...