People v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 19 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 88086,88086
• Citation: 438 Mich. 602,475 N.W.2d 717
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Albert ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant. 438 Mich. 602, 475 N.W.2d 717

Page 717

475 N.W.2d 717

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Albert ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 88086.

438 Mich. 602, 475 N.W.2d 717

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 3, 1991.

Decided Sept. 19, 1991.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Joseph P. Kwiatkowski, Pros. Atty., and Catherine Michelle Castagne, Asst. Pros. Atty., Cheboygan, for the People.

Daniel Loznak, Cheboygan, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

MALLETT, Justice.

Introduction

We granted leave to determine whether it is lawful to charge one who is operating a snowmobile while intoxicated with a violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. 436 Mich. 880, 461 N.W.2d 367. The district court dismissed the OUIL charge, and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that a person who is intoxicated or has an impermissible blood-alcohol content while operating a snowmobile upon a highway or other place open to the general public may be prosecuted as an OUIL offender pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 257.625; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325. We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts

On February 25, 1988, two state police troopers observed a snowmobile traveling on southbound US 23. The troopers stopped the snowmobile because the operator was driving on the shoulder of the highway.

As the driver got off the snowmobile, the trooper smelled intoxicants and noticed that the driver had trouble gaining his balance. When the driver failed several sobriety tests, he was arrested and taken to the state police post in Cheboygan. His blood-alcohol level was 0.23 percent.

The defendant was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense (OUIL). M.C.L. Sec. 257.625(5); M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325(5). A bench trial was held June 3, 1988 in 89th District Court. On July 6, 1988, the judge dismissed the charges because there is a specific statute prohibiting the operation of a snowmobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, M.C.L. Sec. 257.1515; M.S.A. Sec. 9.3200(15). The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal and reversed. This Court granted leave to appeal on October 24, 1990. 436 Mich. 880.

I

Under M.C.L. Sec. 257.79; M.S.A. Sec. 9.1879, " '[v]ehicle' means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices exclusively moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and excepting a mobile home...."

The OUIL statute in question proscribes operating a vehicle on a highway, or other places open to the public while intoxicated. M.C.L. Sec. 257.625; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325. A snowmobile is a vehicle generally prohibited from operating on a highway, except, under limited circumstances. Montgomery v. Department of Natural Resources, 172 Mich.App. 718, 722, n. 1, 432 N.W.2d 414 (1988). ¹ Accordingly, we find that defendant's snowmobile is a vehicle to which the terms of the OUIL statute literally apply.

II

Having determined that the OUIL statute is facially applicable in the instant matter, we now turn to consider the question whether persons operating a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated, can be properly charged with a violation of the Vehicle Code.

Defendant was charged with OUIL pursuant to the terms of the Michigan Vehicle Code. The code provides:

"(1) A person, whether licensed or not, who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within the state...." M.C.L. Sec. 257.625(1); M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325(1).

However, defendant maintains that he should have been charged under a different portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code which proscribes operating a snowmobile upon a highway while intoxicated. The snowmobile act provides:

"A person shall not operate a snowmobile ... [w]hile under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance as defined in section 7104 of Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, as amended, being section 333.7104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws; or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance." M.C.L. Sec. 257.1515(b); M.S.A. Sec. 9.3200(15)(b).

Defendant further maintains that the snowmobile statute has a regulatory scheme separate and distinct from the general Motor Vehicle Code. As such, the more specific snowmobile act, rather than the general Motor Vehicle Code, proscribes operation of a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated.

The Court of Appeals held that a person who operates a snowmobile upon a highway while intoxicated may be prosecuted under the OUIL statute. ² The Court disagreed with defendant and stated that the OUIL statute could not be characterized as more general than the snowmobile act.

We agree with the Court of Appeals. We are unable to say that the OUIL statute is more general than the snowmobile act; nor is the snowmobile act separate and distinct from the general Motor Vehicle Code.

The OUIL provision of the Vehicle Code proscribes operation of any vehicle upon a highway while intoxicated. M.C.L. Sec. 257.625(5); M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325(5). In addition, because snowmobiles, albeit under limited circumstances, may be operated on highways, Montgomery, supra, ³ it can be said that the snowmobile act proscribes operating a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated.

The Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act overlap in that each shares a common application to snowmobiles when operated on highways. Therefore, the Motor Vehicle Code and the snowmobile act are statutes that can be read in "pari materia." ⁴

" 'Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose; and although an act may incidentally refer to the same subject as another act, it is not in pari materia if its scope and aim are distinct and unconnected. It is a well established rule that in construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times, and contain no reference to one another.' " ⁵

Further, we have held that when there are two applicable statutes, as in this case, "the prosecutor is the chief law enforcement officer ... and has the right to exercise broad discretion in determining under which of two applicable statutes a prosecution will be instituted." ⁶

Therefore, in the instant matter, when defendant drove his snowmobile on the highway while intoxicated, his conduct was within the ambit of both M.C.L. Sec. 257.625; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2325 and M.C.L. Sec. 257.1515(b); M.S.A. Sec. 9.3200(15)(b). Accordingly, the prosecutor has broad discretion to determine under which of the two applicable statutes to prosecute.

The question whether a person who is intoxicated while operating a snowmobile on a highway may be prosecuted as an OUIL offender is one of first impression under Michigan jurisprudence. Consequently, we may look to other jurisdictions for guidance.

In Melby v. Comm'r of Public Safety, 367 N.W.2d 527 (Minn, 1985), the defendant was apprehended by the police after operating his snowmobile with a blood-alcohol concentration level above 0.10 percent. ⁷ The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the defendant's driving privileges under the implied consent law. The Dakota County Court rescinded the revocation. ⁸ The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the county court's decision and reinstated the commissioner's revocation of the defendant's driving privileges. The court held that Minnesota's implied consent statute ⁹ applied to snowmobiles operated on a street or highway. Id. at 529.

In Pahl v. Comm'r of Public Safety, 398 N.W.2d 67 (Minn App, 1986), the respondent's driving privileges were revoked for an implied consent violation following a snowmobile accident on a lake. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the implied consent laws applied only to snowmobiles operated on streets and highways, and not to snowmobiles operated on lake surfaces. Id. at 72. ¹⁰

These Minnesota court decisions explicitly provide that implied consent laws are applicable to persons who operate snowmobiles upon a highway while under the influence of intoxicants. In the instant case, however, defendant maintains that the OUIL statute is inapplicable since the snowmobile act prohibits the conduct, and therefore is controlling. To support this contention, defendant looks to State v. Gobeli, 342 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa, 1983), and urges this Court to adopt its logic. ¹¹

We find Gobeli distinguishable from the instant matter. Unlike this case, Gobeli concerned whether the defendant could be convicted of driving with a suspended license for operating a snowmobile along the shoulder of a city street and crossing a highway while his driver's license was already suspended. The defendant in Gobeli was charged with operating a snowmobile without a license where the snowmobile statute did not require a driver's license for its operation. That is not this case. Here, defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle has no bearing on his ability to operate a snowmobile on a public highway while intoxicated.

In the instant matter, defendant makes much of the fact that operating a snowmobile requires no license from the Secretary of State. He asserts that since no license is required, it would be "anomalous" to apply the provisions of the Michigan Vehicle Code to this case. We find this argument unpersuasive. Under the Michigan Vehicle Code, one need not be licensed.

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