People v. Rogers

Decision Date20 May 1953
Docket NumberNo. 32695,32695
Citation114 N.E.2d 398,415 Ill. 343
PartiesPEOPLE v. ROGERS.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Charles E. Mason and Sidney H. Block, Waukegan, for plaintiff in error.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., of Springfield, and Robert C. Nelson, State's Atty., of Waukegan (Eugene T. Daly, Richard Bairstow, Waukegan and Harry L. Pate, Tuscola, and Fred G. Leach, Decatur, of counsel), for the People.

BRISTOW, Justice.

Truman O'Dell Rogers, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was indicated in the circuit court of Lake County, on April 2, 1952, the first and third counts of which indictment charged forcible rape, the second count charging statutory rape.On the trial of this cause on June 10, 1952, the jury by their verdict found the defendant not guilty on counts I and III and guilty on count II, and fixed his punishment at ten years in the penitentiary.A motion for a new trial and arrest of judgment were overruled.Responding to a writ of error sued out of this court by the defendant, the record is here for review.

Numerous issues of law and fact are presented, but in light of our ultimate disposition of the case, it will only be necessary to consider two issues of law.There will be no necessity for a detailed factual account.The complaining witness is a high school girl under the age of sixteen years.She became acquainted only slightly with the defendant while he was working in a small hamburger stand.She resided at 8842 West Grand Avenue, River Grove, Cook County, Illinois.She was a student at Lyden Community High School.On December 11, 1951, at about 6:30 P. M., the defendant persuaded her to ride with him in his automobile.She had planned and was enroute at the time to attend a social function at the high school, but the defendant failed to take her to the high school, as he had promised and persuaded her to go for a ride.The two drove aimlessly about in the northwest part of Cook County and the southwest part of Lake County for several hours.The alleged rape occurred near the Dome Tavern.The exact location of this tavern, near which the complaining witness testified that the assault occurred, was a matter of considerable uncertainty.Consequently, it was with some difficulty that the State was able to properly establish venue.This was accomplished, however, when a deputy sheriff, Frank Valenta, testified without equivocation that the Dome Tavern was situated in Lake County.

Early in the proceedings the defendant moved for his discharge under section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal Code.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 38, par. 748.)This protective measure was enacted to implement section 9 of article II of our constitution, S.H.A., which guarantees every person accused of crime a speedy and public trial.Pertinent provisions of section 18 read as follows: 'Any person committed for a criminal or supposed criminal offense, and not admitted to bail, and not tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense, within four months of the date of commitment, shall be set at liberty by the court, * * *.'This court has repeatedly held that it is mandatory and not discretionary that the State afford a defendant a trial within the statutory period, that such statute confers upon a defendant a substantial and absolute right under the constitutional guarantee.The facts surrounding the prolonged detention of Rogers in the instant case are not in dispute.The alleged offense occurred on December 11, 1951.He was arrested and committed to the Cook County jail on December 12, 1951.Thereafter he was indicted by the Cook County grand jury for statutory and forcible rape.This indictment was nolle prossed on February 15, 1952.On the same date, without being released, he was transferred to the sheriff of Lake County, where he remained in custody until the date of his trial, June 10, 1952.He was indicted by the March, 1952, Lake County grand jury which was recalled in April.

The problem presented therefore is as follows: The prosecuting authorities in Cook County proceeded upon the theory that the complaining witness was assaulted in Cook County.There was much confusion and uncertainty on that question.Further investigation, however, revealed that the alleged offense was committed in Lake County.After this determination, the defendant was transferred to Lake County and it was within four months of his commitment to jail in Waukegan that he received a trial.It is contended by the defendant that the four months' period should be computed from December 12, 1951, the date of his confinement in the jail in Cook County.

Similar in many respects to the case under consideration is that of People v. Stillwagon, 373 Ill. 211, 25 N.E.2d 795.There the defendant was involved in a holdup in Lake County on August 18, 1936.The proceeds of the robbery were transported into Cook County, whereupon defendant was arrested, and held in custody until November 18, 1936.Although indicted by the Cook County grand jury for larceny, the indictment was stricken with leave to reinstate on November 18, whereupon the defendant was surrendered to the sheriff of Lake County who placed him in the jail of Lake County where he remained until February 8, 1937.The defendant was tried on a charge of robbery.The criminal court of Cook County had jurisdiction to try defendant on the charge of larceny under the statute which provides that where property is stolen in one county of the State and carried into another, the jurisdiction shall be in any county into or through which the property may have passed, or where it may be found.The defendant in that case contended that the four months' period should have started from the first day of his confinement in the Cook County jail, but the court holding adversely said in 373 Ill. at page 214, 25 N.E.2d at page 796;'The only court competent to try defendant for robbery was the court having jurisdiction of the offense,-namely, the circuit court of Lake county.He had been neither indicted nor held in custody in Cook county on the charge of robbery.Since the one court having jurisdiction of the crime of robbery tried defendant within four months of the date of his commitment on this charge, it follows, necessarily, that his right to a speedy trial was not invaded and his motion for discharge properly denied.'In this casedefendant's indictment in Cook County contained the same...

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18 cases
  • People v. Lara
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 7, 2013
    ...434 N.E.2d 1127. The defendant argued that the courts in Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 72 N.E. 748 (1904), and People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953), reversed convictions that included age as an element because the only proof of age was the defendants' out-of-court statem......
  • People v. Tipton
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 22, 1980
    ...People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 94 N.E.2d 178, cert. denied (1951), 340 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 348, 95 L.Ed. 663; People v. Rogers (1953), 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398; People v. Lueder (1954), 3 Ill.2d 487, 121 N.E.2d 743; People v. O'Neil (1960), 18 Ill.2d 461, 464, 165 N.E.2d 319; Peo......
  • The People Of The State Of Ill. v. Roberson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 13, 2010
    ...addressed the rule established by the cases of Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 79, 72 N.E. 748, 750 (1904), and People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 348, 114 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1953), that the State had to produce corroborating evidence of a defendant's admission of age when age is a necessary el......
  • People v. Brand
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1953
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