People v. Rongetti
Decision Date | 19 February 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 19625.,19625. |
Citation | 338 Ill. 56,170 N.E. 14 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. RONGETTI. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Robert Gentzel, Judge.
Amante Rongetti was convicted of manslaughter, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago, and James B. Searcy, of Springfield (Henry T. Chace, Jr., and Edward E. Wilson, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
This writ of error is prosecuted to review a record of the judgment of the criminal court of Cook county whereby plaintiff in error, Amante Rongetti, stands convicted of the crime of manslaughter. A former trial resulted in a conviction for murder, which was reversed and the cause remanded at the October, 1928, term of this court, the opinion in which cause is reported as People v. Rongetti, 331 Ill. 581, 163 N. E. 373, to which opinion reference is made for a full statement of the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
It is contended by plaintiff in error that under the indictment in this case a verdict of guilty of manslaughter was not proper and that the only verdict which could be rightfully found was guilty of murder or not guilty. The law is well settled in this state that, where death results from a criminal operation of the character charged in the indictment herein, the person committing the act resulting in the death may be placed upon trial for manslaughter in the first instance (Yundt v. People, 65 Ill. 372), or he may be convicted of manslaughter under an indictment for murder (People v. Carrico, 310 Ill. 543, 142 N. E. 164;Hagenow v. People, 188 Ill. 545, 59 N. E. 242;Howard v. People, 185 Ill. 552, 57 N. E. 441;Earll v. People, 73 Ill. 329), even though the evidence shows him to have been guilty of murder (Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511). In the Earll Case it was said upon this question: ‘The trial is conducted, in all respects, as is required where a criminal is on trial for murder caused by killing in some other manner; and in the absence of a law prohibiting a verdict of manslaughter, we are aware of no reason why a verdict of that character may not be found by the jury as well in a case of this character as under any other indictment for murder.’
It is claimed by plaintiff in error that evidence of similar offenses is not competent in cases of this kind, and particularly that the court erred in the admission of evidence in this case with respect to other alleged offenses. Where the intent with which an alleged offense was committed is a material element of the charge, and such intent becomes an issue on the trial, proof of former similar offenses, within reasonable limits, is admissible as tending to throw light upon the intention of the accused in doing the act charged, and is competent in cases of this character. People v. Hagenow, 236 Ill. 514, 86 N. E. 370;People v. Schultz-Knighten, 277 Ill. 238, 115 N. E. 140;People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, 130 N. E. 779. Evidence of other similar offenses, to be competent as proof of guilty knowledge, must show that such alleged similar offenses were, in fact, criminal offenses. People v. Ernst, 306 Ill. 452, 138 N. E. 116;People v. Perlmutter, 306 Ill. 495, 138 N. E. 152. It must be kept in mind, however, that proof of similar offenses is not admissible to prove that the defendant committed the act charged, but is only to be considered by the jury in determining the intent with which the act charged was done, where the jury are satisfied by the other testimony that the defendant committed the act charged in the indictment. The admission of evidence of similar offenses in a case of this character is an exception to the general rule, and, unless it is kept within the limitations pointed out by the authorities, it might result in denying the prisoner that fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the law, and might break down those barriers erected by the law and designed for the protection of the innocent. People v. Hobbs, supra.
In the instant case, the witness Mrs. Reed, after having testified to the alleged operation upon deceased in this case, was asked this question: ‘And had you ever seen any operation prior to that time by Dr. Rongetti in that room similar to the one you have described?’ and answered, ‘Yes, sir.’ The attorney for plaintiff in error made a motion to strike out the answer on the ground that it came as a surprise to him, and that he did not have an opportunity to make an objection, and also that it called for a conclusion and an improper comparison, and called for the proof of matters which were immaterial and irrelevant, not tending to prove or disprove the issues in the case. The motion to strike the answer was denied, and over the objection the witness was allowed to testify that she had witnessed three or four operations of that sort while she was in attendance at the hospital, that she did not know the names of any of the persons upon whom those operations were performed, and that in each one of the cases she did not determine from the doctor the circumstances surrounding the case so that she could make up her mind whether it was criminal. In response to the question, ‘As far as you know then, or had called to your attention, each one of those operations was justified in some way?’ she replied: ‘It made no difference to me whether they were or not; that was not my business.’
On cross-examination this witness was asked if at the coroner's inquest this question was not put to her: and that in reply thereto she answered, ‘I am not saying anything more about it because I am not sure of anything else.’ In reply to this question she answered, ‘I probably did.’ Following that particular question and answer she said, ‘I am not sure now.’ Over the objection of plaintiff in error's counsel these questions and answers were stricken out. This action of the court was erroneous, in that these answers tended to impeach the testimony of the witness given upon the present trial. The court also erred in denying the motion of plaintiff in error to strike out the answer of the witness Reed that she had witnessed other similar operations, on the ground that the question called for a conclusion and for an improper comparison, and also erred in allowing her to testify to her conclusion and to make general comparisons. The witness should have been required to testify as to the details of each of the operations to which she referred, so that the court might be able to judge as to whether or not such operations were criminal, and tended to show a guilty intention on the part of the accused in doing the act with which he was charged by the indictment in this case.
A witness for the prosecution, who had taken the signature of the deceased to the statement mentioned in People v. Rongetti, supra, as having been made by her upon her admission to the hospital, was allowed to testify, over the objection of the defendant, that she had seen other blanks similar to the one in question in the hospital while she was there. She stated: ‘I suppose they were all the same; I didn't bother to read any of them.’ This witness, having no knowledge of the contents of the papers to which she was testifying, was incompetent to state her conclusion that they were similar to the paper in evidence as having been signed by the deceased.
A coroner's physician testified that he made an autopsy upon the body of the deceased, and that he found a triangular punctured wound, about the size of the body of a fountain pen, on the posterior fundus of the uterus which was practically healed, that death was caused by septic peritonitis due to an abortion, and that the abortion was not necessary to preserve the life of the deceased. Two other physicians, testifying as experts, in answer to a hypothetical question, gave it as their opinions that the hypothetical person came to her death as the result of an abortion, and that such abortion was not necessary to preserve her life. It is claimed by plaintiff in error that these opinions were incompetent, and that these witnesses were allowed by the court to invade the province of the jury and determine questions which the jury were impaneled to decide. The autopsy revealed only one puncture of the uterus, and Fitzgerald, a professional embalmer, testified that in embalming the body he made this puncture with his trocar. While plaintiff in error, testifying in his own behalf, gave his opinion that the cause of death was peritonitis following the discharge of a foetus, he denied that he punctured the uterus, that he performed any operation on the deceased, or that he did anything which could cause her to abort. He was corroborated by the witness Lindquist, the head nurse of the hospital, There was also evidence tending to show that the miscarriage might have resulted from violence which the evidence showed she had sustained prior to her admission to the hospital, and also to the effect that it could be the natural result of diseased conditions of the foetus, which plaintiff in error described as appearing to have been dead about two weeks prior to its expulsion, and there was also testimony to the effect that peritonitis might follow the discharge of a foetus, even though the uterus were not punctured or an abortion committed.
For some years there was an apparent inconsistency in the decisions of the courts of this state as to the range allowable in the examination of physicians and as to the conclusions which they might state while testifying as expert witnesses,...
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