People v. Rosecrants

• Decision Date: 20 February 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2120
• Citation: People v. Rosecrants, 278 N.W.2d 713, 88 Mich.App. 667 (Mich. App. 1979)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Lee ROSECRANTS, Defendant-Appellee. 88 Mich.App. 667, 278 N.W.2d 713
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 713

278 N.W.2d 713

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Robert Lee ROSECRANTS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 78-2120.

88 Mich.App. 667, 278 N.W.2d 713

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Feb. 20, 1979.

Released for Publication May 29, 1979.

[88 MICHAPP 667]Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Edward J. Grant,[88 MICHAPP 668] Pros.Atty., John L. Wildeboer, Asst. Pros.Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard D. Hitt, Jackson, for defendant-appellee.

Before BEASLEY, P. J., and WALSH and McDONALD, ^* JJ.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by jury of resisting a police officer contrary to M.C.L. § 750.479;M.S.A. § 28.747.He was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or spend 60 days in jail and to pay court costs of $582.

The prosecutor had also filed a supplemental information charging defendant with being a second felony offender under M.C.L. § 769.10;M.S.A. § 28.1082.The trial judge dismissed the supplemental information on the ground that, although defendant had one prior felony conviction, defendant's present offense was designated a misdemeanor under the applicable penal code provision, M.C.L. § 750.479;M.S.A. § 28.747 and, therefore, would not support application of the habitual offender statute.The prosecutor appeals this dismissal.

Defendant's offense, that of resisting a police officer, is termed a misdemeanor under the penal code, but is punishable by up to two years imprisonment.M.C.L. § 750.479;M.S.A. § 28.747.The prosecutor argues that, for purposes of charging defendant as a second felony offender under the code of criminal procedure, the court must use the definition of "felony" as set forth in the criminal code rather than on the basis of whether a crime is nominally termed a misdemeanor or felony in the penal code.The trial judge held that, absent an express repealer clause by the Legislature, the court must be governed by the prior enacted designation[88 MICHAPP 669] of defendant's offense as a misdemeanor under the penal code.

"Felony", as used in the code of criminal procedure (M.C.L. § 761.1(g);M.S.A. § 28.843(g)) of which the habitual offender provision in question is a part, reads as follows:

"As used in this act:

"(g)'Felony' means an offense for which the offender, upon conviction, may be punished by death or by imprisonment for more than 1 year or an offense expressly designated by law to be a felony."1974 P.A. 63, § 1.

Prior to the amendment, a "felony" under the code of criminal procedure was "construed to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction may be punished by death, or by imprisonment in state prison".1970 M.C.L. 761.1.Defendant's offense, although termed a misdemeanor, would also appear to have been a felony under the penal code before the statute's amendment as it is "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than (two) years, or by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars".1970 M.C.L. 750.479.

The Legislature has expressed two intents as to the designated grade of defendant's offense; under the penal code defendant's activity is termed a misdemeanor while under the later enacted code of criminal procedure it falls under the classification of a felony.The Legislature has the general power to designate both the grade and the punishment of criminal offenses.¹The habitual offender statute is an example of the Legislature's intent to use this power to augment the permissible punishment for second and subsequent felony offenders [88 MICHAPP 670] rather than to make a separate substantive crime out of being an habitual offender.²

The Legislature, in implementing its inherent power to define the grade of crimes, sets forth a uniform definition of the term "felony" for use when the code of criminal procedure applies, as in the instant case where the habitual offender statute is being applied.Although this uniform definition in M.C.L. § 761.1(g) does not expressly purport to affect or change the designated grade, as set forth under the prior enacted penal code, a legislature, enacting or amending a statute, must be presumed to have knowledge of existing statutes and laws.³

This case does not present a situation where the Legislature has enacted two inconsistent penalties.If so, defendant could argue that he was entitled to receive the lesser of the two penalties.⁴The statute governing prosecution of an habitual offender is clear in designating defendant's offense as a felony, and the punishment for defendant's activity falls within the felony definition under the criminal code.

Furthermore, we do not find the divergent designations of the grade of defendant's offense to be irreconcilable.For purposes of the penal code alone, the crime of resisting a police officer is treated as a misdemeanor.However, any application of...