People v. Rossi
| Decision Date | 22 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 42122,42122 |
| Citation | 284 N.E.2d 275,52 Ill.2d 13 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gino ROSSI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago (James B. Haddad, George L. Lincoln and James J. Doherty, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and George Pappas, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
The defendant, Gino Rossi, was indicted for the offenses of aggravated battery and rape. A jury in the circuit court of Cook County found him guilty of aggravated battery, but the jurors could not agree as to the offense of rape, and a mistrial was declared on that charge. The defendant was sentenced to serve not less than nine nor more than ten years in the penitentiary for the offense of aggravated battery. Thereafter, he entered a plea of guilty to the charge of rape and for that offense he was sentenced to serve not less than three nor more than six years in the penitentiary. These two sentences were to run concurrently with one another, but they were to be served consecutively to a sentence for burglary previously imposed by the circuit court of Du Page County.
The complaining witness testified that she had been taken from a railroad station in Downers Grove to a 'clubhouse' in the city of Chicago. There the defendant severely beat her and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. She was then forced to submit to acts of intercourse with several other young men. She was then taken from the clubhouse to a nearby apartment by the defendant and another man. On the way she attempted to run away but the defendant tackled her and led her to the apartment. At that apartment the defendant again had intercourse with her against her will. He slapped her again and she was again forced to submit to acts of intercourse with other men against her will. Finally, the defendant took her to another apartment where she was again forced to submit to intercourse with the defendant and others. The witness managed to escape from this apartment and run to a nearby gas station. From there she telephoned her boy friend. His friend answered and came in a cab and took her to her apartment. There she called her cousin, whose husband called the police.
Michael Hoduc, a witness for the State, testified that he was with the defendant when he took her to the clubhouse and that he later saw her crying in a room in the clubhouse. The gas station attendant testified as to her appearance when she arrived at the station and that she then told him that she had been raped.
The defense presented only one witness, Walter Kaleski, whose testimony related to the events on the night in question. He testified that on that night at the clubhouse the complaining witness had voluntarily had sexual intercourse with him and that she had asked him to hit her before they had intercourse.
The defendant did not testify in his own behalf. At the trial his attorney requested the trial judge to rule that he would prohibit the State from showing the defendant's prior burglary convictions if he testified. The judge refused because he did not believe that he had any discretionary authority to make such a ruling. In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, this court held otherwise, but our ruling was made prospective. As this trial was conducted before January 25, 1971, the date of the Montgomery opinion, we hold that the trial judge did not commit error in refusing to consider whether he should exclude proof of the defendant's prior convictions if the defendant testified.
The defendant asserts that his conviction for aggravated battery should be reversed because the trial court did not rule upon his motion for a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness. A trial court may order a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in a criminal case involving a sex violation upon a properly supported motion for such an examination. (People v. Glover (1971), 49 Ill.2d 78, 82, 273 N.E.2d 367.) But in this case, while defense counsel at one point suggested that if the court granted the State a continuance he would move for a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness, no such motion was actually made. It is clear that no one connected with the trial thought that a motion for a psychiatric examination had been presented to the court.
After judgment and sentence had been entered on the aggravated battery charge, and a mistrial had been declared on the rape charge, defense counsel did move for a psychiatric examination. But this was the first such motion, and while the trial judge did not rule on it, his failure to do so could not have been of any consequence in connection with the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery. While the defendant was still under indictment on the charge of rape, he subsequently pleaded guilty to that charge, so that no disposition of the motion was necessary.
The defendant also argues that the judgment should be reversed because of the trial court's failure to rule on certain of his attorney's objections to testimony. The failure of a trial court to rule on objections to evidence is not open to review at the instance of one who failed to request a ruling when the court did not make one, or in some other manner pointed out to the trial judge his failure to act. (People v. Weiss (1937), 367 Ill. 580, 12 N.E.2d 652.) In this case defense counsel moved for a mistrial shortly after his first series of objections because the court had not ruled on those objections. The issue of the court's failure to rule was thus preserved for review.
There is no doubt that the trial judge erroneously failed or refused to rule upon these objections. Each of the objections, however, was directed to the answers of the witnesses rather than to the...
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People v. Caballero
...the judge's attention to the fact that no ruling had been made. The question is therefore not preserved for review. People v. Rossi (1972), 52 Ill.2d 13, 17, 284 N.E.2d 275. The defendant next raises several issues regarding the accountability instruction which was given to the jury. The ju......
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People v. Lopez
...due to the apparent unequivocal nature of our holding in Glover and given that Glover was again cited with approval in People v. Rossi, 52 Ill.2d 13, 284 N.E.2d 275 (1972), and in a handful of appellate court cases (see, e.g., People v. Davis, 97 Ill.App.3d 299, 52 Ill.Dec. 780, 422 N.E.2d ......
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People v. Carroll
...the trial court did not commit error when it denied the motion to suppress evidence of defendant's prior rape conviction. People v. Rossi, 52 Ill.2d 13, 284 N.E.2d 275; compare People v. Jackson, 132 Ill.App.2d 464, 270 NE.2d Second, defendant contends that the trial court committed error w......
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People v. Visgar
...the proposition was stated unequivocally in Glover and has been restated without question by the supreme court in People v. Rossi (1972), 52 Ill.2d 13, 284 N.E.2d 275, and numerous times by the appellate court (see e.g., People v. Davis (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 299, 52 Ill.Dec. 780, 422 N.E.2d......