People v. Rostad

• Decision Date: 06 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82SA31,82SA31
• Citation: 669 P.2d 126
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory Scott ROSTAD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 126

669 P.2d 126

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory Scott ROSTAD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82SA31.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 6, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1983.

Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., Robert B. Harward, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard Tegtmeier, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee.

KIRSHBAUM, Justice.

The People appeal the trial court's judgment declaring Colorado's vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes unconstitutional. We reverse.

Defendant, Gregory Scott Rostad, was charged with violations of sections 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) and 18-3-205(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) (1982 Cum.Supp.). ¹ These statutes state as follows:

"If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of any drug or intoxicant and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, he commits vehicular homicide. This is a strict liability crime." Section 18-3-106(1)(b)(I).

....

"If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of any drug or intoxicant and this conduct is the proximate cause of a serious bodily injury to another, he commits vehicular assault. This is a strict liability crime." Section 18-3-205(1)(b)(I).

Prior to trial defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide charge on the grounds that section 18-3-106 is unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection guarantees of the federal and Colorado constitutions. The trial court concluded that the references in that statute to proximate cause and to strict liability create unascertainable and therefore impermissibly vague standards, in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law. ² The trial court also declared both statutes unconstitutional "because they deny the accused the opportunity to rebut the presumption raised by his or her blood alcohol content...." We disagree with these conclusions.

I.

The concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution and Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution requires that legislation must be drafted in language sufficiently precise and clear to provide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of what conduct has been determined to be unlawful. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); People v. Boyd, 642 P.2d 1 (Colo.1982); People v. Beruman, 638 P.2d 789 (Colo.1982). Statutes are presumed constitutional, however, and a party asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving such claim beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Caponey, 647 P.2d 668 (Colo.1982); Bollier v. People, 635 P.2d 543 (Colo.1981). When a statute is challenged on grounds of vagueness, courts will attempt to construe the legislation in a manner which will satisfy constitutional due process requirements, if reasonable and practicable construction of the statute will achieve such result. People v. Beruman supra; R & F Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, 199 Colo. 137, 606 P.2d 64 (1980).

It is true, as defendant argues, that the term "proximate cause" has been the subject of protracted debate and a source of great confusion in the law of torts. See, e.g., Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (1965). However, many other technical terms peculiar to the law, such as "hearsay evidence" and "res gestae," have also been the object of extensive judicial interpretation. Analytical difficulty cannot be deemed synonymous with constitutional vagueness.

Historically, courts have developed explanatory definitions of the term proximate cause in the context of civil litigation which, for all their difficulties, have in practice been found adequate to advise fact finders of the distinct type of causal connection required between conduct and injury to permit determination of liability in civil actions. See Mosko v. Walton, 144 Colo. 602, 358 P.2d 49 (1960); Stout v. Denver Park & Amusement Co., 87 Colo. 294, 287 P. 650 (1930). In the criminal law, the gist of the concept is the not-so-complex principle that persons normally should be deemed responsible for the natural and probable consequences of their acts. Hamrick v. People, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo.1981). The principle serves an evidentiary function, requiring proof by the prosecution of the causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the result. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, proof of proximate cause does not require a finding of some undefinable mental state of the actor; rather, proximate cause is determined by an objective standard, and the actor's particular state of mind is not relevant to this issue. See 1 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 195 (1957).

Several other jurisdictions have approved legislation which provides that an operator of a motor vehicle cannot be convicted of homicide related to the use of such vehicle in the absence of proof that the operator's conduct proximately caused the victim's death. See, e.g., State v. Benson, 5 Conn.Cir. 316, 251 A.2d 185 (1968); Coffelt v. State, 159 Ind.App. 485, 307 N.E.2d 497 (1974); State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1982); State v. Vaught, 56 Ohio St.2d 93, 382 N.E.2d 213 (1978); State v. Dionne, 442 A.2d 876 (R.I.1982). See also 3 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 985 (1957). Indeed, this court implicitly has recognized that the doctrine of proximate cause is not an inappropriate concept in the context of legislation defining criminal conduct. People v. Fite, 627 P.2d 761 (Colo.1981); Hamrick v. People, supra; People v. Palumbo, 192 Colo. 7, 555 P.2d 521 (1976); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). The decision by the General Assembly to require proof of proximate cause in criminal proceedings relating to the operation of a motor vehicle represents a rational choice among many public policy alternatives. We conclude that the phrase "proximate cause" is sufficiently intelligible to satisfy both federal and Colorado constitutional standards of due process of law.

II.

The concept of strict liability is one by-product of the trend toward the adoption by state and federal legislative bodies of comprehensive codes defining "criminal" conduct. The policies underlying this concept directly conflict with one of the most enduring common law principles of criminal jurisprudence--the concept that in general a person may not be subjected to severe penal sanctions unless the act in question is accompanied by a state of mind reflecting some degree of awareness that such conduct is prohibited. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that, subject to constitutional limits, legislation may punish conduct alone. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971); United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 84 S.Ct. 559, 11 L.Ed.2d 536 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). In this nation, such "strict liability" crimes began to appear in the middle of the nineteenth century, initially in the context of regulatory legislation designed to control the availability of particular products such as food ³ and liquor. ⁴ See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum.L.Rev. 55 (1933).

As the concept of criminal responsibility without "fault" has gained in popularity, the list of subject areas addressed by legislation designed to punish conduct alone has multiplied. See, e.g., Comment, Liability Without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis.L.Rev. 1201. Efforts to delineate constitutional limitations which might restrict the range of legislative choice in creating crimes of conduct alone require consideration of often conflicting definitions of fundamental principles of criminal law.

Before embarking upon such uncertain paths, however, courts must determine to what extent, if any, particular legislation has in fact established penal sanctions for conduct alone. We conclude that the two statutes here challenged require proof of an actor's state of mind as well as proof of prohibited conduct.

Both section 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) and section 18-3-205(1)(b)(I) are stated to be offenses of "strict liability." Contrary to defendant's basic assumption, however, a "strict liability" offense in Colorado is not characterized by the absence of any mental state. In section 18-1-502, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), the General Assembly has defined the principle of strict liability in relation to the general requirements for criminal liability which underlie the entire criminal code. The statute states in pertinent part as follows:

"The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense ... the offense is one of 'strict liability'."

A "voluntary act" is "an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it." Section 18-1-501(9), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Thus, the minimal requirement for a "strict liability" offense is proof that the proscribed conduct was performed voluntarily--i.e., that such act must be the product of conscious mental activity involving effort or determination. Although this mental state of voluntariness...