People v. Rothe
Decision Date | 24 October 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 22566.,22566. |
Citation | 358 Ill. 52,192 N.E. 777 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. ROTHE et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Daniel P. Trude, Judge.
Alex Rothe and Andrew Cannizzaro were convicted of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and they bring error.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.Charles A. Bellows, of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error.
Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, J. Albert Woll, and Henry E. Seyfarth all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
The plaintiffs in error, Alex Rothe and Andrew Cannizzaro (hereinafter called the defendants), were indicted in the criminal court of Cook county on a charge of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. They were convicted, sentenced to the penitentiary, and now prosecute this writ of error to review that judgment.
The evidence for the people tended to prove that the defendants attempted to sell whisky to a man by the name of Randall Prieve, who operated a cigar store at Fifty-ninth street and Wentworth avenue, in the city of Chicago, and that in pursuit of this purpose they decoyed him into an alley; that he had $300 in his pocket with which he intended to purchase whisky; and that they held him up at the point of a gun and took his money from him. The testimony of Prieve to this effect was corroborated by George Lindquist, who worked for him and who was present at the supposed robbery. The testimony for the defendants was to the effect that they were selling cigarettes for a man named Frank Rossi on a commission and that they got Prieve to a garage, where he turned over the $300 on a promise that the cigarettes would be delivered later. Apparently they were never turned over to the complaining witness, and this prosecution followed.
The evidence is close, highly conflicting, and entirely irreconcilable. Inasmuch as the case must be tried again we will decline further comment.
Several errors are argued, among them being (1) that the evidence is of an unsatisfactory character and preponderates in favor of the defendants; (2) that the trial court was guilty of prejudicial conduct of such a character as to deprive the defendants of a fair trial; (3) that incompetent testimony was admitted over the defendants' objections; (4) that the court erred in permitting the people to attempt to impeach the defendants upon an immaterial and irrelevant point; and (5) that the state's attorney trying the case was guilty of conduct prejudicial to the rights of the defendants.
We will not discuss the first point at any length because there is enough evidence to go to the jury in a properly conducted trial. The other points so far as necessary will be discussed in the order above named.
During the examination of the complaining witness, Prieve, he testified that at the police station the defendants admitted that they were guilty of robbery. An argument then ensued between counsel as to the use of the word ‘admitted,’ it being the conclusion of the witness, involving a determination of a point of law and clearly incompetent. Thereafter the court took up the examination of the witness and continued it for about four pages of the record. During this time the court was endeavoring to explain to the witness the difference between a conclusion and a fact, using various illustrations in his discourse with the witness. He ended it with the remark, ‘The jury may determine whether he admitted it or not.’ The witness had not testified as to any words of either defendant which could amount, technically, to an admission of guilt of robbery while armed with a gun. It was therefore error on the part of the court to convey the information to the jury that it might decide whether or not the defendants had admitted it. An admission of guilt of obtaining money by means of the confidence game or of larceny from the person might erroneously be construed by a juror or a lay witness as equivalent to an admission of guilt of the crime charged in this particular indictment. In People v. Rongetti, 331 Ill. 581, 163 N. E. 373,People v. Lurie, 276 Ill. 630, 115 N. E. 130, and in many other cases cited in those mentioned, we have pointed out the impropriety and dangers attendant upon the trial court attempting any extended examination of a witness. We have said that such examination is more properly the function of counsel, and explained the dangers of giving the appearance of bias in this particular method of procedure. What we have said in those cases need not be repeated here. The court erred in conducting this examination and his remark quoted above was prejudicial. prejudicial.
Later in the trial there occurred a lengthy colloquy between the trial judge and the attorney for the defendant concerning a point as to whether or not certain questions were leading and suggestive. This culminated in a statement by the trial judge, in the presence of the jury, that he intended to fine the attorney for contempt of court. In considering this point w...
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People v. Smith
...present to the jury what amounts to his own testimony. (People v. Beier (1963), 29 Ill.2d 511, 517, 194 N.E.2d 280; People v. Rothe (1934), 358 Ill. 52, 56, 192 N.E. 777.) Furthermore, it is improper for the prosecutor to do or say anything in argument the only effect of which will be to in......
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People v. Leger
...in violation of defendant's sixth amendment right (Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91; People v. Rothe (1934), 358 Ill. 52, 192 N.E. 777). We review defendant's due process claim under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)), first determining if error ......
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People v. Holman
...evidence presented and facts fairly inferable therefrom (People v. Beier (1963), 29 Ill.2d 511, 517, 194 N.E.2d 280; People v. Rothe (1934), 358 Ill. 52, 56, 192 N.E. 777), and it may not be assumed in the absence of evidence that a person convicted of murder will escape from prison or comm......
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People v. Boston
...neither material or relevant to the issue being tried." Lewerenz , 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299, 181 N.E.2d 99 (1962) (citing People v. Rothe , 358 Ill. 52, 57, 192 N.E. 777 (1934) ). "The language of relevancy and materiality utilized by our supreme court in Lewerenz and Rothe indicates that the Il......