People v. Rowe
| Docket Number | Docket No. CR-008011-23QN |
| Decision Date | 08 January 2024 |
| Citation | 2024 NY Slip Op 24013 |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York v. Rowe, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County (by Abigail Neuviller)
For Rowe: The Legal Aid Society (by Laura Eraso)
Pending before the court is a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion to dismiss. Amongst other arguments, the motion alleges that the People have never filed a facially sufficient information, a prerequisite to their readiness. Upon considering all the papers submitted, the court agrees. The motion is granted.
Where as here, an information's top count is a misdemeanor punishable by 364 days in jail, the People have ninety days from commencing their case to validly state ready for trial. To validly state ready for trial, the People must first file a facially sufficient information. (People v. Colon 59 N.Y.2d 921 [1983]; People v. Maslowski, 187 A.D.3d 1211 [2d Dep't 2020]; People v. Sosa, 71 Misc.3d 140 [A] [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2021]).
An information is facially sufficient only if it contains non-hearsay evidentiary factual allegations that, if true establish "every element" of the charged offense. (People v. Rodriguez, 214 A.D.3d 908, 908 [2d Dep't 2023]; see also C.P.L. §§ 100.40[1][c]; 100.15[3]). This standard is called a "prima facie" case. (People v. Alejandro 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138 [1987]). The prima-facie standard is "necessary because of the 'unique function that an information serves'" under our criminal procedure law. (People v. Parsons, 69 Misc.3d 11, 14 [App Term, 1st Dep't 2020] [quoting Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d at 137]). Unlike an indictment, which requires support "by legally sufficient evidence before a Grand Jury," an information is an accusatory instrument for which the People "need not, at any time prior to trial present actual evidence." (Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d at 137-38 [internal citations omitted]).
The law does not require that an information contain the most precise words that most clearly express the alleged narrative. So long as the factual allegations "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." (People v. Sanson, 59 Misc.3d 4, 6 [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
A person violates P.L. § 170.20 when, "with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument." Thus, "[a]n essential element of the offense of criminal possession of a forged instrument is knowledge by the defendant that the instrument is forged." (People v. Johnson, 65 N.Y.2d 556, 560 [1985] []). Some states presume, as a legal matter, that a person knows an instrument is forged simply from "the mere unexplained possession or negotiation" of the instrument. (Id.). But not in New York-our statutes reject that approach. (Id. at 561). Here, "[t]he mere negotiation or utterance of a forged instrument cannot, of itself, establish a presumption that defendant had knowledge of the forged nature of the instrument." (Id.).
People v. Rodriguez, a case from the Appellate Division, Second Department, provides a prototypical example of an information that does not establish the element of knowledge. (214 A.D.3d 908 [2d Dep't 2023]). There, an information alleged that a person "owned and operated" a vehicle, that a "forged Texas buy tag" was affixed to that vehicle, and that the officer "concluded the tag was forged" based on his "training in the detection and identification of forged instruments." (214 A.D.3d at 909). He also noted that upon checking "Z-finest," the records showed that the "forged instrument [was] not associated with any vehicle." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The Appellate Division, Second Department, found these allegations facially insufficient to establish that "the defendant had knowledge of the forged nature of the instrument." (Id. at 910 [internal quotation marks omitted]). It reiterated the New York rule that "'[t]he mere negotiation or utterance of a forged instrument cannot, of itself, establish a presumption that defendant had knowledge of the forged nature of the instrument.'" (Id. at 909 [quoting Johnson, 65 N.Y.2d at 561]).
Aside from mere negotiation or utterance, there must be some "conduct and events" from which knowledge could be inferred. (See People v. Mbaye, 51 Misc.3d 142 [A], at *1 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2016]). People v. Cerda provides an example. (61 Misc.3d 131[A], at *1 [App. Term, 1st Dep't 2018]). There, the First Department's Appellate Term held that a person's knowledge was properly inferred "from his conflicting explanations and the suspicious circumstances under which he came into possession of [a temporary license] plate." (Id.).
Here, the People ground their circumstantial prima-facie case of knowledge in Mr. Rowe's failure "to produce valid registration or insurance." Various unpublished decisions from this county have not adopted that reasoning. (See, e.g., People v. Devontai Carlie, CR-021557-19QN [Crim. Ct., Queens County Feb. 3, 2020] [Hartman, J.] [in which the driver was "unable to produce a valid driver's license or valid registration for the vehicle"]; People v. Vincent Udom, CR-023910-18QN [Crim. Ct., Queens County Aug. 13, 2019] [Watters, S.J.] [in which the driver was unable to "provide a valid registration or valid proof of insurance" for the vehicle]). However, the People rely on a Brooklyn trial-court case from 1998, People v. Stephens, 177 Misc.2d 819 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 1998]. There, the court held that it could infer an unlicensed driver knew his license plate was forged from his inability to produce proper registration and insurance. This court disagrees with Stephens and nonetheless finds its reasoning distinguishable from this case.
The rationale in Stephens goes like this. The Vehicle and Traffic Law requires "proof, on demand, of proper registration and insurance." (Stephens, 177 Misc.2d at 824). It also requires that drivers be duly licensed. (Id.). Thus, the "inability to present [these] documents," together with the "disregard of the law's requirement to be properly licensed," constitutes a circumstantial prima-facie case that a person knows their plate is forged. (Id.). In other words, if someone knowingly violates the law's requirements in some respects, then they are likely knowingly violating it in others, as well. (See id.).
This court does not find such generic reasoning strong enough to establish a prima-facie case. To be sure, the failure to produce other vehicle-related documents may be relevant to establishing that a person knows their license plate is forged. It is fair to say that these facts may make the other more likely. But the facial sufficiency of an information demands more than mere relevant allegations-it requires a prima-facie case. Of course, a prima-facie case does not require proof beyond a...
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