People v. Royer
| Decision Date | 01 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 68--57 |
| Citation | 101 Ill.App.2d 44,242 N.E.2d 288 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Wayne ROYER, Defendant-Appellant. M. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Emerson Baetz, Alton, for appellant.
Leon G. Scroggins, State's Atty., Lawrence T. Hartman, Asst. State's Atty., Edwardsville, for appellee.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of guilty following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois. Defendant was charged with a violation of Section 31--1 of the Criminal Code, Chapter 38, Section 31--1, Illinois Revised Statutes.
Defendant contends that his arrest was unauthorized in that the facts surrounding the occurrence did not comply with any of the requirements set out in Section 107--2 of the Criminal Code, Chapter 38, Section 107--2, Illinois Revised Statutes.
The instant arrest was made without a warrant and without reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant for the defendant's arrest had been issued in this State or in another jurisdiction.
We must now determine whether or not the People have proven that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is committing or had committed an offense.
Everett Kelly, a police officer, testified that at about two-thirty A.M. on April 25, 1967, he saw the defendant driving his automobile in Granite City, Illinois, accompanied by two other persons, one of whom he recognized as a Fred Tanner; he started his red light and followed the defendant's car stating, 'I wanted to find out why Fred Tanner was out with the adult.'; followed the defendant's car to Black's Bakery; it drove into a back yard, asked the defendant for his identification or driver's license; the defendant said, 'Why do you want my license, I'm on private property.'; he told the defendant he was under arrest; he put his hands on the defendant and that he, the defendant, tried to pull away so he used necessary force; he knew Fred Tanner and wanted to ask him about his age; he had reference to the curfew law; and at the station house he again told defendant he was under arrest for contributing to the delinquency of a child.
Glen Wright, another Granite City police officer, testified that he was called for assistance and came to Officer Kelly's assistance; three persons were at the scene and one person said something about he could not be arrested on private property; the defendant jerked himself free pulling violently; we put the handcuffs on the defendant; defendant was cursing about his wallet and I was kicked in the leg; he shoved defendant away and he fell down; upon arrival at the station he saw defendant's chin bleeding; and the defendant was taken to the hospital.
The defendant Royer, testifying in his own behalf, stated he drove his car into the back yard of his mother- in-law's home; a police car drove into the alley behind the yard; a policeman asked me to come down the alley; that I said I didn't have to; I did not have to give him my license; the officer tried to pull the license away from me while I was holding a tree; the policeman then went to his car; I was knocked down, hit and stomped on, kicked in the face; I presume I was taken to the station house but do not remember as I was unconscious; I was brought back to the station house from the hospital at which time I was told I was under arrest charged with something illegal; and I do not recall the officer having stated I was under arrest.
Helen Courtney, testifying on behalf of defendant, stated that she was his mother-in-law; the controversy was in her back yard; she heard the policeman holler at the defendant; and the officer was wrestling with the defendant, drug him to the police car and threw him in the back seat.
Marion Courtney, testifying on behalf of the defendant, said he saw Officer Kelly standing about thirty feet from the defendant shouting at the defendant to come to his car; the defendant approached the police officer but did not take the license out of his wallet; and another officer drove up and took he, Marion Courtney, into custody.
Officer Mank, who was present and one of the complainants did not testify on behalf of the prosecution.
In discussing Section 4 of Division 6 of the prior Criminal Code, Chapter 38, Section 657, a similar statute to Section 107--2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the Supreme Court, in People v. Doody, 343 Ill. 194, 175 N.E. 436, had this to say regarding the verbiage 'reasonable ground for believing', 'An officer making an arrest without a warrant and without the Authority conferred by statute to arrest without a warrant is a trespasser, * * * (Citing cases).' Emphasis supplied.
The court went on further to say,
To sustain the charge of resisting arrest under Section 31--1 of the Criminal Code the prosecution must show among other things that the defendant knowingly resisted the performance by one known...
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People v. Leach, Gen. No. 54922
... ... In a prosecution for violation of this section, where the charge is resisting, one of the issues is whether the defendant resisted an 'authorized' act of the peace officer. People v. Young, 100 Ill.App.2d 20, 23, 241 N.E.2d 587; and see People v. Royer, 101 Ill.App.2d 44, 242 N.E.2d 288. Since performance by a peace officer of an authorized act within his official authority is an element of the crime, failure of the complaint to set forth this element subjects it to dismissal under the provisions of section 114--1(a) (8) of the criminal code ... ...
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Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 86-1970
... ... This court has found committee comments to be accurate indications of legislative intent and appropriate aids in construing statutes. (People" v. Royer (1968), 101 Ill.App.2d 44, 242 N.E.2d 288.) The comments on the antitrust statute support plaintiffs' contention in the instant case: ... \xC2" ... ...
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People v. Foss
... ... Ortiz (1973), 16 Ill.App.3d 13, 305 N.E.2d 205, where the officers arrested the defendant in the middle of the afternoon in a playground; defendant resisted, was charged with disorderly conduct, and the jury found him not guilty. Likewise, in Ortiz, the case of People v. Royer (1968), 101 Ill.App.2d 44, 242 N.E.2d 288, was cited with approval. In Royer the court considered the arrest as unlawful because the officer had no reasonable ground to believe that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. The court therefore reversed the conviction of resisting ... ...
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People v. Carroll
... ... Committee Comments, S.H.A., ch. 38, sec. 7--7; Cf. People v. Fort, 91 Ill.App.2d 212, 234 N.E.2d 384 (1968). The invalidity of an arrest does not justify physical or forcible resistance under either para. 31--1 or 7--7. But Cf. People v. Royer, 101 Ill.App.2d 44, 242 N.E.2d 288 (1968) ... The related character of sections 31--1 and 7--7 was discussed in Landry v. Daley, Supra. The court noted that in spite of the fact that section 31--1 does not proscribe resisting or obstructing an unauthorized act of a police officer, ... ...