People v. Ruiz

• Decision Date: 26 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1-16-3145,1-16-3145
• Citation: 2020 IL App (1st) 163145,165 N.E.3d 36,444 Ill.Dec. 754
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Israel RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (1st) 163145

165 N.E.3d 36

444 Ill.Dec. 754

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Israel RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-16-3145

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Opinion filed May 26, 2020

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Israel Ruiz and Omar Johnson, whose separate appeal we also decide today (see People v. Johnson , 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– ), were convicted of violent murders they committed at the ages of 18 and 19, respectively. Both availed themselves of their constitutional right to a direct appeal and their statutory right to postconviction proceedings. Both come before us from the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Both petitions claim that a long line of cases expanding constitutional protections in juvenile sentencing proceedings—commonly referred to by the flagship case, Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) —apply to them as young adults. Their petitions, and their counsel on appeal, urge that we account for the emerging consensus that the development of the brain continues well beyond 18 years, the arbitrarily demarcated admittance to adulthood for individuals arrested and entering our criminal law system. We hold, in both cases, that Ruiz and Johnson have made prima facie showings in their pleadings that evolving understandings of the brain psychology of young adults require that Miller apply to them.

¶ 2 Here, we reverse the trial court's denial of Ruiz's request for leave to file his successive petition and remand for further postconviction proceedings so he can develop his claim. We do the same in Johnson , 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––.

¶ 3 At the outset, we make two critical points. Neither decision should be read to minimize or excuse the suffering wrought by the taking of another life. Indeed, Miller engages constitutional protections to young people who commit the most heinous type of offenses. There, the defendants committed similarly violent murders. One defendant participated in the attempted robbery of a video store, during which the clerk was shot point blank with a sawed-off shotgun. The other defendant robbed a neighbor of $300 and repeatedly hit the victim with a baseball bat saying, "I am God, I've come to take your life," before setting fire to the victim's trailer with the victim alive inside. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller , 567 U.S. at 465-68, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

¶ 4 Our decisions also should not be overread in terms of the relief we provide to Ruiz and Johnson. Both petitions were dismissed at an early stage in the successive postconviction process. We order the petitions proceed so they can attempt to show that Miller applies to them, as they have sufficiently pled in their petitions. If, and only if, they succeed, the trial court will consider a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 5 With those understandings, we proceed to our analysis.

¶ 6 BACKGROUND

¶ 7 People v. Ruiz , 2014 IL App (1st) 112993-U, ¶¶ 4-13, 2014 WL 992021, the appeal from the second-stage dismissal of Ruiz's initial postconviction petition, sets out the trial court proceedings in substantial detail. We reiterate facts that give context to Ruiz's claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 8 On November 7, 1998, Roy Billups was helping his friend, Brian Ellison, move into Ellison's new apartment. At about 8:30 p.m., as they assembled beds in a second-story room, Billups looked out the window on 90th Street. He saw two Hispanic men walking, one of them bald except for a ponytail "hanging in the back." The two men stood on the corner; Billups kept his attention there because the man with the ponytail had his hand by his waist "toward the belt buckle at the front of his pants." Billups identified this man as Ruiz and the man next to him as codefendant, Michael Mejia.

¶ 9 Billups watched as Ruiz and Mejia walked 30 to 40 feet west on 90th Street, coming to a stop in front of a garage on the south side of the street. Billups saw Ruiz, who was facing north, "pull[ ] out a gun and start[ ] shooting." Ruiz shot "8 or 9" times. Ruiz and Mejia turned and ran south down the alley. Later that night, Billups went to the police station and identified Ruiz and Mejia as the men involved in the shooting. Ellison gave substantially similar testimony, including identifying Ruiz as the shooter, both at the police station shortly after the offense and in court.

¶ 10 Jose Ortiz lived nearby. While watching a movie at about 8:30 p.m., he "heard several shots that sounded like they came from the rear of the house," leading him to look out the kitchen window. That window overlooked the alley behind his house. Ortiz saw a sports utility vehicle (SUV) reversing north in the alley and heard a second series of shots. Then, he saw two people walking south down the alley and noticed "something similar to a gun, a shiny, chrome gun that somebody was walking with on the side of their body." The person carrying the gun "had sort of a bald head."

¶ 11 After watching the SUV drive away, Ortiz went to join a crowd gathering on 90th Street. There, he saw a man (Nathaniel Walls) on the ground with a child in his arms. Ortiz found a police officer and reported what he saw. Sometime later, he went to the police station and viewed a lineup. He identified Ruiz as a person who "resembled the person that [Ortiz] saw in the alley." On cross-examination, Ortiz admitted to uncertainty regarding whether the person he saw was carrying a gun, and that he "didn't get a full picture of their face[s]." He identified Ruiz based on his "shirt, bald head, and his stature."

¶ 12 The State also presented witnesses from inside the SUV. See id. ¶¶ 6-7. These witnesses testified that after hearing gunshots, they saw Ruiz and Mejia run through the alley to the waiting SUV. Araceli Garcia testified that Mejia said G.D.s (member of the Gangster Disciples) shot at them. Vanessa Rios testified, through the transcripts from her grand jury testimony, that Ruiz threw a gun out the window after they drove off.

¶ 13 Officers on patrol saw the SUV move slowly in the alley, toward 91st Street, with its lights off. A woman inside the SUV leaned out of the window and said, "them black G.D.'s over there were just shooting at us." The officers pulled over the SUV. As they walked up, someone threw a gun out, and the SUV drove a bit further before a final stop. After hearing a radio transmission describing the shooting suspects, officers took Ruiz to the scene where he was identified. Later, at the police station, three witnesses, including Billups and Jose Ortiz, identified Ruiz in a lineup as the shooter.

¶ 14 Ruiz also gave a statement to Assistant State's Attorney Paul Quinn. Ruiz admitted to belonging to the Latin Counts street gang. Ruiz stated that his friend, Christopher Anderson, "had been shot on Halloween Night in the face by rival gang members." On November 7, 1998, after driving around in the SUV for a while, he and Mejia went for a walk. As they came toward Commercial Avenue, "the dividing line between the territory of the Latin Counts and Gangster Disciples," Ruiz saw three black teenagers across the street "dressed all in black." Ruiz did not see a gun, but they "started whistling and running around and * * * one of them started going down a gangway." Mejia gave Ruiz "a 45 handgun." Ruiz "raised it with his right hand and pointed it at the teenagers across the street and fired several shots at them." Then he ran.

¶ 15 Forensic technicians matched the gun officers had seen thrown from the SUV to the gun that shot Nathaniel Walls. Although some of the fingerprints on the gun were suitable for comparison, none matched Ruiz's. The State presented no other physical evidence linking Ruiz to the shooting.

¶ 16 A jury found Ruiz guilty of first degree murder of Walls and aggravated discharge of a firearm as to Walls's child.

¶ 17 At sentencing, two officers testified about offenses for which Ruiz had been arrested. The State argued that Ruiz shot Walls as an "act of retaliation." And that, despite his upbringing, Ruiz "chose to take a path that would lead to bloodshed and violence." The State argued that Ruiz had not taken advantage of the juvenile system that tried to rehabilitate him. In response, Ruiz's counsel argued that he had a supportive family and goals to complete his education. Counsel urged the court "not to put him away for the rest of his life and not let him die in prison."

¶ 18 The trial court mentioned Ruiz's age and discussed the evidence and the potential for rehabilitation. The court noted Ruiz's "loyal and supportive family." The court said Ruiz had "two personas, one for his family and the other when he was away from his family." It considered "all of his background" and whether he posed a threat to society. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Ruiz to 40 years for Walls's murder and a concurrent 15 years for the aggravated discharge of a firearm.

¶ 19 In 2010, after we ordered second stage postconviction proceedings, Ruiz filed the final version of his first postconviction petition, raising 22 claims. The trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage. Ruiz pressed three of those claims on appeal—that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective (i) for failing to challenge the trial court's denial of a second degree murder instruction, (ii) for failing to challenge the use of an "outdated" pattern jury instruction, and (iii) for failing to litigate a motion to suppress statements. Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 26. We affirmed the second-stage dismissal. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 20 In 2016, Ruiz filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He raised four claims, three relevant here: (i) his 40-year sentence constituted a de facto life sentence in violation of the Illinois Constitution and the eighth amendment to the United...