People v. Ruiz

Decision Date15 March 2019
Docket NumberNo. 1-15-2157,1-15-2157
Citation2019 IL App (1st) 152157,430 Ill.Dec. 370,126 N.E.3d 458
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abel RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Adrienne N. River, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Abel Ruiz, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 51 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court should not have allowed into evidence, as tacit admissions, portions of a police station video recording that included certain statements from a co-arrestee. Defendant also asserts that the mittimus should be corrected to reflect an additional day of presentence custody credit. We affirm and correct the mittimus.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The record reveals that defendant shot the victim, Brandon Cage, in the early morning hours of June 12, 2013, near the intersection of 60th Street and Homan Avenue in Chicago. Cage died from his injuries. At trial, defendant asserted that he shot Cage in self-defense. This appeal concerns the use of a police station video recording that captured defendant's conversation with a co-arrestee, Steve Cervantes.

¶ 4 On April 24, 2014, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements. In part, defendant stated that while at the police station after the incident, defendant and other arrestees communicated with each other through the walls and doors of different rooms.1 Defendant asserted that those private communications were captured by illegal eavesdropping via video recording. On August 5, 2014, defendant filed an amended motion to suppress statements. Defendant stated that his invocation of the fifth and sixth amendments was inadmissible under Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Defendant also asserted that any statements made by him more than six hours after his arrest should be suppressed.

¶ 5 After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motions. In its ruling, the court stated in part that the police did not act surreptitiously and are required to have video recorders on when witnesses or the accused are interrogated in homicide cases. Thus, there was no expectation of privacy in the rooms at the police station.

¶ 6 Prior to trial, defendant again tried to exclude recorded statements by filing a motion in limine to preclude the introduction at trial of a conversation between defendant and co-arrestee Cervantes that took place in adjacent rooms at the police station shortly after the incident. During the conversation, Cervantes stated, "You always take things too far," "You guys f*** take things too far, dude," "For real, dude, you guys take things too f*** far," "You went too far, dude," "Come on, man. No s*** man, you guys take things too f*** far," and "You guys take s*** too far, dude." Defendant stated that he had asserted self-defense and the reasonableness of his actions was directly at issue. According to defendant, Cervantes's commentary about defendant's past actions was irrelevant, inadmissible, and highly prejudicial. At a subsequent hearing, the State asserted that Cervantes's statements were responses to defendant's questions. The State also did not intend to argue "any prior bad acts for motive."

¶ 7 Ultimately, the court denied defendant's motion in limine . The court found that the conversation between defendant and Cervantes was not entitled to any constitutional protections because it was not prompted by the police or law enforcement. The court further stated that the statements were voluntary and defendant "could have said, ‘Listen, you're out of line by saying this,’ otherwise it could be considered * * * an admission by silence."

¶ 8 The matter proceeded to trial. The State's witnesses included two people who were with the victim, Cage, just before the shooting: Joseph Santiago and Amber Glassco. Santiago acknowledged that he had a prior conviction for misdemeanor theft and further testified as follows. In the early morning hours of June 12, 2013, he was at his house having beers with friends, including Glassco, who was his girlfriend. Santiago and Glassco wanted cocaine, so around 1 a.m., they drove Santiago's van to the home of their friend, Brandon Cage, because Cage knew someone who sold cocaine. After a brief discussion, Santiago, Glassco, and Cage went to 60th Street and Homan Avenue. Cage sat in the back passenger-side seat of the van, Glassco sat in the front passenger seat, and Santiago drove. When they arrived, Cage went to the spot "where he would normally get cocaine" while Santiago and Glassco stayed in the van with the windows down.

¶ 9 Santiago further testified that a dark Ford Taurus drove by and Santiago heard, "Ho, ho, ho. Hold up. Hold up." The Taurus stopped in front of Santiago's van, and defendant emerged from the back passenger seat. Defendant was wearing a jersey and shorts and had a shag hairstyle, which meant he had "long hair from the bottom down." Defendant pulled up his shirt, pulled out a gun, and approached Santiago's open window, where defendant put the gun to Santiago's head and asked, "What are you?" Santiago replied, "Nothing," meaning that he was not part of a gang. Defendant then told Santiago to "drop the forks," and Santiago complied. Defendant said, "You're lucky. I would have killed your a***." You're lucky your girlfriend's here," and walked back to the Taurus. At that point, Cage returned from getting the cocaine and said, "What's up?" to defendant, who was about 10 feet away from Cage. Defendant asked, "Well, what you is?", and Cage replied, "GD Folks." Defendant walked toward Cage, shot him three times, and ran to the back passenger seat of the Taurus, which left the area. Santiago told Glassco to call 911. After the police arrived and Santiago talked to the officers, Santiago was placed in the back seat of a police car where, in a show-up identification, he identified defendant as the person who shot Cage.

¶ 10 According to Santiago, before the shooting, Cage did not make any physical contact with defendant, take any swings or slaps or try to punch defendant, or make any threatening comments to defendant. Santiago also stated that Cage was not close enough to hit defendant if he tried. Further, Cage did not have any weapons on him.

¶ 11 Glassco testified as follows. A little after midnight on June 12, 2013, she and Santiago were at their apartment watching a basketball game and drinking. Around 1 a.m., Glassco and Santiago drove to Cage's house in their van. After they picked up Cage, they drove to 60th Street and Homan Avenue to buy drugs. When they arrived, Cage went to make the purchase, and Santiago and Glassco stayed in the van. A male voice came from the driver's side and asked Santiago "what he was." Santiago blocked Glassco's view of the man's face, but Glassco could see that the bottom part of his hair was long. The man told Santiago to "[d]rop the forks." After Santiago complied, the man told Santiago that he was lucky that Glassco was sitting next to him because the man would have shot Santiago otherwise. While the man walked to a dark Ford Taurus that was in front of the van, Cage returned and said, "What's up? Folks." The man asked what Cage was. After Cage replied, "I'm GD," the man shot at Cage. A gun was pointed at Cage, and Glassco heard three shots. Cage fell to the ground, and the man ran to the Taurus, which drove off. Glassco called 911. Glassco denied seeing Cage with a weapon or seeing Cage threaten or hit the man.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Glassco stated that she was unable to see the man's body, face, and hands when he approached the van. Glassco also admitted that she could not identify the shooter in a show-up identification at the scene or in a later lineup at the police station.

¶ 13 Also testifying for the State was Kristina Diosdado, who had been with defendant before the incident and stated as follows. On June 11, 2013, Diosdado spent the day at the beach with defendant, Andres Davila,2 and Cervantes, who was her boyfriend. Defendant's nickname was "Ghost," and Davila's nickname was "Tiny." The group eventually drove to defendant's house, where Cervantes became so intoxicated that he fell asleep. After a few hours, Diosdado left to drive Cervantes home. Diosdado drove a dark green Ford Taurus, Cervantes sat in the front passenger seat, and defendant, who came along, sat in the back passenger seat. Diosdado drove around with the windows down so Cervantes could get fresh air and perhaps wake up. When the Taurus approached 60th Street and Homan Avenue, defendant asked to stop and jumped out of the car. Using the rearview mirror, Diosdado observed defendant approach the driver's side of a van that was behind them. Since the Taurus's windows were down, Diosdado heard defendant check the occupants—a man and a woman—for gang affiliations. Defendant also spoke to a man that Diosdado stated was Cage, though she did not know the man's name at the time. Defendant said, "King love," and Cage said, "I'm Folks," whereupon Diosdado heard three or four shots. Diosdado did not see Cage punch or swing at defendant and did not hear anyone say, "I'll smoke you" or "take your things." Defendant returned to the Taurus and told Diosdado to "go." Defendant had a gun on his lap. Diosdado drove around and encountered Davila, who jumped into the car. A few blocks later, the police pulled over the Taurus.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Diosdado admitted that she did not see what occurred between defendant and Cage and did not know if Cage struck defendant.

¶ 15 The State also presented testimony from several law...

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3 cases
  • People v. Saulsberry
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 23 d4 Setembro d4 2021
    ...silence in the face of an accusation of criminal conduct may be introduced as a tacit or an implied admission of guilt. People v. Ruiz , 2019 IL App (1st) 152157, ¶ 13, 430 Ill.Dec. 370, 126 N.E.3d 458. While we note that the activities of the Latin Kings gang perhaps created a perverse inc......
  • People v. Allen
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 d4 Fevereiro d4 2022
    ...to, both the statement and the failure to deny it are admissible as evidence of defendant's acquiescence in its truth. People v. Ruiz , 2019 IL App (1st) 152157, ¶ 35, 430 Ill.Dec. 370, 126 N.E.3d 458. The necessary elements for admissibility under the tacit admission rule are "(1) that the......
  • People v. Marzette
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 16 d2 Maio d2 2023
    ...deny it are admissible at trial as evidence of the accused's acquiescence in its truth." People v. Ruiz, 2019 IL App (1st) 152157, ¶ 35, 126 N.E.3d 458. "The necessary elements for admissibility under the tacit admission rule are (1) that the statement incriminates the defendant such that t......

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