People v. Ryan

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: THOMAS R. JONES; Fuld
• Citation: People v. Ryan, 340 N.Y.S.2d 321, 72 Misc.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973)
• Decision Date: 23 January 1973
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Keith RYAN and Paul Smoot.

Page 321

340 N.Y.S.2d 321

72 Misc.2d 990

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Keith RYAN and Paul Smoot.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, Part 12.

Jan. 23, 1973.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty., Kings County, Leon Borstein, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel, for the People.

Allen Drezin, Brooklyn, for defendant Paul Smoot.

Henry Selkowe, New York City, for defendant Keith Ryan.

MEMORANDUM

THOMAS R. JONES, Justice.

The petitioners were arrested on March 23, 1972 and have been held prisoner in the Brooklyn House of Detention since that date because they lacked $15,000 in cash bail or sufficient credit to buy their freedom. Each prisoner moves to dismiss the felony indictment filed against him on the ground that his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, has been violated by the unwarranted nine month delay in prosecution. The defendants also assert that their long imprisonment without trial violates the letter and spirit of sections 30.30 and 210.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law of New York State.

In response to the motion, the District Attorney merely states that he has not moved this case for trial because of 'heavy calendar congestion'; that he has determined to prosecute 'older cases first', in order of indictment numbers; and that he is now 'ready for trial'. The prosecutor acknowledges that his announced 'readiness' for trial actually means that these defendants will not be tried for another six months, and then only after earlier indictments have been disposed of.

Such reasons do not satisfy the commandment of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ¹ which guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. Jailing an impoverished defendant for nine months without a trial violates the spirit, and purpose of section 30.10 et seq., of the Criminal Procedure Law of New York.

There has been presumptive prejudice to the rights of these defendants. The defendants' rights to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, have been violated and they have been denied their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (cf. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 and Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26). The indictment is dismissed and defendants discharged from custody.

The written records of the case disclose that the following proceedings were held in the Criminal Court and the Supreme Court since defendants' arrest on March 23, 1972:

Date      Disposition
                ----      -----------
                 3/23/72  Defendant arraigned; bail fixed $25,000
                 3/29/72  Hearing in Criminal Court
                 5/3/72   Indictment filed in Supreme Court
                 5/10/72  Bail $15,000 filed in Supreme Court; defendants
                          remanded to prison
                 5/25/72  Case "Off Calendar" in Part I-AA Supreme
                          Court
                 8/14/72  Case adjourned to August 28; defendants'
                          "counsel did not appear".
                 8/28/72  Case adjourned to September 19 at defendants'
                          request.
                 9/19/72  Defendants move for their release for failure to
                          prosecute.
                 9/21/72  Defendants not produced by clerk of court or
                          Department of Correction; adjourned to September
                          22,1972.
                 9/22/72  Defendants' attorney not present; adjourned to
                          October 13.
                10/13/72  Case marked "ready and passed" by D.A.
                10/24/72  Case marked "ready and passed" by D.A.;
                          adjourned to November 10, 1972 by prosecution.
                

The United States Supreme Court and the New York State Court of Appeals have repeatedly reminded all law enforcement agencies of this state that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is not an idle statement of our laws. This provision which mandates a speedy trial for citizens accused of crime was not rhetorical in the sense that the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' was used. The court in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1568, 26 L.Ed.2d 26, said:

'The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed . . .. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases.'

From time immemorial, even before Magna Carta, unreasonable delay in the determination of criminal actions has been denounced as official oppression, and as a disgrace to the administration of justice (People v. Solomon, 296 N.Y. 85, 87, 70 N.E.2d 404; People ex rel. Hammond v. Warden, 35 A.D.2d 520, 521). Long delays in the prosecution of criminal charges approaches tyranny. As the weeks and months pass, the legal rights of the accused as well as the prosecution's case are undermined. In the eyes of the people, unwarranted delay in prosecuting crime discredits the justice and fairness of the criminal law (People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 279, 281, 321 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571, 270 N.E.2d 300, 301; People v. Boyd, 37 A.D.2d 582, 583, 323 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31). Perhaps the most pernicious consequence of unexplained delay to speedily bring an accused defendant to trial is that criminals and would-be offenders become bolder in attacking their victims and society, especially when free on bail.

The social and legal imperatives for a speedy trial were succintly set forth in Matter of Watts v. Supreme Court, 36 A.D.2d 17, 19, 318 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (Third Dept., Feb. 1971)):

'The purposes of the guarantee are threefold: it protects the accused, if held in jail to await trial, against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion upon him; and it prevents him from being exposed to the hazard of a trial after so great a lapse of time, thereby helping, for example, to prevent against the loss of witnesses or the dulling of memory (People ex rel. LaBelle v. Harriman, 35 A.D.2d 13, 14, 312 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893).'

In People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 358, 130 N.E.2d 891, 895, the New York Court of Appeals announced that the prosecutor cannot slough off his own responsibility to promptly try a citizen whom he has imprisoned and charged with a crime. The court said:

'It is the state which initiates the action and it is the state which must see that the defendant is arraigned. It is likewise the state which has the duty of seeing that the defendant is speedily brought to trial.'

With such awesome power over men's lives and freedom at his disposal, a district attorney may not, must not be permitted to postpone his obligation to an accused and to society by simply saying that 'he has too much work to do.'! This court is shocked by the prosecutor's latest affirmation that his own '* * * 10-month delay in (bringing the accused to) trial cannot be considered a violation of due process or denial of Sixth Amendment protections'.

More than two years ago, i.e., in January, 1971, the New York Court of Appeals warned the Executive...