People v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 27 November 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31781,31781 |
| Citation | 103 N.E.2d 116,410 Ill. 486 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. RYAN. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Ralph S. McFarland, of Chicago (G. A. Buresh and C. Vernon Thompson, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen., and John S. Boyle, State's Atty., of Chicago (John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, Arthur F. Manning, William J. McGah, Jr., and Edmund H. Grant, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
A judgment of the criminal court of Cook County found the defendant, James Ryan, guilty of criminal contempt of court and sentenced him to the county jail until such time as he should comply with the order of the court by producing the books and records of Tam O'Shanter Country Club, a corporation, as specifically designated in a subpoena duces tecum. The case is here on writ of error.
The July, 1950, grand jury of the criminal court of Cook County was investigating violations of the State's antigambling laws. On July 19, 1950, the State's Attorney filed a verified petition in the criminal court seeking the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum requiring the Tam O'Shanter Country Club, an Illinois corporation, and Wilfred A. Weismann, its secretary, to produce certain books, records and documents alleged to be in their possession and necessary and material to be produced.
An order was entered that the desired subpoena duces tecum issue, directed to the club and its secretary, Weismann, commanding each of them to appear forthwith before the grand jury to give evidence in the cause and to produce all papers described. The subpoena duces tecum issued the same day contained the name of the defendant, James Ryan, in addition to the parties named in the petition and order. It commanded the corporation, Weismann and defendant to produce the following records before the grand jury:
'together with all copies, drafts, and vouchers relating to said documents, and all other documents, letters and paper writings whatsoever, that can or may afford any information or evidence in said matter.'
This subpoena duces tecum and a grand jury subpoena ad testificandum were served upon defendant on the following day. He appeared before the grand jury, answered some questions, refused to answer others on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate him, but failed to produce the materials demanded by the subpoena duces tecum. On August 3, 1950, the foreman of the grand jury filed a verified petition for a rule to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to obey the subpoena duces tecum. An order directing defendant to show cause was entered on the same day. Defendant filed a sworn answer, and, after a hearing, he was found guilty of contempt and committed by the court to the county jail to remain until such time as he complied with the order by producing the books and records of the Tam O'Shanter Country Club Specifically designated in the subpoena duces tecum.
To reverse the judgment, defendant first contends that he should be discharged because his sworn answer to the rule to show cause purged him of the alleged contempt. He argues that he was tried for a criminal contempt and therefore was entitled to be tried on his answer alone, that answer being conclusive as to the facts it alleges, and the remedy for false statements in the answer being by prosecution for perjury.
We do not pause to consider either our own decisions indicating that since the grand jury is a constituent part of the court, a contempt committed before it is a direct contempt to which the rule relied upon by defendant is inapplicable. People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N.E. 617; In re Estate of Kelly, 365 Ill. 174, 6 N.E.2d 113, or the decisions of other jurisdictions pointing out the anachronistic character of that rule. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993, and the authorities there cited. For analysis of defendant's answer shows that even if the rule relied upon was applied here, it would not assist him. It is not just any answer which purges the witness of contempt, but only an answer which sets forth facts which, as a matter of law, excuse him from responding to the command of the subpoena.
Setting apart, for the moment, those portions of the answer in which defendant justifies his position upon constitutional grounds, the answer first points out that the subpoena was served upon defendant by a policeman of the city of Chicago at a place outside the city limits. Just what legal consequences of benefit to defendant might be thought to follow from these allegations is not apparent. See, Chicago and Aurora Railroad Co. v. Dunning, 18 Ill. 494. In any event, defendant's assignment of error that no lawful service of the subpoena was had upon him has not been argued and is abandoned.
The answer next alleges that following defendant's failure to appear before the grand jury he was arrested under an irregular writ of attachment and forcibly brought before the grand jury. This arrest occurred prior to the issuance of the rule to show cause which instituted the contempt proceeding now before us. It is manifest that defendant was arrested for his failure to appear as a witness in response to the subpoena ad testificandum which had been served upon him. The circumstances of that arrest and its validity or invalidity have no bearing upon the propriety of the order committing defendant for failure to obey the subpoena duces tecum.
Defendant's answer next asserts that the petition for the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction to order the issuance of the subpoena. The defect relied upon is the alleged failure of the petition to state the nature of the matter pending before the grand jury or any other fact indicating that the documents sought were necessary or material to the investigation. To sustain his contention, defendant relies upon section 9 of the Evidence Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 51, par. 9) which provides: 'The several courts shall have power, in any action pending before them, upon motion, and good and sufficient cause shown, and reasonable notice thereof given, to require the parties, or either of them, to produce books or writings in their possession or power which contain evidence pertinent to the issue.' It is true that in Bentley v. People, 104 Ill.App. 353, the Appellate Court, placing reliance upon this statute, held that a subpoena duces tecum to produce books and records before a grand jury should not issue, in the absence of any showing that the books requisitioned contain anything pertinent to any matter undergoing investigation before the grand jury. But the unambiguous language of section 9 discloses that it is not applicable to proceedings before a grand jury. The statute specifically refers to pending actions, issues, reasonable notice and 'the parties, or either of them'. A proceeding before a grand jury is not a pending action but rather a secret investigation which may or may not result in the commencement of a criminal proceeding. The giving of notice of a motion for a subpoena duces tecum is unknown in grand jury investigations. There are no parties but only witnesses. There are no issues. Section 9 of the Evidence Act does not apply to grand jury investigations. There is no statutory requirement that the witness subpoenaed be informed as to the nature of the investigation, either in the petition for the subpoena or in the order directing its issuance. A witness commanded to produce documents before a grand jury may be entitled, however, to be informed as to the nature of the matter under investigation in order to safeguard his constitutional rights. In this case, the defendant was informed by the original petition, indeed by the subpoena itself, that the grand jury was investigating Tam O'Shanter Country Club in connection with gambling and slot machines. That information was adequate to meet any constitutional requirement. In addition, as hereinafter pointed out, the petition of the foreman of the grand jury for a rule to show cause spelled out in detail the relevance of each of the documents included in the subpoena.
Defendant's answer next complains that he was not named in either the petition seeking the subpoena or the order directing its issuance and that his name was improperly added to the subpoena issued by the clerk of the court. On this ground, he contends that he was not guilty of contumacious conduct in refusing to produce the designated books and records. Defendant was not named in the petition, and the order entered directed that a subpoena issue to the Tam O'Shanter Country Club and Weismann, its secretary. Defendant's name, written in longhand, appears in the subpoena served upon him. The names of the other witnesses were typed. Defendant's conclusion is that his name was added to the subpoena after it was issued by the clerk. But the facts remain that the documents requisitioned were the books and records of the corporation; that the petition filed sought a subpoena directed to the...
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October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, In re
...re February 1970 Cook County Grand Jury, 46 Ill.2d at 450, 263 N.E.2d 832.) That decision followed the reasoning in People v. Ryan (1951), 410 Ill. 486, 103 N.E.2d 116, cert. denied (1952), 343 U.S. 964, 72 S.Ct. 1057, 96 L.Ed. 1361, which held that "[a] proceeding before a grand jury is no......
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... ... Calihan, Jr., Chicago, for appellants ... William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Francis T. Crowe, Calvin C. Campbell, Morris Bromberg, Samuel E. Hirsch, and Gerald T. Rohrer, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for the People ... [50 Ill.2d 117] RYAN, Justice ... The State of Illinois instituted an action in the circuit court of Cook County the ultimate purpose of which is to collect from the defendants, Rocco Pintozzi and Frank Pintozzi (hereafter called principal defendants), a substantial amount of retailers' occupation ... ...
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State ex rel. Pollard v. Criminal Court of Marion County, Division One, 375S70
... ... people of this state in their ratification of the new Judicial Article adopted in 1970. An understanding of the origins of this provision is critical in ... See People v. Ryan (1951), 410 Ill. 486, 103 N.E.2d 116. We require that such information be contained in the subpoena. When a witness receives a subpoena duces tecum ... ...
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October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, In re, 86-306
...that the court intended to foreclose all possibility of appeal of this type of order. There, the court relied upon People v. Ryan (1951), 410 Ill. 486, 103 N.E.2d 116, cert. denied (1952), 343 U.S. 964, 72 S.Ct. 1057, 96 L.Ed. 1361, for the proposition that a grand jury proceeding is not a ......