People v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 29 December 1943
• Docket Number: No. 84.,84.
• Citation: 307 Mich. 610,12 N.W.2d 474
• Parties: PEOPLE v. RYAN et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

307 Mich. 610

12 N.W.2d 474

PEOPLE

v.RYAN et al.

No. 84.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 29, 1943.

John W. Roxborough, Elmer Ryan and others were charged with an offense, and defendant Elmer Ryan was convicted of conspiracy and alone appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Earl C. Pugsley, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

P. J. M. Hally, of Detroit (Thomas F. Chawke, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant Elmer Ryan.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Detroit, and Thomas A. Kenney and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

BOYLES, Chief Justice.

Appellant is one of a number of defendants convicted by jury in the circuit court for Wayne county on an information charging criminal conspiracy. He prosecutes separate appeal on the same record filed in People v. Roxborough et al., 12 N.W2d 466, and seeks reversal on five grounds stated as follows, which will be discussed seriatim:

1. ‘Was the conviction of this defendant and appellant had without any proof of knowledge upon his part of the conspiracy as pleaded, and is he entitled to his discharge?’

Ryan actively participated in furthering, aiding and abetting the conspiracy charged in the information. It is not necessary to conviction for conspiracy that one must have knowledge of its inception or of all its many ramifications. One who joins in a criminal conspiracy after it has been formed is as guilty as though he were an original conspirator. People v. Garska, 303 Mich. 313, 6 N.W.2d 527. Conspiracy may be established by circumstances and may be based on inferences. People v. Robinson, 306 Mich. 167, 10 N.W.2d 817.

2. ‘Was the testimony of the witness Boettcher sufficient upon which to predicate a conviction of this defendant and appellant?’

It was, when linked with the other testimony in the case. The weight to be given Boettcher's testimony was for the jury to decide. Credibility of witnesses is for the jury. The conspiracy was proven. There was testimony indicating that Boettcher, an inspector of the Detroit police department, was a go-between who handled the bribery money, that he had numerous conversations with appellant regarding its distribution, that Ryan was told that it was ‘policy’ money, that Ryan suggested who should be contacted, that Ryan himself received large sums of this money each month for some length of time, that Mayor Reading was paid money by Boettcher at Ryan's suggestion, that Ryan received monthly payments into a ‘down-town’ pool, that the collection of illegal money was discussed with Ryan in his office, and that Ryan complained he was not getting enough in to take care of everybody. It is reasonable to infer that Ryan participated in the conspiracy, aided and abetted in the common purpose and design. Ryan claims that the money paid to him was for some other purpose, personal to himself, to discharge other ‘obligations.’ The same might be said of any conspirator who knowingly receives bribery or graft money. It is no defense.

3. ‘Was the testimony relating to other offenses improperly employed by the prosecuting attorney, and was the argument of the prosecuting attorney prejudiciously erroneous?’

We have reviewed the references to Ryan made during the course of the trial and by the prosecutor in his argument. When appellant's counsel during the prosecutor's argument to the jury objected to the accuracy of certain statements of the prosecutor, the court said to the jury: ‘The Court: Members of the jury, you have heard the challenge that has just been made by Mr. Hally to the accuracy of the statements and arguments made by Mr. Kenney. I remind you again that you will be governed by your own recollection and understanding of the facts, and if they are at variance with the statement made by counsel, your own understanding should prevail in preference to the arguments made by counsel.’

There was some justification in the testimony, for the prosecutor's argument. The conclusions of fact were properly left to the jury for decision. Again, when appellant's counsel was about to present his argument to the jury on behalf of his client, the court said to the jury: ‘The Court: Members of the jury, Mr. Hally is about to present an argument in behalf of his client, Elmer Ryan. There has been submitted to me among the requests to charge...