People v. Saille

• Decision Date: 12 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. S016721,S016721
• Citation: 54 Cal.3d 1103,820 P.2d 588,2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 820 P.2d 588 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel De Jesus SAILLE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 364

2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364

54 Cal.3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel De Jesus SAILLE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S016721.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 12, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1992.

Richard L. Phillips, Mark E. Cutler and Bradley A. Bristow, Sacramento, Central Cal. Appellate Program, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Fiedler, Gardner & Derham, Cliff, Gardner, San Francisco, Elaine A. Alexander, San Diego, Martin Buchanan, San Francisco and Madeline McDowell, Sacramento, as amici curiae, on behalf of defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, San Francisco, and Daniel E. Lungren, Attys. Gen., Sacramento, Richard B. Iglehart, San Francisco, and George Williamson, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jane N. Kirkland, W. Scott Thorpe and Janet Neeley Kvarme, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

John J. Meehan, Dist. Atty., Thomas J. Orloff, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., Oakland, Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson Sacramento, as amici curiae, on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

PANELLI, Justice.

We granted review in this case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal regarding the impact of legislation abolishing diminished capacity on the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the issue is whether the law of this state still permits a reduction of what would otherwise be murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication and/or mental disorder. ¹ In this case, the Court of Appeal held that it does not. After careful examination of the relevant statutes and legislative history, we agree.

Following a retrial, defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Guadalupe Borba (Pen.Code, § 187) ² and the attempted murder of David Ballagh (§§ 664/187). His earlier conviction for these crimes was reversed on appeal for Wheeler error (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748).

Facts

On November 30, 1985, defendant started drinking at a friend's house shortly before noon. He had drunk 15 to 18 beers by about 6 o'clock that evening; he then went to a bar and drank about 3 or 4 more beers. He was noticeably drunk when he went to Eva's Cafe about 9 p.m. The bartender signalled the security guard, David Ballagh, to ask defendant to leave. Ballagh told defendant he could not drink there because he appeared intoxicated and asked defendant to leave; defendant did so. Defendant returned about an hour later, but was reminded by Ballagh that he could not come in. Defendant left but returned again around 11 p.m. and was rebuffed once again by Ballagh. As he left he said to Ballagh, "I'm going to get a gun and kill you."

Defendant went home around 1 a.m., got his rifle (a semiautomatic assault rifle), and returned to the bar. As he entered the bar, defendant said to Ballagh, "I told you I would be back." Ballagh tried to grab the rifle; it discharged and killed a patron. Defendant was eventually subdued outside the bar; both he and Ballagh were shot during the struggle.

A blood sample taken from defendant about two hours later showed a blood-alcohol level of .14 percent. Expert testimony at trial established that the level would have been about .19 percent at the time of the shooting.

Contentions

Defendant contends the court's instructions on the effect of voluntary intoxication were inadequate. The court gave CALJIC No. 4.21, stating that voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether defendant had the specific intent to kill. The court instructed on first and second degree murder and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It did not, however, relate voluntary intoxication to anything other than the specific intent to kill. Defendant contends the instructions were insufficient because they did not tell the jury that voluntary intoxication, like heat of passion upon adequate provocation, could negate express malice and reduce what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. Defendant also contends that the court should have instructed sua sponte that the jury could consider his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he had premeditated and deliberated the murder. Defendant further contends that the instructions on involuntary manslaughter improperly required a showing of unconsciousness.

In rejecting these contentions, the Court of Appeal based its reasoning on the legislative enactments that (1) abolished diminished capacity and (2) clarified the definition of malice aforethought. Accordingly, before we can properly assess the correctness of the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the legislation, we review the historical development of the doctrine of diminished capacity.

The first step in the development of the diminished capacity doctrine was taken in People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53. (See People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 323, 149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308.) In Wells the defendant, a life-term prisoner, was charged with assault on a prison guard, which was a capital offense if done with malice aforethought. The defendant contended he did not act with malice aforethought because he was reacting to an honest but unreasonable fear of bodily harm. He sought to introduce psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase to show that he was suffering from an abnormal physical and mental condition that caused him to fear for his personal safety in response to even slight external stimuli. We held that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered evidence. We explained: "Evidence which tends to show legal insanity ... is not admissible at the first stage of the trial because it is not pertinent to any issue then being litigated; but competent evidence, other than proof of sanity or insanity, which tends to show that a (then presumed) legally sane defendant either did or did not in fact possess the required specific intent or motive is admissible." (Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 351, 202 P.2d 53, emphasis added.)

The next step was taken in People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492. Gorshen, a longshoreman, reported to work intoxicated and was told by his foreman to go home. After Gorshen refused to leave, the two men fought briefly. The fight ended when the foreman knocked Gorshen to the ground. Gorshen announced that he was going to go home, get his gun, return, and kill the foreman. Gorshen went home, cleaned and loaded his gun, returned to the docks, and killed the foreman. In addition to introducing evidence of his intoxication, Gorshen introduced psychiatric testimony that he was suffering from a mental disease at the time of the killing. The psychiatrist described the effect of the disease and concluded that Gorshen did " 'not have the mental state which is required for malice aforethought or premeditation or anything which implies intention, deliberation or premeditation.' " (Id., at p. 723, 336 P.2d 492.) The trial court found Gorshen guilty of second degree murder. The court relied on the psychiatrist's testimony to reduce the murder to second degree, but found there was malice aforethought.

Citing People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, we upheld the admission of the psychiatric evidence, as it was evidence of defendant's mental infirmity short of insanity that tended to prove the defendant did not have the necessary specific mental state to commit first degree murder. (Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 726, 336 P.2d 492.) In so doing, we opened the door for diminished capacity, since we permitted expert evidence "not as a 'complete defense' negating capacity to commit any crime but as a 'partial defense' negating [a] specific mental state essential to a particular crime." (Id., at p. 727, 336 P.2d 492.) Moreover, we recognized that murder could be reduced to manslaughter, not only on the statutory basis of the reasonable person objective standard of provocation (§ 192), but also on the subjective standard of defendant's voluntary intoxication or mental impairment. (51 Cal.2d at pp. 731-733, 336 P.2d 492.)

In People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911 we applied the Gorshen- Wells principles to reverse the defendant's conviction of two counts of first degree murder. The defendant shot and killed his former girlfriend and her husband. He testified that he did not intend to kill the victims and that he did not remember anything from the time he was drinking at his sister's house until the time of his arrest shortly after the shooting. His blood-alcohol level was .21 percent three hours after the shooting. We held that the trial court erred in refusing to give voluntary manslaughter instructions based on the defendant's diminished capacity as a result of voluntary intoxication. We concluded that the statutory limitation of voluntary manslaughter to homicides caused by adequate provocation (§ 192) was not exclusive: "[S]ince the statute [§ 192] had been enacted before the concept of diminished capacity had been developed, its enumeration of nonmalicious criminal homicides did not include those in which the lack of malice results from diminished capacity." (Conley, supra, at p. 318, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911.) As a result, malice aforethought could be negated by showing that a person who intentionally killed was incapable of harboring malice aforethought because of a mental disease or defect or intoxication. (Ibid.) To explain how diminished capacity negated malice, we redefined and expanded the mental component of malice aforethought beyond that stated in section 188 ³ to include a requirement that the defendant was able to comprehend the duty society places on all persons to act within the law, i.e., that he had an "awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society." (Id., at p. 322, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911.) ...