People v. Samman

Decision Date22 March 1951
Docket NumberNo. 31802,31802
Citation97 N.E.2d 778,408 Ill. 549
PartiesPEOPLE v. SAMMAN.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lester A. Samman, pro se.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and Ben Robinson, State's Atty., of Galesburg (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

SIMPSON, Chief Justice.

On November 20, 1931, Lester A. Samman was sentenced by the circuit court of Knox County to serve a penitentiary term of one year to life for the crime of robbery while armed. On January 22, 1949, Samman filed his verified motion or petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, pursuant to section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 110, par. 196,) alleging insanity, which was unknown to the trial court at the time of his conviction and sentence. The State's Attorney filed a motion to dismiss, which was allowed by the trial court, and this writ of error followed.

In this petition Samman alleges that at the time of his conviction and sentence, he was legally incompetent and insane and had been so declared by the superior court of Los Angeles County, California, by a judgment entered in that court on a jury's verdict on January 18, 1931. He attaches to his petition, as exhibit B, a copy of the judgment order of the trial court of Los Angeles County, California. Pursuant to this judgment order, he was confined in Norwalk State Hospital, at Norwalk, California, from whence he made his escape on August 5, 1931. This judgment of the California court is still in full force and effect.

On November 3, 1931, Samman was indicted for robbery in Knox County, Illinois. Arraignment, the appointment of an attorney to defend, plea of guilty, judgment, and sentence to the penitentiary followed in due course. Neither a plea of insanity nor the prior judgment of the California court was called to the attention of the trial judge. Samman was received at the Illinois State Penitentiary on November 24, 1931, and there came under the supervision of the psychiatric ward of the penitentiary. He remained at Joliet until September 22, 1932, when he was transferred to the Illinois Asylum for Insane Criminals at Menard, Illinois. Attached to his petition, as exhibit C, is the order of transfer and supporting documents. Among the supporting documents is a report of the prison psychiatrist, which shows the following: 'Any previous conviction-One term insane asylum, Norwalk, California, one term State Penitentiary, San Quentin, California. Was the patient probably insane when convicted?-Yes.' Also, as a part of exhibit C, is an order dated November 15, 1943, signed by the Superintendent of Prisons, transferring Samman back to the Illinois State Penitentiary 'in accordance with the findings and recommendation of the Classification Board under the general direction of the State Criminologists.'

The truth of the facts set forth in the petition and photostatic copies of the various exhibits is verified by the affidavit of Samman. From these facts, he concludes that the judgment of the California court was still in full force and effect at the time of his conviction and would remain so until superseded by the judgment of a court of equal dignity and jurisdiction finding him same and restoring him to his civil rights; that because of his mental condition, these matters were not brought to the attention of the Knox County circuit court at the time of his plea of guilty and subsequent sentence; that had the circuit court known of the California judgment, the plea of guilty would not have been accepted nor the sentence imposed without an appropriate inquiry into his sanity, and, to cure this error, the petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis lies.

To this petition the State's Attorney filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petition did not state a cause of action; that it did not affirmatively show that Samman or his attorney interposed the defense of insanity; that the matters therein presented are res judicata by virtue of habeas corpus proceedings in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, wherein Samman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied and that judgment affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as reported in 167 F.2d 543, and that the petition fails to assert that at the time of the trial Samman was an insane person without lucid intervals, and contains no allegation that the act or offense was committed while insane. The motion of the State's Attorney was allowed by the trial court, and that order is here for review.

It is now well settled in this State that a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis is the filing of a new action, is civil in nature, and is applicable alike to civil as well as criminal proceedings. People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 829; Schroers v. People, 399 Ill. 428, 78 N.E.2d 219; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N.E.2d 23. The question first presented on this record for determination is whether, taking all of the facts well pleaded in the motion of the plaintiff in error and admitted by the State's Attorney's motion to be true, the plaintiff in error is entitled to any relief authorized by section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. That section provides: 'The writ of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all errors in fact, committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the common law, could have been corrected by said writ, may be corrected by the court in which the error was committed, upon motion in writing, made at any time within five years after the rendition of final judgment in the case, upon reasonable notice. When the person entitled to make such motion shall be an infant, non compos mentis or under duress, at the time of passing judgment, the time of such disability shall be excluded from the computation of said five years'.

As in any civil case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in error to allege and prove a right to the relief sought. In this State, the issue of fact may be made, and is usually made by affidavits in...

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17 cases
  • People v. Jayne
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 2, 1977
    ...motion to dismiss this ground of the petition. A petition under Section 72 is the filing of a new civil action. (People v. Samman (1951), 408 Ill. 549, 97 N.E.2d 778.) Hence, where the petition fails to state facts sufficient to warrant relief it is subject to a motion to dismiss. (Glenn v.......
  • Glenn v. People
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 25, 1956
    ...in nature, and it is necessary, as in any civil case, that the petitioner allege and prove a right to the relief sought. People v. Samman, 408 Ill. 549, 97 N.E.2d 778. Where the motion fails to state a cause of action or shows on its face that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief so......
  • Withers v. People
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 22, 1961
    ...properly raised by a petition under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. Costas v. People, 9 Ill.2d 534, 138 N.E.2d 468; People v. Samman, 408 Ill. 549, 97 N.E.2d 778; Schroers v. People, 399 Ill. 428, 78 N.E.2d 219. Section 72 requires that the petition be filed within two years after the......
  • Fefferman v. Marohn
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 22, 1951
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