People v. Sammons
| Decision Date | 24 September 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 35164,35164 |
| Citation | 17 Ill.2d 316,161 N.E.2d 322 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Arthur SAMMONS, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
F. Vern Lahart, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and Benjamin S. Adamowski, State's Attorney, Chicago , for the People.
Arthur Sammons was tried by jury in the criminal court of Cook County and convicted of the crime of murder. A writ of error has been issued by this court to review the judgment of conviction.
The principal assignment of error is that the defendant's confession which was introduced in evidence at the trial was induced by police brutality and a promise of leniency. It is also contended that the trial court erroneously permitted the State to introduce evidence that defendant had taken a lie-detector test.
At the trial a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine whether defendant's confession was involuntary. Defendant testified that following his arrest he was held at one police station for 3 or 4 hours but was not questioned on the murder charge. Thereafter, he was taken to another station where he was held for several hours without questioning and then taken back to the first station. The following morning he was questioned briefly on the murder charge and was not questioned again until that evening when he was given a lie-detector test. Defendant testified that he took two tests and one of the examiners told him that he had lied about everything. Defendant then told the examiner that he was involved in a larceny case but that he knew nothing about the murder charge. The examiner told him that he should tell he police whatever they wanted to know, sence it would help defendant in his larceny case. Defendant was then returned to the police station where he was again questioned on the murder charge. Two police officers, an assistant State's Attorney and a court reporter were present during the questioning. Defendant testified that one of the officers beat him and that as a result of this beating he confessed to the crime of murder and signed a written statement. Defendant's photograph which had been taken at the county jail after this interrogation and which purportedly shows evidence of bruises on defendant's face was introduced in evidence at the hearing.
Officer Younger testified that at the time of the questioning, his partner, officer Parker, assistant State's Attorney Armstrong, and a court reporter were present. According to Younger, Armstrong asked the questions which defendant answered, the statement being taken down in shorthand by the court reporter. Officer Younger denied striking defendant and testified that no one else struck the defendant at any time in his presence. Officer Parker testified that he was present at the time the lie-detector test was giver and the examiner tried to impress upon defendant that it would be wiser for him to tell the truth. According to Parker, the defendant denied all knowledge of the murder until this statement was made but, after being told this, defendant admitted being involved in the murder. The admission at the time of the lie-detector test was not reduced to writing, and immediately after the test defendant was taken back to the station where he was questioned by the assistant State's Attorney and the written confession was obtained. Parker testified that he was present at the time the written statement was obtained and that no one hit defendant at that time. The court reporter merely testified that the typewritten statement was an accurate transcript of his shorthand notes. In the written statement, defendant said that he had been told by the lie-detector man that he should 'tell the things just the way they were' and that he 'might get a break.' Assistant State's Attorney Armstrong did not testify at the hearing.
It has long been the rule in this State that where a defendant contends that a confession was involuntary, the burden is on the State to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the confession is voluntary. People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24; People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 81 N.E.2d 434. It is also well-established that a confession is involuntary and inadmissible if obtained by force and brutality or by promises...
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Com. v. Medeiros
...Prison, 339 F.Supp. 30 (D.N.J.1972), or allegations of physical abuse, bribes, or threats by police. Leonard, supra. People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322 (1959). Upon review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's admissions, we conclude that the evidenc......
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State v. Dillon
...while VanVlack supports the 'Massachusetts' rule.27 378 U.S. 368, at 378 n. 8, 391 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964).28 People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322, 324 (1959); cf. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 184-185 (1943).29 See Washington Rules of Superior Court, Criminal ......
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People v. Sims
...time the confession was made, and at the time of the alleged promise of leniency and the alleged police brutality.' People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 320, 161 N.E.2d 322, 324. Throughout these variations in phraseology there runs the dominant theme that, when the voluntary character of a co......
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State v. LaStair
...that may affect the results, are not present in this case. Here, the results of the test were not in evidence. See People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322 (1959); State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 515, 184 S.E.2d 282 (1971). Further, the jurors were specifically instructed that results a......