People v. Samuels
| Decision Date | 16 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 7X037258,7X045883.,s. 7X037258 |
| Citation | 997 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Table) |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Patricia SAMUELS, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County, by Bari L, Kamlet, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, for the People.
Jack G. Goldberg, Esq., for the Applicant.
By motion dated November 5, 2013, Applicant moves pursuant to CPL Sec. 440.10(1)(h) to vacate her convictions in each of the above stated matters, on the grounds that her pleas were involuntary because she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applicant asserts that her attorneys never advised her of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea in each matter.
The Court has reviewed the following; the Court files for each docket; Applicant's Motion; the minutes of the plea and sentence dated August 10, 1987 under Docket number 7X037258; the minutes of the plea and sentence dated September 11, 1987 under Docket number 7X045883, the People's Response dated April 25, 2014; the Applicant's Reply dated April 26, 2014; and the People's Sur–Reply dated May 29, 2014.
For the following reasons, the motion is decided as follows;
As to Docket number 7X037258, the motion is denied; and
As to Docket number 7X045883, Applicant's motion is hereby granted, based upon the inadequacy of the plea allocution in that matter. This docket is restored to the Criminal Court calendar for further proceedings.
On July 26, 1987, the Applicant was arrested and charged with one count of Criminal Sale of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree (PL Sec. 221.40), a Class A misdemeanor, and Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fifth Degree (PL Sec. 221.10), a Class B misdemeanor under Docket 7X037258. On August 10, 1987, the Court file reflects that Applicant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Criminal Possession of Marijuana, and received a sentence of a Conditional Discharge. The applicable surcharge was waived.
On September 9, 1987, Applicant was again arrested and charged with one count of Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fifth Degree under Docket 7X045883. On September 11, 1987, Applicant entered a plea of guilty to the sole charge in the docket, and was sentenced to pay a $50.00 fine. The fine was paid that same day.
To date, the Applicant has not appealed her conviction under either docket.
In her Affidavit, attached to her motion, regarding docket 7X037258, the Applicant asserts that when she See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 2, para 6.
Applicant further asserts that when she met with her attorney after her July 26, 1987 arrest, he See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 4, para 10.
The Applicant also asserts that her attorney “never provided any advice regarding the strengths and weaknesses of my case.” See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 4, para 11.
Regarding docket 7X037258, See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 4, para 12.
The Applicant asserts further that “both (of my assigned attorneys) assured me that my pleading to a B misdemeanor without incarceration would not affect (my) immigration status ... neither ... suggested that I consult with a specialist in immigration law nor did they attempt to craft a plea that would afford me a chance of challenging my removal.” See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 5, para 13–14.
Though Applicant states that she “recently learned that the 1987 convictions mandate deportation,” she does not indicate that any immigration proceeding has been commenced against her. See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 5, para 15. In fact, she notes that her convictions are “potentially deportable and excludable offenses.” See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 8, para 26 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, the Applicant asserts that “if I'd been advised correctly I would have rejected the plea offers and taken my chances at trial.” See, Affidavit of Applicant dated October 5, 2013, p. 9, para 26.
Before addressing the merits of Applicant's motion, this Court finds that a formal hearing in this matter is unnecessary. This Court has reviewed the record of the underlying proceedings, as well as the statements of the relevant parties. As such, this Court may be “presumed to be fully familiar with all aspects of the case.” ' See, People v. Demetsenare, 14 A.D.3d 792, 793, 787 N.Y.S.2d 515 (3d Dept., 2005) citing People v. Loomis, 256 A.D.2d 808, 808–809, 683 N.Y.S.2d 306 (3d Dept., 1998), lv. den. 93 N.Y.2d 854, 688 N.Y.S.2d 502, 710 N.E.2d 1101 (1999). Therefore, no formal hearing is necessary. See, also, People v. Robetoy, 48 A.D.3d 881, 883, 851 N.Y.S.2d 297 (3d Dept, 2008).
Pursuant to CPL Sec. 440.10(1)(h), the judgment against a defendant may be vacated if said judgment “was obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.” Clearly, the right to the effective assistance of counsel would constitute such a right. See, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 (1981).
Here, Applicant asserts that her convictions should be vacated in each docket based upon the violation of her right to effective counsel under “both federal and state constitutions.” See, Memorandum of Law in support of Applicant's motion, p. 2.
Under Strickland, to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, brought as a violation of the defendant's rights under the United States Constitution, the court must engage in a two-prong analysis. The court must determine whether 1) counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether a defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of counsel's deficiencies. 466 U.S. at 687, 692.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the failure of a criminal defense attorney to properly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and was a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court based their ruling on the first prong of the Strickland standard. 130 S Ct at 1483.
In Chaidez v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013), the Supreme Court limited its Padilla ruling to ineffective assistance of counsel claims for pleas taken after Padilla was handed down. The Supreme Court based its decision on its holding that the application of Strickland to ineffective assistance claims in this context required “a new rule.” 133 S Ct at 1108.
In so ruling, the high court reasoned that “before Padilla ... the (Supreme) Court had never held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly related to (a) client's criminal prosecution.” 133 S Ct at 1110.
Thus, Chaidez held that since Padilla announced a new rule, “defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla ... cannot benefit from its holding.” 133 S Ct at 1113.
In each docket before the Court, the Applicant was convicted in 1987. Therefore, Padilla, and the federal standard of collateral review of an ineffective assistance claim, is not applicable to this matter. See, People v. Lezama, 117 A.D.3d 752, 985 N.Y.S.2d 260, 2014 WL 1797717 (2d Dept, 2014) (); People v. Austin, 43 Misc.3d 135(A), 2014 WL 1661633 (App Term, 1st Dept, 2014).1
For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought as violations of the New York State Constitution, the Baldi standard applies; that is, “so long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met.”2 54 N.Y.2d at 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400.
Thus, each docket will be reviewed by applying the hBaldi standard.
Under Baldi, “a court must examine whether counsel's acts or omissions prejudice(d) the defense or defendant's right to a fair trial.' “ See, Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 713–714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584, citing People v. Hobot, 84 N.Y.2d 1021, 1024, 622 N.Y.S.2d 675, 646 N.E.2d 1102 (1995) (other citations omitted). Prejudice is a showing “that, but for counsel's errors, (the defendant) would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See, People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109, 115, 769 N.Y.S.2d 781, 802 N.E.2d 131 (2003), citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984). See, also, People v. Valestil...
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