People v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 19 July 1993
• Citation: People v. Sanchez, 600 N.Y.S.2d 946, 195 A.D.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Victor SANCHEZ, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 946

600 N.Y.S.2d 946

195 A.D.2d 578

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v.Victor SANCHEZ, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

July 19, 1993.

Philip L. Weinstein, New York City(Kevin Casey of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Steven J. Chananie, Robin A. Forshaw and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and BALLETTA, ROSENBLATT and MILLER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Dufficy, J.), rendered July 3, 1990, convicting him of grand larceny in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree (four counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree, criminal impersonation in the second degree (four counts) and fortune telling (five counts), upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 3 to 9 years imprisonment for grand larceny in the second degree, four indeterminate terms of 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 years imprisonment for grand larceny in the third degree, an indeterminate term of 1 to 3 years imprisonment for scheme to defraud in the first degree, four definite terms of one year imprisonment for criminal impersonation in the second degree, and five definite terms of 60 days imprisonment for fortune telling, with all terms of imprisonment to run consecutive to each other.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and the facts, (1) by reducing the defendant's conviction of grand larceny in the second degree under the second count of the indictment to grand larceny in the third degree, and vacating the sentence imposed thereon, (2) by reversing the defendant's convictions for grand larceny in the third degree under counts four and five of the indictment, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment, and (3) by providing that the term of imprisonment imposed for the scheme to defraud in the first degree and all definite terms of imprisonment run concurrently with the indeterminate terms of imprisonment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for resentencing for grand larceny in the third degree under the second count of the indictment.

The proof established that in the five-year period from 1984 to 1989, the defendant represented himself as a spiritual healer, generally charging people $20 per consultation.During the consultations, the defendant purported to transform himself into various spirits who would offer advice and claim that they could cure illnesses.The defendant, acting through these spirits, induced victims to lend him sums of money, sometimes in the thousands of dollars, which "loans"he never repaid.The defendant also told some of his victims that he was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, using this false claim as a further means of obtaining money from them.

The defendant claims that he was not given fair notice of the grand larceny charges against him to enable him to prepare an adequate defense to those charges (see, People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489, 534 N.Y.S.2d 647, 531 N.E.2d 279;People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 502 N.E.2d 577;People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 461 N.E.2d 1256;People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656).He contends, in essence, that proper notification of the charges should not be reduced to a matter of guess work, and that a conviction on any count for which the defendant has not been given proper notification of the nature of the charge should not be countenanced.Specifically, neither the indictment, the bill of particulars, the Grand Jury minutes supplied to the defendant(which were redacted as to the victims' names), the People's opening statement, nor much of the trial, served to fully inform the defendant as to which individual complainants corresponded to the various counts of larceny.We conclude that the People's failure to so notify the defendant was so derelict as to deprive him of the ability to defend against counts four, five, and six of the indictment.

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