People v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 07 May 2020
• Docket Number: E072647
• Citation: 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389,48 Cal.App.5th 914
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Victor Serrato SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

48 Cal.App.5th 914

262 Cal.Rptr.3d 389

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Victor Serrato SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

E072647

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed May 7, 2020

Patricia L. Brisbois, Tualatin, OR, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Lynne G. McGinnis and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MENETREZ, J.

Victor Serrato Sanchez was charged with first degree murder but pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95¹ to vacate that conviction. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Sanchez is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because he was not convicted of murder. Sanchez appeals from the trial court's order. We join the courts that have held that section 1170.95 does not apply to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. ( People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 997, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ( Flores ); People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 438, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 ( Turner ); People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 176 ( Cervantes ).) We also reject Sanchez's argument that section 1170.95 violates equal protection. We accordingly affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2010, Sanchez was charged with first degree murder with a gang enhancement allegation. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b).) In 2011, the information was orally amended to add a second count of voluntary manslaughter, also with a gang enhancement allegation. (§§ 192, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b).) Sanchez pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the truth of the gang enhancement and an out-on-bail enhancement. (§ 12022.1.) In the factual basis provided for the guilty plea, Sanchez admitted that he and fellow gang members confronted someone they thought to be a rival gang member, Sanchez and others yelled at the person, and others in Sanchez's group assaulted the person, causing him to smash his head on the pavement. Sanchez was sentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years.

In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Sanchez petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that section 1170.95 provides relief for first degree murder convictions only.

DISCUSSION

A. Overview of Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1170.95

Senate Bill 1437 narrowed the scope of liability for first and second degree murder by altering the doctrines that had allowed convictions for those offenses in the absence of malice. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 made that change by amending sections 188 and 189 to restrict the scope of first degree felony murder and to eliminate murder liability based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3.)

The Legislature also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. That provision creates a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to obtain the benefits of these changes retrospectively. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (a), the petitioner is entitled to receive "a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been previously been sentenced." ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(1) ; see also id. , subd. (c).)

B. Section 1170.95 and Voluntary Manslaughter

Sanchez argues that he qualifies for resentencing relief under section 1170.95 as a person who "accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which [he] could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." ( § 1170.95, subd. (a)(2).) To reach that conclusion, he reads section 1170.95 as containing an ambiguity that he argues must be interpreted in his favor in order to avoid rendering some of the statutory language surplusage, which he claims would create an absurd result.² He further contends that the legislative intent of Senate Bill 1437 supports interpreting section 1170.95 as applying to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Two of our sister courts have rejected these arguments and concluded that section 1170.95 does not apply to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter. ( Flores, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 997, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ; Turner, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 ; Cervantes, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 176.) We agree with those decisions.

We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. ( People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480.) In interpreting a statute, our " ‘fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.’ " ( People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191.) " ‘Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ " ( Ibid. ) " ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ " ( Id. at p. 1106, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191.)

Section 1170.95 allows "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition" to seek to have that "murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts" if certain conditions are met. ( § 1170.95, subd. (a).) Subdivision (d) of section 1170.95 reiterates that the available relief under the section is the vacating of a "murder conviction." ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(1)-(2).) No reference to voluntary manslaughter appears in section 1170.95. In sum, these "petitioning prerequisites and available relief all presuppose a murder conviction." ( Turner, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 439, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) By its plain language, section 1170.95 thus makes resentencing relief available only to qualifying persons convicted of murder.

Other courts have interpreted the plain language of section 1170.95 the same way. ( Flores, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ["Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder"]; Turner, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 435-436, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 ["Relying on the clear language of the statute, courts including ours have concluded that section 1170.95 is unambiguous and does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter"]; Cervantes, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 176 ["The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions"].)

Acknowledging that section 1170.95 does not reference manslaughter convictions, Sanchez nevertheless contends that section 1170.95 applies to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea because of an alleged ambiguity in one of the three qualifying conditions that must be met under subdivision (a) of section 1170.95. One of those conditions requires the petitioner to have been "convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. " ( § 1170.95, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) Sanchez claims that because the plea portion of this provision does not expressly mention that the guilty plea had to be to murder, section 1170.95 must apply to defendants like him who pled guilty to manslaughter to avoid being convicted of murder at trial. The argument is unpersuasive because it "ignores the introductory language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a) that limits petitions to persons ‘convicted of ... murder. ’ " ( Turner, supra , 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706.) Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 provides that "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" may petition to have that "murder conviction vacated" "when all of the following conditions apply." ( § 1170.95, subd. (a).) Consequently, only a person who has been "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" may petition for relief under section 1170.95 in the first place. ( § 1170.95, subd. (a).) If that prerequisite is not met, then fulfillment of the subparts in subdivision (a) is not relevant.

Relying on this same qualifying language in subdivision (a)(2) of section 1170.95, Sanchez maintains that if the Legislature intended to limit section 1170.95 to those convicted of murder "it would have been unnecessary for the Legislature to distinguish between those convicted by trial and those convicted by guilty plea." He contends that interpreting section 1170.95 as being limited to those convicted of murder therefore would render most of the language in that qualifying provision surplusage. We do not agree. Specifying that section 1170.95 applies to murder convictions both by trial and by guilty plea clarifies that it does not matter how the murder conviction was obtained for section 1170.95 to apply. Regardless of whether that clarification was necessary, " ‘the Legislature may choose to state all applicable legal principles in a statute rather than leave some to even a predictable judicial decision.’ " ( Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 929, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 223, 135 P.3d 637.)...